The NATO Monitor

NGOs Call for Policy Change in Afghanistan

2011-11-24T15:47:00.001Z

Thanks to NATOWatchfor the following report regarding the future of Afghanistan to the attentionof NATO Monitor.

Oxfam, together with more than 20 other NGO partners, has published a joint position paper on the future of Afghanistan, tenyears after the original Bonn conference, with a view to influencing the 5 December Conference that will examine longer termpolitical perspectives for that country.

Their prescription for what needs to be done to build a secure future for Afghanistan’speople shows the gap between traditional development work and the COIN strategycurrently being pursued by ISAF. One key finding of the report is that:

Over the past decade, too much aid has been spent to meet the short-termmilitary objectives of ISAF-contributing nations rather than to address theneeds of Afghan men, women and children.

This is surely correct, and Oxfam and the other NGOs are right to say intheir recommendations that:

Agree clear new commitments on how they will provide long-term developmentassistance in a coherent and sustainable way. Such assistance must address theneeds and rights of Afghans, and not be subordinated to security and militaryobjectives. It should not be overly focused on areas in the country affected byconflict at the expense of more peaceful, but still poor, areas.

This would be the best for the economic development of the entire country, butit is not to say that the conflict ridden areas of Afghanistan do not need aidas part of reducing support for insurgents. The problem, of course, is that theAfghan government has next to no legitimacy, being fiscally corrupt and havingbeen elected through a process that was so blatantly a perversion of the electoralprocess as to be meaningless.

Unfortunately there is an assumption running through the position paper thatthe central government of Afghanistan can be brought to a position where it canhave control of the entire country, something which has never really been thecase. It is doubtful in the extreme if it can be brought about now.

Neither ISAF nor international NGOs will be able to mould Afghanistan into a western vision of what it should be. The best that can be hoped for is that Afghans themselves, acting within their own cultural context, can act over time to repair the damage done by decades of outside intervention.

NATO BMD Underming NATO Security

2011-11-24T10:16:00.001Z

On the anniversary of the Lisbon Summit, President Medvedev of Russia made an announcement on missile defence cooperation between Russia and NATO. His statement showed frustration after a year of largely fruitless talks:

The problem is, it means that in the future, interceptor missiles and other missile defense elements may be deployed close to the Russian borders and in adjacent seas. At the Russia-NATO summit in Lisbon a year ago, I suggested creating a joint missile defense system in Europe. We suggested that if we have to develop missile defense, it is better to do it together. We suggested making this system sector-based, with each party responsible for the corresponding sector. Moreover, we said we were open to suggestions from our NATO partners and could make necessary adjustments to this layout, as long as its key elements remain intact. And the key element is that Europe does not need new dividing lines. It needs a common security perimeter, with Russia participating in it as an equal partner. I am still convinced that such an approach would offer unique opportunities for Russia and NATO to develop a real strategic partnership, because friction and confrontation in our relations can be replaced with the principles of equality, indivisible security, mutual trust and predictability. Unfortunately, the United States, and later other NATO members, failed to demonstrate serious readiness to take this way. They are not going to take account of our concerns regarding the architecture of the European missile defense system. At least they are not doing it today. They merely tell us that their plans are not aimed against Russia.

Leaving aside a discussion of the use of missile defence deployment, it has been clear for some time that there is no possibility of NATO entering into a genuinely cooperative programme with Russia, under which Russia would be a genuine partner. Any BMD system deployed to Europe would remain under NATO control.

This is not an issue that can be looked at in isolation, but is a wider part of relations between the US, NATO and Russia. Other issues intimately bound up in the BMD question include the presence of some 180 US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, and NATO's insistence that these can only be removed as part of an arms control deal involving the several thousand remaining Russian tactical nukes; the collapse of the Adapted Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty; NATO-Georgia relations; and the new NATO exercises designed to reassure the Baltic States that NATO is able to come to their defence in the unlikely event of war with Russia.

The problem here is Russia's weakness rather than its strength. Russia now places the same reliance on tactical nuclear forces to outweigh a conventional imblanace in NATO's favour as NATO used in the reverse circumstance during the Cold War. In addition,t he Adapted CFE Treaty is seen as no longer meeting current conditions, where NATO heavily outnumbers Russia in conventional forces. The treaty constrains Russia within its own borders, in particular in the Caucasus, where it has a long term insurgency.

President Medvedev announced several actions as a result of the failure of BMD talks. The timing must be seen as a reaction to the US announcement that it is ending compliance with its obligations under the CFE Treaty (see this AP article). These are worth quoting in full:

First, I have instructed the Defense Ministry to immediately activate an early warning radar in Kaliningrad. Second, as part of the Russian aerospace defense program, Russia will urgently strengthen its defensive capabilities for Strategic Nuclear Forces installations.
Third, strategic ballistic missiles coming into the arsenals of Russia's Strategic Missile Forces and the Navy will be fitted with advanced missile defense penetration systems and the latest effective warheads.
Fourth, I have ordered the Armed Forces to develop a set of measures that will enable Russia, if necessary, to destroy the data exchange and control centers of the missile defense system. These measures are adequate, effective and cost-efficient.
Fifth, if the aforementioned measures prove to be insufficient, the Russian Federation will deploy, along its western and southern borders, advanced offensive systems capable of destroying the European component of the missile defense system. This will include deploying Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad. Other measures aimed at neutralizing the European component of the US missile defense system will also be prepared and implemented if necessary.
Next, if problems persist, Russia reserves the right to refrain from taking further steps as regards disarmament and arms control. Furthermore, considering that strategic offensive and defensive weapons are closely interrelated, Russia may have sufficient grounds to withdraw from the New START Treaty. Such a possibility is envisaged in the very idea of this treaty.
The threat to move Iskander missiles to NATO's borders is most unfortunate and unhelpful. As is the threat to the New START treaty. In truth there is nothing here that will make Russia-NATO or Russia-US relations any better, or contribute to a solution to the BMD problem.

NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen has responded, but his statement is weak. He fails to acknowledge that NATO as a whole (especially the more easterly parts) is simply not ready to work with Russia as a parter, and that in the Baltic States, Poland and elsewhere the majority rather see Russia as a threat to be deterred and countered.

In Russia, it seems for political reasons, the "threat" of NATO BMD is overblown. There is little to no prospect that this 'missile shield' will work, anymore than the systems the US has deployed to date. It will certainly not work against Russian strategic systems, especially if these are now fitted with simple countermeasures as Medvedev has ordered.

Important questions remain unanswered. Is NATO really ready to restart the Cold War just to deploy and expensive and non-functional defence against a largely illusory missile threat?

Does it not make much more sense to actually sit down with Russia as a partner and negotiat a security relationship that makes sense for both? The CFE Treaty, if it is to survive, needs to change to reflect the fact that since 1999 NATO has expanded to Russia's borders and is now the overwhelmingly most powerful military force in the world. Russia needs to recognise that its actions in Georgia, not to mention Chechenya and Dagestan, inspire fear in its other neighbours and it must seek a peaceful resolution of border disputes.

The tiny US nuclear force in Europe should be withdrawn within US borders, and tactical nuclear forces should be part of talks between the US and Russia on all nuclear forces. After all, these tacnukes are at several months readiness, and the threat they were deployed to face no longer exists.

And BMD needs to be put back into its box and left there. It doesn't work, it probably can't ever work, and the damage it is already doing to European security through this quarrel with Russia needs to be undone immediately.

HISTORICAL NOTE:

On 9 March this year in a Press Conference before ministerial meetings, Secretary General Rasmussen said the following, which shows exacty NATO's position. NATO and Russia would operate two completely separate missile defence systems. This position still has not changed, and that is what has caused the Russian pullout. NATO is not offering a partnership, so why would Russia cooperate?

Q: ITAR-TASS News Agency, Denis Dubrovin. Secretary General, a step back from Libya to NATO-Russia cooperation in the area of missile defence. A few days ago our mutual friend James Appathurai has said in Washington that it's totally unacceptable for NATO, the proposals of the sectoral missile defence system in Europe, Russian proposals.
So does it mean that we now have more misunderstandings in this area? Or how could you comment on this statement? Thank you very much.
ANDERS FOGH RASMUSSEN: Yes, but that statement does not represent a new position. It is actually what has already been stated by NATO leaders already during our meeting in Lisbon. It's well-known that we have initiated a joint analysis as to how we can implement practical cooperation on missile defence. It is a joint analysis.
Russia presents her ideas. We present our ideas, and I am quite optimistic that at the end of the day we will find a solution because we are faced with a common security challenge.
I would like to stress that we want to pursue a cooperative approach, but we do believe that it is possible to really pursue a cooperative approach through a system which is based on a Russia missile defence system responsible for the protection of Russian territory and the Russian population and a NATO-based system responsible for the protection of NATO allies.
It shouldn't be a surprise that NATO can't, of course, outsource the protection of a NATO territory and NATO populations. So now let's focus on what unites us and I do believe that we can find mutually satisfactory solutions to a cooperative approach

Concerns on Small Arms and Light Weapons Proliferation from Libya

2011-11-04T13:13:00.000Z

NATO Secretary General Rasmussen Speaking to Press, Nov. 3 (NATO photo)

Questions were raised during Secretary General Rasmussen's Press Briefing on November 3
about the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW) from Libya into neighboroughing countries, and even into Gaza. The Secretary General admitted that there were concerns, but said that with the end of Unified Protector, this was nopw a responsibility for Libya, regional countries and individual NATO nations rather than for NATO collectively:

Oana Lungescu: Associated Press.
Q: Yes, Secretary General, just a question on the loose weapons in Libya. As you mentioned the Security Council has already considered this and I understand that there's quite a lot of concern throughout Europe and in other countries that some of these weapons have already been smuggled out through Libya to Sub-Saharan Africa and across Egypt, perhaps to Gaza. Can you comment on that, please? Thank you.
Anders Fogh Rasmussen: I have no exact information as regards to the possible smuggling of arms, but I would like to remind you that the arms embargo is still in place. We have terminated our Operation Unified Protector, including the enforcement of the arms embargo, but according to the United Nations Security Council Resolutions the arms embargo is still in place and it is a responsibility of individual nations now to enforce the arms embargo, including Libya's neighbours.
And the UN Security Council has also clearly stated that it is a responsibility of the new political authorities in Libya to make sure that all weapons are properly controlled, monitored, secured, and eventually maybe also destroyed, if necessary.

Further questioned as to whether the new Libyan government is able to prevent the flow of weapons from Libya, he added:

Oana Lungescu: Defence News at the back.
Q: Secretary General, could you just confirm I've got it right on Libya that on the arms embargo, preventing proliferation of weapons then is just down to the regional countries? And do you... my follow-up question to that is, can you be confident that they're capable of doing that work alone? And thirdly, are there any circumstances in which NATO would help ensure that weapons are not crossing borders?
Anders Fogh Rasmussen: The enforcement of the arms embargo is not just for Libya's neighbours or countries in the region. The arms embargo is still in place according to the United Nations mandate, so it is a responsibility of all members of the United Nations to enforce the arms embargo, including NATO Allies.
As I said, NATO as such has terminated Operation Unified Protector, so it's not for NATO any longer to enforce the arms embargo as an alliance, but it's still the responsibility of individual Allies to implement the United Nations resolution as far as the arms embargo is concerned.
And upon request from the new authorities in Libya, it is, of course, possible for individual nations, including NATO Allies, to assist the new authorities in Libya. That follows from international law that the legitimate government of a country can ask other countries to help enforce, for instance, an arms embargo or control arms smuggling or whatever.
So, I would not exclude the possibility that individual Allies and individual nations in general can help the new authorities in Libya on their request.

There are indeed very serious concerns that the outcome of Libya's short civil war will be bad for the region. Having gone far beyond a 'responsibility to protect' mandate in supporting the overthrow of the Gadhafi regime, NATO has some responsibility to assist in the prevention of weapons proliferation to conflict zones in Africa, or to terrorist organisations.

Two real concerns currently exist. It is estimated that thousands of anti-aircraft missiles (MANPADS) which had been stockpiled by Gadhafi are now flowing out of Libya to the south. Two such weapons were used against an Israeli aircraft in East Africa in 2002, although the plane in question was not shot down. With thousands available on the black market now, the risk dramatically increases to civilian aircraft in the region. There are reports of RPGs and SA-7 MANPADS reaching Gaza (see here for example).

Secondly, Tuareg tribes in northern Mali and Niger sent many fighters to support Gadhafi and these men are now returning to their own countries much better armed than before. A Tuareg rebellion in Mali was only ended in 2009, and there are reports (see this from AP for example) that Tuareg rebels are preparing a new insurrection against Bamako, fuelled by Libyan arms.

Whatever the rights and wrongs of NATO's engagement in Libya over the past six months, it is clear that the Alliance and its member states must act proactively to assist the new Libyan government in dealing with this threat to state and human security. The NTC is not in charge of Libya at present, the 300 plus militia groups that actually fought the civil war are. The situation in the country is fragile. If NATO is really interested in protecting civilians then stemming the flood of SALW both within and out of Libya is a must.

CER Blogs on NATO Future

2011-03-15T14:39:00.001Z

Tomas Valasek of the Centre for European Reform has an interesting piece on their blog, where he examines the consequences for Europe of likely declines in US defence expenditure in coming years.

His assessment that the withdrawal of some the remaining US forces from Europe will make little difference to the Alliance, notwithstanding Baltic nerves, is surely correct. His analysis is perhaps a little more worrying when he writes that:

In the future, Washington will look to its allies to assume main responsibility for dealing with the Balkans and other crises on Europe’s periphery. The defense department’s resistance to a no-fly zone in Libya could be a sign of things to come.

If NATO is becoming unable, as an Alliance, do act together to deal with instability at the Alliance's borders which could grow to pose risks for NATO members - at least in terms of refugees fleeing fighting or through economic dislocation across the Mediterranean - then some will begin to wonder what it is for. Contingency planning for defence of the Baltics is an interesting exercise, but hardly relevant to the real security tasks facing NATO. There are simply no foreseeable circumstances in which Russia would start a war with the Alliance.

Another point where Valasek is correct is on missile defence. If, as he says, Europeans are deeply reluctant to fund ballistic missile defences for the continent and:

It is not obvious why the US Congress would fund a programme to defend European mainland, which the Europeans themselves are unwilling to support.

Indeed. And most Europeans have been sceptical of BMD programs since the US first started suggesting them as a new area for Alliance cooperation back in the early 1990s.

In times of budgetary hardship Alliance members have to ask themselves what is NATO for, and what should the Alliance be doing? One thing that Valasek doesn't question is whether the money spent on retaining a few US nuclear weapons in Europe, and in training European air forces in their use, makes any financial or strategic sense at all. It's a question the deterrence review should be asking.

US Mission to NATO on Facebook

2011-03-10T14:07:00.001Z

The US Mission to NATO has a Facebook page. Today they posted a video by US Perm Rep to NATO, Ivo Daalder, previewing today's defence ministerial. Good use of social media, and worth a watch.

The Ambassador also gave a short preview of the meeting to the Atlantic Council of the US, which you can read here.

NATO Defence Expenditure and 'Soft' Power

2011-03-10T13:56:00.000Z

It's been a busy time and so posts on NATO Monitor have been a bit thin on the ground, but there'll be a few over the next few days. The Secretary General made an interesting speech at the Munich Security Conference back at the beginning of February, and a couple of its themes are worth picking up. Secretary General Rasmussen said:

First, I wish to emphasise how the crisis confronts Europe with some stark choices if it is to remain a credible security actor, and preserve the ability of the transatlantic community to act as one. And second, I want to highlight the importance of what I call Smart Defence – how NATO can help nations to build greater security with fewer resources but more coordination and coherence, so that together we can avoid the financial crisis from becoming a security crisis.

This is a message that NATO Secretary Generals have been trying to put across for a long time, but Mr Rasmussen put it more starkly than usual:

Europe simply cannot afford to get out of the security business. It has to re-vitalise its role as the United States’ prime security partner and adjust to the new global security environment.

The equation of military spending with security is both old-fashioned and in contradiction with European history since World War Two, as is the downplaying of soft power in the SecGen's speech. The development of the EU since the days of the coal and steel community has been a demonstration that political cooperation and economic integration do far more for peace and security than building up a vast military. France and Germany (or parts thereof) had been fighting since the break-up of Charlemagne's empire over a thousand years ago. Does anyone seriously imagine that a continued policy of a military stand-off between the two would have achieved better results in preventing war than the path they chose? Similarly, if European nations want to turn the Mediterranean into a base for a floating Maginot Line, would that help protect us from the economic pressures that drive migration from Africa and destabilise that continent? Of course not. Military force has a place, as a last resort, as NATO is debating today over the Libya 'no-fly zone'.

On Secretary General Rasmussen's second major point, that Europe spends unwisely on defence while it continues to spend in a fractured manner NATO Monitor are in agreement. When he says:

Of course, not all nations can afford or need all capabilities. After all, NATO's foundation is collective defence – an attack on one Ally is considered an attack against all. In times of need, we help each other. The reassurance of solidarity should encourage some nations to focus on certain capabilities – either alone or working together with a few other Allies. And NATO can help identify those options.
What we also need is overall coherence. Again, NATO can provide the bigger picture of what Allies need and want. This is the time to make better use of NATO as an adviser and an honest broker -- to ensure a degree of coherence in any cuts which nations may consider, and to minimise their impact on the overall effectiveness of the Alliance.
So, ladies and gentlemen, this is how we get greater security for the money we invest in defence: pool and share capabilities, prioritise and coordinate better.

the Secretary general is absolutely correct. On NATO figures, NATO Europe last year spent some US$275 billion on defence. That's around a third of US defence expenditure, and the result is certainly not one-third of US capability. Europe needs to coordinate more, both on spending and in joint military capabilities and units. This should be a common activity of NATO and the EU. Everyone would benefit.

But this should not be done at the expense of the kind of economics-based soft power at which the EU has historically excelled, and which, in the long run, creates much greater security for everyone than all the world's militaries combined.

Building NATO Security Through Arms Control and Disarmament

2011-02-02T17:03:00.000Z

A number of media including the Daily Telegraph and Global Security Newswire have reported on a Wikileaks cable describing a briefing to NATO ministers in 2009 on nuclear issues. The headlines have concerned Al-Qaeda attempts to acquire nuclear materials for a dirty bomb, but the briefing was said to concern that, Russian tactical nuclear forces and Iranian nuclear and missile programmes.

It was particularly striking that there was reference to non-proliferation being the first line of defence against these threats, something with which NATO Monitor concurs.

Nuclear terrorism is a threat which, while remote, would have catastrophic consequences if a full nuclear bomb were used, and devastating ones if even an explosive radiological dispersal device were used in a major western city. It is also a threat which is absolutely impervious to deterrence. The only solution is a serious effort by the international community to secure all radioactive sources, a massive undertaking and one which is not sufficiently high up the international agenda - despite President Obama's best endeavours. And end to the civilian use of plutonium and highly enriched uranium are also essential, or the prospective spread of civilian nuclear reactors will bring enormous dangers in its wake. The Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty, which has languished in the Conference on Disarmament for year, must be pursued whether in that body or elsewhere if progress is impossible.

The discussion of Russian tactical nuclear forces could also have benefited from this perspective. While NATO is able to deter any putative Russian attack, it is likely that a negotiation which reduced and redeployed Russian and US tactical nuclear weapons, while also re-establishing the currently suspended Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty - adapting it beyond the 1999 to focus on the realities of post-enlargement NATO - would do much to enhance the security of all NATO members, especially those in the Baltic States who most fear Russia. Transparency and stability can be achieved through arms control, and can save enormous amounts of money. CFE fulfilled this function in the 1990s, when stable relations with Russia were far from a given for NATO. They could do so again.

Iran is likely to prove the most intractable of these problems, and success on the non-proliferation front is only likely if placed in the context of a Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone in the Middle East. It is far from clear the President Ahmedinejad wants to negotiate, or that he or any other part of the Iranian ruling structure is strong enough to do so. It is also clear that they will be more encouraged to do so if they feel there is something in it for them in the shape of enhanced regional security, and less threat of their overthrow. This would, of course, require action from actors including Israel, NATO and Syria and would be exceptionally hard to achieve. But even the effort can bring some worthwhile change to an incredibly tense situation.

In short, NATO needs to get back into the business of arms control and disarmament. It used to be serious about such things, and should be now. It would find its secuirty much enhanced if it succeeded, and if it failed, well, it would still be the largest military bloc on the planet.

NATO, the EU and Turkey

2011-01-02T09:36:00.000Z

An interesting piece in Sunday's Zaman on the NATO, EU Turkey triangle. The vast preponderance of EU and NATO members have an interest in leaning hard on Greece to allow deeper cooperation between Turkey and the EU, and on Turkey to behave reasonably about Cyprus. This article is a good summary of the Turkish side of the security debate.

Turkey has a vital role to play within the alliance as it engages more and more with the Muslim world, as the perspectives it brings are unique within the Alliance. It's time to put much more effort into this 'entrianglement', as Zaman puts it, to allow Turkey to play a fuller role. Bending towards the Turkish point of view could pay dividends in relations with Iran, for example, that will do much to enhance regional security, and that of the Alliance as a whole. That would be a much better use of effort than pandering to the Baltic States in preparing for a Russian attack that simply isn't coming.

Wikileaks Reveals Secret US Government Contact With North Pole?

2010-12-24T17:53:00.000Z

NATO Monitor has a policy of not using Wikileaks cables and this unsourced cable has not been verified. However, its importance for NATO security in the High North cannot be doubted, so, at this time of year we believe it is appropriate to publish it in full so that our readers can make up their own minds. NATO Monitor cannot verify the source or author of the cable, but believe that the author is a genius!

======

SUCRET NOFROST

To: SECSTATE WASHDC

From: AMEMBASSY NORTHPOLE

INFO: AMEMBASSY FRANZ JOSEF LAND

AMEMBASSY NUUK

AMEMBASSY LONGYEARBYEN

AMCONSUL NORD

JTF WRANGEL ISLAND

NORTH POLE COLLECTIVE

TAGS: OVIP, ECON, PREL, PSANTA, XMAS, HOHOHO

SUBJECT: Upcoming Arctic Negotiations - Background for USDEL

(SU/NF) Negotiations scheduled for December 16 in [location redacted] represent an important opportunity for the USG to improve relations with a globally influential Northern neighbor while increasing the delivery of child-oriented luxury/leisure goods to the United States. This cable provides background information on the North Pole’s enigmatic leader and his policies.

NORTHERN STRONGMAN

(SU/NF) Mr. Santa Claus is the undisputed leader of North Pole. He has been in power for many generations, and we see no prospect for polar regime change. While reported to be “jolly,” some overseas critics note that North Pole has never had an election, and that workers there toil under intense deadline pressure (one BIG deadline!). These workers - referred to disparagingly as “elves” -- work in what - but for the temperature! - would be referred to as “sweat shop conditions.” Claus is said often be quite cross with the elves -- one contact characterized his leadership and management style as “an iron fist in a red flannel glove.”

(SU/NF) Claus dominates the political and economic life of one of the world’s most isolated societies. Communication with the outside world is limited to one delivery of mail each year (mid-December, incoming only).

Claus is the only citizen permitted to travel, and he only leaves North Pole once each year. Perhaps in an indication of concerns about personal security we note that Claus ALWAYS travels at night, and never publishes his itinerary.

POLAR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY: THE KINDLY OLD MAN FACADE

(SU/NF) Through his connections in Hollywood, Claus has over the years carefully cultivated the image of a kindly, avuncular senior citizen. But behind the scenes he has shown himself to be capable playing an almost Nixonian brand of political hardball. He seems to have a harsh, black and white, good and evil, with-us-or-with-the-terrorist worldview. We are told that each fall, Claus’s staff prepares for him a worldwide “enemies list.”

Enemies are listed as “naughty,” friends as “nice.” To prepare this list, Claus seems to make use of a sophisticated intelligence network. One staffer told us (in an arrogant tone): “Look, it’s like this: He’s gonna find out who’s naughty and nice.” And then, a threat: “You better not pout, you better not cry.” Claus himself reportedly checks the enemies list… twice.

THE INNER CIRCLE: THE WIFE AND THE ELVES

(SU/NF) Claus has reportedly surrounded himself with a small group of sycophantic advisors. We hear from contacts that no dissent is tolerated.

Claus’s wife (Mrs. Claus) is widely seen as “the real power behind the toy bag.” Also influential is a my sterious figure referred to only by his first name: Rudolf. Claus frequently seeks “guidance” from this person.

Post has not had contact with him, but the name does raise the prospect of Russian influence. Other influential advisors reportedly include staffers named Donner and Prancer. Claus’s relationship with an aide nick-named “Vixen” has raised eyebrows in conservative, traditional North Pole society and has caused unsubstantiated rumors of personal indiscretion.

THE POLAR FAST LANE: “IT’S NOT ALL COOKIES AND MILK”

(SU/NF) There have also been rumors of substance abuse. One sarcastic doggerel that has recently been muttered by Claus-critics (with obvious use of drug slang) says: “The stump of a PIPE he held tight in his teeth, and the smoke it encircled his HEAD like a wreath...” Other observers note that Claus is almost constantly giggling: One contact notes: “He has a broad face and a little round belly that shakes when he laughs like a bowlful of jelly.” Another observer told us: “His eyes-how they twinkled!

His dimples were merry. His cheeks were like roses, his nose like a cherry. His droll little mouth was drawn up like a bow. And the beard of his chin was as white as the snow.” Our DEA office note that Claus and his inner circle seem to have developed a sophisticated global shipment network that allows for clandestine delivery of packages. They also note that Claus and his advisors are frequently overheard discussing “snow” and “ice” and “candy.” Clearly, the rumors of drug abuse have to be given some credence.

NORTH POLE ECONOMICS: “ONE HUGE-MUNGOUS TRADE SURPLUS”

(SU/NF) The North Pole economy is highly seasonal, and is dominated by the export of leisure/luxury goods aimed primarily at the under 10 demographic. The Claus government recently came under criticism after the IMF carried out its first ever Article IV consultations. North Pole exports were found to exceed imports by 6,000,000 percent. In fact, the IMF found essentially no imports (they bring in only a small quantity of egg-nog). This trade surplus has caused one prominent Washington pundit to claim that the “North Pole makes China look like a free and open currency market.”

(SU/NF) Rumors of Claus’s alleged communist leanings were quite common during the Cold War years. Observers frequently noted that Claus ALWAYS dressed in red, and promoted “a gift-based economy.”

(SU/NF) There is a strong internationalist and humanitarian streak in North Pole economic policy. International Development is a high priority - Claus attempted to add an additional goal (The Right to Toys!) to the UN’s Millennium Development Goals. He is a big supporter of UNICEF.

ENVIRONMENTAL VIEWS: “SCREW THE POLAR BEARS!”

(SU/NF) Claus’s views on environmental issues are nuanced: for obvious reasons he is deeply concerned about global warming, but he has not been a strong supporter of CITES and other efforts to protect endangered species.

He is clearly not fond of Polar Bears, quipping to the press that “Those damn bears are always trying to eat the elves” and that if it was up to him, “they’d be a whole lot more endangered.” Claus does, however, seem quite fond of Reindeer. And Post believes we can count on North Pole support for our efforts to save the whales. Claus has no strong feelings on Cetaceans, but we hear that he has a long-standing grudge against Iceland (a whaling country). This is apparently related to a 1979 episode in which a bouncer at a Reykjavik night club denied Mr. Claus and his elf entourage access, and made disparaging comments about both their attire and their physiques.

(SU/NF) Perhaps in another indication of his concern about global warming Claus has made “a lump of coal” an important symbol of societal disapproval.

MILITARY AND LAW ENFORCEMENT POLICIES: SANTA IS WEAK ON TERROR

(SU/NF) For many years Claus and his staff have annually flaunted international flight clearance procedures, and he regularly crosses borders without submitting to document checks or customs inspections. This has recently caused FOX News to question Claus’s commitment to the war on terror. DHS is very concerned that Claus’s very lax immigration policies and non-existent border controls are making the North Pole a potential avenue for the infiltration of terrorists into the United States. Claus himself has frequently come close to arrest (usually on charges of trespassing or breaking and entering).

(SU/NF) Claus obviously could be a key figure in the coming war for the Arctic. While we cannot take his support for granted, we are encouraged by the participation of North Pole assets in an annual U.S. Marine Corps exercise (“Toys For Tots”).

PROTOCOL TIPS: ITS ALL ABOUT DAIRY AND PASTRIES

(SU/NF) USDEL should be aware that North Pole culture puts a premium on late night socializing. The preferred beverage is milk (WHOLE milk) and the preferred food is cookies (CHOCOLATE cookies). Carrots are also sometimes provided. Most entertaining takes place close to chimneys.

COMMENT

(SU/NF) Long considered the alpha dog of the high north, Claus has a complex personality that mixes a strong ego, a desire to be the center of attention, and a burning desire for adoration and celebrity. He is a very challenging diplomatic interlocutor. While he has his flaws, Post believes that Claus will be in power for many centuries to come. Like him or not, we believe that Santa Claus is a leader we can and should work with.

New START Ratification Resolution Establishes US Policy on Tactical Nuclear Disarmament Talks in Europe

2010-12-24T09:35:00.001Z

The US Senate ratified the new START strategic arms treaty on December 22nd, despite intense partisan opposition from those determined to inflict a defeat on President Obama. Secretary General Rasmussen welcomed the ratification on behalf of NATO allies who endorsed the treaty strongly in the Lisbon Summit declaration. While the treaty is modest in its aims, failure to ratify would have been a tremendous blow for the US and NATO in relations with Russia.

Interestingly, the ratification resolution makes it US policy to open talks with Russia on tactical nuclear weapons within a year of entry-into-force of the Treaty, and in the meantime to work on increasing transparency between the US and Russia on tactical nuclear weapons, and to extend cooperative threat reduction to assuring the safety and security of Russian weapons. NATO allies are to be consulted.

While the ratification debate has been marked by a generally negative tone and anti-Russian sentiment, this provision is to be welcomed. having refused to discuss these issues for years, Republicans in the Senate sought to criticise new START for not dealing with tacnukes. As a result, this clause was added to the ratification resolution. NATO has already allowed for this in the outcome of the Lisbon Summit and it is to be hoped that ratification by the Duma will allow these talks to go forward.

The resolution can be found here and on tacnukes reads:

(12) Tactical nuclear weapons .-(A) Prior to the entry into force of the New START Treaty, the President shall certify to the Senate that-

i) the United States will seek to initiate, following consultation with NATO allies but not later than one year after the entry into force of the New START Treaty, negotiations with the Russian Federation on an agreement to address the disparity between the non-strategic (tactical) nuclear weapons stockpiles of the Russian Federation and of the United States and to secure and reduce tactical nuclear weapons in a verifiable manner; and

(ii) it is the policy of the United States that such negotiations shall not include defensive missile systems.

(B) Not later than one year after the entry into force of the New START Treaty, and annually thereafter for the duration of the New START Treaty or until the conclusion of an agreement pursuant to subparagraph (A), the President shall submit to the Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed Services of the Senate a report-

(i) detailing the steps taken to conclude the agreement cited in subparagraph (A); and

(ii) analyzing the reasons why such an agreement has not yet been concluded.

(C) Recognizing the difficulty the United States has faced in ascertaining with confidence the number of tactical nuclear weapons maintained by the Russian Federation and the security of those weapons, the Senate urges the President to engage the Russian Federation with the objectives of-

(i) establishing cooperative measures to give each Party to the New START Treaty improved confidence regarding the accurate accounting and security of tactical nuclear weapons maintained by the other Party; and

(ii) providing United States or other international assistance to help the Russian Federation ensure the accurate accounting and security of its tactical nuclear weapons.

Senior UK Leaders on NATO Nuclear Policy

2010-12-18T11:28:00.000Z

Sir Malcolm Rifkind, Lord Owen and Lord Browne, all former ministers, have written an article on NATO nuclear policy for the website of the European Leadership Network for Multilateral Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, in which they are prominent members. They write that:

the new Concept must allow for NATO’s founding ideas of collective defence, the transatlantic link, and burden-sharing to be retained but applied to challenges far different from those faced at the time of the Alliance’s formation. This is far from an easy task but it is a vital one, and nowhere is it more needed than in the area of NATO nuclear policy.

This is surely correct, and nuclear policy has been an area where the Alliance has been , most resistant to change, with its members (except perhaps the Balts) all knowing that the current situation is untenable, but tip-toeing around a rather awkward problem. Indeed, they write:

In our view, if NATO is to remain of central relevance to the security challenges we face today, the Alliance must address this issue head-on and not seek to by-pass it.

In order to achieve a 'reduction and consolidation' of the 180 or so US nuclear weapons still forward based in Europe, the ELN urges NATO to work with cooperatively with Russia and:

To facilitate this engagement, we are also calling for an updated Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty and for the NATO-Russia Council to support cooperative dialogue with Russia on ballistic missile defence.

They also call for a reduction in the salience of nuclear forces in NATO doctrine, for the Alliance to state that the only role for nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear attack. This would build on US and UK changes in doctrine which have, de facto, already shifted Alliance nuclear use doctrine in this direction. They warn to that if the Alliance doesn't act together then a series of uncoordinated unilateral national decisions will undoubtedly weaken the Alliance. This is surely true. NATO members including Germany and Belgium are very unlikely to spend the billions of Euros needed to renew their dual-use aircraft over the coming decade or so, without which their nuclear mission will simply wither away.

In addition, the basis of NATO nuclear sharing is a legal ruling in the US in the 1960s that, in times of 'general war' the NPT has failed in its purpose and is no longer in force. The NPT RevCon this spring agreed unanimously that the NPT remains in force under all circumstances. This opens NATO policy up to international challenge, since all NATO states agreed with this RevCon interpretation.

As the NATO deterrence review moves forward, the Atlantic Alliance can either take hold of this issue and decisively lead in international non-proliferation and disarmament efforts, or it can just let the drift continue, thus weakening the Alliance, as these former defence and foreign ministers of the right and the left have so correctly said.

Good Advice for NATO from the European Leadership Network

2010-12-07T20:53:00.000Z

NATO Monitor didn't post on the release of this European Leadership Network statement on NATO nuclear policy at the time. But now NATO has agreed to hold a deterrence review, it is worth a good look.

The ELN is a trans-European network of senior statesmen and women who are working for multilateral nuclear disarmament, and for a secure Europe. They come from most European countries, north south east and west, from Ireland to Russia, from Norway to Greece. The network is comprised of former defence, foreign and prime ministers, as well as senior generals. They are conservatives, christian democrats, liberals, social democrats, socialists and greens. They have enormous experience in international security work, and their views merit attention.

In the case of NATO nuclear policy, their statement notably calls for a greater emphasis by NATO on arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament as tools for security-building and asks some very pertinent questions:

What can NATO do to help establish safe conditions for the adoption of deterring nuclear attack as the sole purpose for its nuclear weapons, consistent with the declaratory policy goal as stated in the US NPR and with our suggested ambition to reduce the number and roles of nuclear weapons in the NATO arsenal?

Are NATO’s current nuclear arrangements the only available and credible option for providing European allies with reassurance against nuclear threats? What alternative options are available that could provide this reassurance while also allowing NATO to do more to support international moves toward multilateral nuclear disarmament? What might the risks and benefits of each of these alternatives be?

What alternatives to current nuclear burden-sharing arrangements might be available, if any, that could both maintain the political cohesion of the alliance and maintain the principle that nuclear risks and burdens are shared across the alliance?

How can NATO best maximise the security of nuclear weapons on its own territory?

What would the implications of any changes to NATO nuclear policy be for NATO relations with Russia, approaches to reassurance on Article V commitments within the alliance, and consideration of issues such as missile defence and conventional forces in Europe?

This is exactly the kind of debate NATO needs, and Secretary General Rasmussen could do much worse than to convene a meeting with the ELN for an in-depth examination of NATO's future deterrence policy.

Analysis on NATO Nukes in the Strategic Concept from Arms Control Association

2010-12-07T19:58:00.000Z

Just a quick note that Oliver Meier has a good piece in the latest Arms Control Today. You can read it here. I was taken with this quote:

The U.S. official said the language on nuclear sharing “was very carefully drafted.” He maintained that it does not preclude future changes in NATO’s nuclear posture. “It applies very nicely to a situation where a country suggests that it is no longer possible for it to participate in nuclear sharing for domestic reasons,” he argued. “The questions allies need to ask [are]: What kind of participation in nuclear sharing is politically acceptable? Is participation by one country enough? Is it sufficient if two countries participate?”

These will be key questions for NATO as it moves forward. Already Greece and Turkey have given up the nuclear sharing role. The UK no longer bases US nukes. Will NATO be able to act to gain some credit for removal of the few remaining tactical nuclear weapons in Europe before national reductions mean all credibility is lost? That would be the sensible course of action, but France seems dead set against it.

Defence Planning for the Baltic States

2010-12-07T16:56:00.000Z

In October 2009, NATO Monitor reported on discussions at an informal Ministerial meeting on contingency planning for the defence of the Baltic States (See here). At the time, NATO Monitor reported on the difficulties associated with starting that process, and the unhappiness felt by the Baltic States at what they felt was a second-class citizenship in NATO, and the vulnerability they felt in the wake of the 2008 Russo-Georgian war.

Now we learn from a report in the Guardian, based on a cable released by Wikileaks, how this situation was resolved. The Guardian reveals that secret plans have been drawn up, and were approved at the Lisbon Summit. They say NATO contingency planning is detailed:

Nine Nato divisions – US, British, German, and Polish – have been identified for combat operations in the event of armed aggression against Poland or the three Baltic states. North Polish and German ports have been listed for the receipt of naval assault forces and British and US warships. The first Nato exercises under the plan are to take place in the Baltic next year, according to informed sources.

The Guardian says that:

The decision to draft contingency plans for Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania was taken secretly earlier this year at the urging of the US and Germany at Nato headquarters in Belgium, ending years of division at the heart of the western alliance over how to view Vladimir Putin's Russia.

In the run up to the drafting of the new Strategic Concept, this process would have been important. Newer NATO members had significant concerns that missions such as ISAF in Afghanistan were replacing traditional territorial defence, and that western European NATO states were not really prepared to enforce the Article V defence guarantee. However, it is equally important for the Alliance not to be seen to be fueling a new Cold War. Russia is a NATO partner, and has indeed been invited to participated in the new NATO missile defence system.

Russian sources have told the Guardian that they are"bewildered" by this news:

A source in Russia's foreign ministry said the information disclosed by WikiLeaks and detailed in the Guardian caused "a lot of questions and bewilderment with us".

The Nato-Russia summit in Lisbon last month had adopted a statement that "clearly says the security of Nato countries and Russia is intertwined, and the NRC [Nato Russia Council] member states will refrain from any use or threat of the use of force against each other," the source told Interfax.

"Russia has repeatedly raised the question about the need to ensure that there is no military planning aimed against one another," the source added.

"Obvious facts" demonstrated that "Russia is not building up its military presence near the borders of the countries mentioned in the release, but on the contrary it is coherently reducing heavy weaponry in the Kaliningrad region," the source said.

All of which goes to show how hard it is for the Alliance to tread the line between building a cooperative relationship with Russia and dealing with the fears and suspicions of Eastern Europeans. NATO members need Russian support in Afghanistan and in dealing with nuclear negotiations with Iran. If a new Cold War is to be avoided, then a cooperative security relationship within Europe will also be needed. The release of the Wikileaks cable is ill-timed as it brings out into the public issues which would be much better dealt with by diplomats behind the scenes at present. The release has the potential to damage emergent NATO-Russia cooperation, and to weaken the hand of President Medvedev against those on the Russian side who oppose working together with a former foe. One good way to ensure that no lasting damage is done would be for NATO to come back to the table with proposals for reviving the suspended Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, and adapting it further to meet the realities of 2010.

What NATO leaders Will Discuss on Afghanistan

2010-11-20T13:16:00.000Z

James Appathurai, NATO Spokesman, gave a press briefing yesterday. He talked about all the Summit issues, including decisions expected on Afghanistan, saying:

We will be joined here by all of the 48 countries, the 20 partners and NATO allies who are contributing forces to the mission in Afghanistan, as well as representatives of important international organizations, the United Nations, Ban Ki-moon, the World Bank, the European Union, and of course President Karzai, because this is about his country.

We expect to see two main decisions taken here. One is to launch the process of transition whereby beginning in the first half of next year, early next year, district by district, province by province, Afghan Security Forces will take lead responsibility for security in their own country. In essence, President Karzai has laid out the vision, the aim, that by 2014 Afghan Security Forces should be in the lead for security operations throughout Afghanistan. That is an aim the whole international community has endorsed. That is the goal for which we are working. It must be a conditions-based process, but we are quite confident that the conditions can and will be in place with a goal of Afghans being in the lead for security by 2014 to be met.

The second decision we expect from the ISAF meeting is an agreement between NATO and Afghanistan on a long-term partnership that goes beyond the combat mission and that is broader than the combat mission. It is a political commitment to the long-term future of Afghanistan. It has very clear areas in which NATO will continue to support the development of the country in terms of training and other capacity-building. And it sends a clear message that NATO will stay as long as it takes to help Afghanistan find its feet and become resistant to terrorism. That is in Afghanistan's interests, it is in the interest of the region, and it is in our interest as an international community that terrorism can find no safe haven in Afghanistan and that Afghanistan is able to resist terrorism on its own.

The Guardian has a good piece on the Summit work on Afghanistan here.
Of course, the prospects for success are very mixed. Even a definition of what success is proves elusive. NATO continues to suffer attacks in Pakistan as well as Afghanistan (see this story, and this one too), and its ability to win any kind of military victory has to be questioned.

Indeed, some still debate the entire rationale and approach of the West to Afghanistan over the past decade. This was an interesting short piece on those lines.

The Need for Civilian Protection in Afghanistan

2010-11-20T12:13:00.000Z

NATO forces have increased significantly in Afghanistan in the past year. The counter-insurgency mantra of enhancing security for civilians as part of winning hearts and minds is a central part of discussion as leaders turn to Afghnaistan this morning.

However, a new report from Oxfam and 28 other aid organisations active in Afghnaistan shows that the goal of civilian protection is not being met. The report, Nowhere to Turn: The Failure to Protect Civilians in Afghanistan provides a sobering verdict on ISAF operations and the prospects for 'success' in Afghanistan (whatever that would look like). It says:

As the conflict continues to intensify, Afghans are increasingly caught between PGF seeking to win their "hearts and minds" and an insurgency that, in many areas, is utilizing increasingly violent tactics. Experience in Afghanistan has shown that when one party to a conflict makes the population the prize, the opposition is likely to make them a target. Building schools in highly insecure areas often turns them into targets for the insurgency; healthcare clinics are bombed, mined and occupied by both sides, including PGF who may be paradoxically engaged in building clinics in neighboring districts; and in the south and east, anyone associ-ated with the government or IMF is a target for assassination. Strategies to "protect the population" all too often do anything but.

This really matters as the COIN strategy considered so successful in Iraq (although that is debatable) is not working in Afghanistan, and the effects of failure are appalling for the Afghan people As NATO leaders try to find a way forward in Afghnaistan that doesn't look like failure for the Alliance and does at least something for the country itself, they should consider the recommendations of Oxfam and its partners who know the country so well:

The insurgency continues to grow, violence is spreading and some ana-lysts even fear a new civil war. Yet this failure to protect civilians from the escalating conflict, now and in coming months, is not inevitable. More can and must be done to minimize the harm to civilians, especially as ISAF begins to handover responsibility for security to the Afghan gov-ernment.

Recommendations

To ISAF:

• Issue a directive outlining procedures to provide redress to those civilians affected in the course of military operations. Work with the Afghan government to effectively and transparently investi-gate civilian casualties.

• Allegations of both past and present criminal acts and violations of international law must result in meaningful investigations, prosecution and disciplinary procedures.

• Avoid night raids if at all possible and utilize regular law en-forcement measures instead.

• Terminate implementation of ALP and other community defense initiatives. Instead, devote greater resources to the development of a professional and accountable ANP.

• Actively promote, support and monitor all the measures that the Afghan authorities need to take to ensure lawful conduct by ANSF, and ensure that respect for rights is an integral part of training and advice given to ANSF.

• Ensure that all soldiers are familiar with and trained in the Civil Military Guidelines for Afghanistan and adhere to them through-out their deployment.

To ANSF:

• Increase the capacity to report and follow up on civilian casualty incidents, allegations of harm to civilians and human rights viola-tions.

• Allegations of both past and present criminal acts and violations of international law by ANSF must be taken seriously and result in meaningful investigations and disciplinary measures.

To the Afghan Government:

• Establish a civilian casualty tracking unit, which would regularly investigate allegations of harm and make its procedures public, as well as the findings of investigations.

• Reform Code 99 to address corruption and ensure greater trans-parency and consistency, including measures to improve access to the fund by those that have been harmed by AOG.

• In addition, a clear procedure should be established for ensuring ANSF adhere to or at least behave in a way that is consistent with the existing ISAF compensation guidelines.

• Terminate implementation of ALP and other community defense initiatives. If they must move forward, establish an independent monitoring mechanism for community defense initiatives. Con-duct an audit, the results of which should be made public, to as-certain the impact and status of past community defense initia-tives.

To the International Community:

• The UN, through OCHA, should immediately seek to establish re-lationships with ANSF and IMF at appropriate levels to ensure that there are mechanisms in place to investigate and address in-cidents of IHL violations.

• The UN, through OCHA, should fulfil its commitment to imple-ment a full, effective training and awareness-raising programme for all relevant actors on the Afghanistan Civil-Military Guide-lines, as well as a system for monitoring breaches of the guide-lines.

• The lead nations of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) should establish and implement a plan to gradually phase out PRT-provided assistance and other militarized forms of aid. This transition strategy should prioritize an increase in funding and support for national and international civilian organizations.

To AOG:

• Minimize harm to civilians and damage to their property in the conduct of all operations and prioritize the protection of civilians. Take all feasible measures to distinguish between civilians and combatants, and avoid using disproportionate force.

• Seek to limit the adverse impact of military operations on aid ag-encies, their staff and operations.

• Ensuring that operations do not lead to forced displacement or the denial of the right of freedom of movement and other rights of displaced Afghans.

• Improve efforts to investigate, recognize and address allegations of harm to civilians caused by AOG operations.

Missile Defence Agreed (again)

2010-11-20T12:00:00.000Z

NATO leaders approved the development of an Alliance missile defence programme as part of the Strategic Concept. There was controversy about linking the deployment of missile defences to further nuclear disarmament, largely from France. But there is agreement that a NATO BMD programme can fill the need for a major defence effort to cement the trans-Atlantic link once played by tactical nuclear weapons. As Secretary General Rasmussen said to journalists “Missile defense will bind the NATO allies closer together”.

The Strategic Concept paragraph n missile defence reads:

We will ensure that NATO has the full range of capabilities necessary to deter and defend against any threat to the safety and security of our populations. Therefore, we will:
….

• develop the capability to defend our populations and territories against ballistic missile attack as a core element of our collective defence, which contributes to the indivisible security of the Alliance. We will actively seek cooperation on missile defence with Russia and other Euro-Atlantic partners;

There are a number of useful stories on this here, here and here.

There are dissenting voices. US conservatives oppose spreading the BMD decision to include Russia, something that the Obama administration has made a central part of the reset of relations with NATO’s former enemy. They claim that Russian participation will render any system ineffective. (See this for example)However, since US conservatives are inveterately and irrationally hostile to Russia, and also backed enormous spending on missile defence systems that demonstrably do not work, probably cannot work and even if they did could be easily tricked by countermeasures, we probably shouldn’t take their views to seriously.

More serious for NATO was the Turkish objection, based on regional sensitivities, notably refusing to name Iran as a potential enemy which made the missile shield necessary.
Any such stance was dropped from official documents and the missile shield (effective or not) will go ahead.

Over dinner, Alliance leaders decided to invite Russia to participate. The cost of the proposed system is said to be some $270m over the next ten years, which ensures it will be extremely limited. The US spends far more each year to very little effect. Of course, NATO Summits have been agreeing to work on missile defences since the early 1990s, with few results. Let's see where this one takes us.

Nuclear Weapons Aspects of the Strategic Concept

2010-11-20T09:28:00.003Z

Over the next few days NATO Monitor will take a look at different aspects of the Strategic Concept, starting with a first take on the nuclear aspects of the new paper.

The new Strategic Concept has both similarities and striking changes on nuclear policy with the Concept agreed at the 1999 Summit in Washington DC. It reflects, as do most NATO documents, the divergent positions of member states trying to come to a consensus. Thus, the the Preface to the Concept says that it:

.. commits NATO to the goal of creating the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons – but reconfirms that, as long as there are nuclear weapons in the world, NATO will remain a nuclear Alliance.

Some have expressed disappointment at this, seeing it as a statement of the status quo. (See for example the BASIC and the Arms Control Association joint press release) For another, more positive analysis of the new Concept see Hans Kristensen’s blog for the FAS here.

However, it is necessary to look at the policy as a whole, and to differentiate between tactical and strategic nuclear weapons, to see the possibility for change built into the new Concept. NATO leaders were never going to make a dramatic announcement on the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Europe, especially given Eastern European and French opposition. What it has announced is the creation within the Alliance of the circumstances under which that withdrawal can happen.

On nuclear forces the concept now says:

16. The greatest responsibility of the Alliance is to protect and defend our territory and our populations against attack, as set out in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. The Alliance does not consider any country to be its adversary. However, no one should doubt NATO’s resolve if the security of any of its members were to be threatened.

17. Deterrence, based on an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional capabilities, remains a core element of our overall strategy. The circumstances in which any use of nuclear weapons might have to be contemplated are extremely remote. As long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance.

18. The supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies is provided by the strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United States; the independent strategic nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France, which have a deterrent role of their own, contribute to the overall deterrence and security of the Allies.

Thus far, the language is drawn fairly closely from the 1999 Concept. The US, UK will continue to provide strategic nuclear forces so long as they have them and NATO requires it. These strategic forces provide the ‘supreme guarantee’ of Alliance security, and the circumstances for their use are still said to be ‘extremely remote’.

However, on tactical nuclear forces (precisely the area of most controversy) the differences are striking. This is the culmination of a year in which first Germany, then others including The Netherlands, Belgium and Norway, have worked for change in NATO policy, particularly that regarding European based US nuclear bombs.

The old Concept was explicit on the need for tactical nuclear weapons in Europe:

63. A credible Alliance nuclear posture and the demonstration of Alliance solidarity and common commitment to war prevention continue to require widespread participation by European Allies involved in collective defence planning in nuclear roles, in peacetime basing of nuclear forces on their territory and in command, control and consultation arrangements. Nuclear forces based in Europe and committed to NATO provide an essential political and military link between the European and the North American members of the Alliance. The Alliance will therefore maintain adequate nuclear forces in Europe.

In the new Concept the statement on these weapons as an essential transatlantic link has gone. This is a major change in an area where the alliance had come under strong criticism. In addition, the language on Allied participation in nuclear policy has also been significantly weakened. The Alliance now wishes to:

.. ensure the broadest possible participation of Allies in collective defence planning on nuclear roles, in peacetime basing of nuclear forces, and in command, control and consultation arrangements;

It places less importance for the alliance as a whole on cross-NATO participation of nominally non-nuclear states in alliance nuclear operations. The new Concept clearly allows for NATO nations deciding to opt out of the nuclear sharing process, under which some nations host US nuclear forces and train their own air forces for nuclear missions in wartime. This possibility of change is reinforced by new language:

National decisions regarding arms control and disarmament may have an impact on the security of all Alliance members. We are committed to maintain, and develop as necessary, appropriate consultations among Allies on these issues.

This allows individual nations to take decisions to reduce or eliminate nuclear weapons, the nuclear sharing countries which wish to opt out can do so. Only consultations are necessary to facilitate this process, not the permission of the Alliance Thus Germany, which has expressed a strong desire to end nuclear sharing and have US nuclear weapons withdrawn from its territory now has a mechanism blessed by NATO under which this can occur, and most importantly it is a national decision.

NATO has also committed itself to further multilateral arms control:

With the changes in the security environment since the end of the Cold War, we have dramatically reduced the number of nuclear weapons stationed in Europe and our reliance on nuclear weapons in NATO strategy. We will seek to create the conditions for further reductions in the future.

This is placed in the context of ambitions to achieve a nuclear weapons free world:

We are resolved to seek a safer world for all and to create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons in accordance with the goals of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, in a way that promotes international stability, and is based on the principle of undiminished security for all.

One can argue that the continued nuclear role of the Alliance runs counter to this desire, but the fact that France has signed up for it at all in a NATO context is striking.

The Concept says that NATO has no adversaries, thus no targets for its nuclear forces, but it explicitly links US forces in Europe and Russian tactical nuclear forces in a a curious echo back to the Cold War The purpose it seems is to get Russia engaged in future arms reductions talks beyond the New START Treaty currently bottled up in the Senate. NATO will work with Russia to try to encourage a reduction of tactical nuclear forces by Moscow, but NATO appreciates it is in too weak a position to force reductions as a quid pro quo for its own 200 or so nuclear bombs in Europe, seeking transparency and deployment changes:

In any future reductions, our aim should be to seek Russian agreement to increase transparency on its nuclear weapons in Europe and relocate these weapons away from the territory of NATO members. Any further steps must take into account the disparity with the greater Russian stockpiles of short-range nuclear weapons.

NATO send s a strong signal to Russia that this arms control is part of a wider security building process in Europe:

NATO-Russia cooperation is of strategic importance as it contributes to creating a common space of peace, stability and security.

This sends Russia a very positive signal that NATO wishes to engage it as a partner, and sees that as so important that the desire for partnership is written not only in a communique but in the Alliance's main document on security. It will be interesting to see how far progress on issues like BMD cooperation goes at the NATO Russia Council today and in the future. Cooperation over Afghanistan is also vital to NATO.

Overall this could have been much less positive. There was no chance that this concept would state that the weapons would be withdrawn. A more decisive change might have been to remove rather than weaken the stated need for Allied cooperation in nuclear policy. However, France led very strong opposition to any kind of change, resisting to the last moment the slightest weakening of NATO policy. Some states in Eastern Europe have also been concerned at allowing anything that might dilute US security guarantees for NATO against Russia, at the same time as the US is trying to build a more friendly security relationship with its former foe. Easterners are none too happy at this. All this constricted options for change, but the new Concept is positive in that it allows for change on the tactical nuclear front in a way that France cannot block.

There will need to be a rewrite now in the Military Committee paper which is the basis for implementing changes in the Strategic Concept. This process is much more secretive even than the Strategic Concept negotiations which, since the experts group began meeting a year or so ago has been opaque and undemocratic. This revision will need to incorporate something that went unmentioned in the Strategic Concept. Both the US and the UK have rewritten their nuclear doctrines this year. They have said they will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear countries that are not in material breach of the NPT. Since NATO as an Alliance cannot override national doctrine, NATO doctrine has itself changed de facto. During the Bush years the Alliance was shifting, however slowly and in however ambiguous a fashion, towards US counterproliferation doctrine which allowed for the (possibly preemptive) use of nuclear forces against nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and other targets. (For a detailed treatment of this topic see a previous report) This more recent shift, even unheralded, has taken NATO in a much more positive direction towards the devaluing of nuclear forces in Alliance strategy.

The work will continue. It is thought, and the communiqué is likely to say more about this, that the Alliance will conduct a ‘deterrence review’ in 2011 and the possibility for change is very strong. The concept says:

.. continue to review NATO’s overall posture in deterring and defending against the full range of threats to the Alliance, taking into account changes to the evolving international security environment.

Sources within the Alliance have said that there was a drive to conduct a ‘nuclear posture review’ along American lines, but that this was blocked by the French. The 'deterrence review' will most likely happen in the coming year or so. Involving the full range of conventional and nuclear forces, France will participate.

In conclusion, this new Strategic Concept contains some change in reduced role for nuclear forces, but there is a lot of work to be done. Non-nuclear states in the NPT are unlikely to be satisfied and will continue to pressure the alliance for more change.

Summit Overview on Missile Defence

2010-11-19T17:06:00.001Z

The major business of the NATO Summit will be the new Strategic Concept, which will replace the one agreed in 1999. NATO has undergone a process over the past year leading to this point, a process which has, unfortunately, been far less open and democratic than it could have been. A chance for a major political revitalization of the Alliance has been lost, as parliaments and civil society have not been given the chance to input into the process in any meaningful way – thus buy-in by the political class is very limited. The latest relaunch of the NATO presence in Afghanistan is also on the agenda. NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen briefed the press earlier this week:

The Summit will put in place an Alliance that is more effective, more engaged and more efficient. More effective because NATO will invest in key capabilities like missile defence, cyber defence and strategic and tactical airlift. More engaged because NATO will reach out to connect with our partners around the globe, countries and other organizations. And more efficient because we are cutting fat, even as we invest in muscle. For example, by slimming down our command structure by about 5,000 personnel.

A decision to develop a NATO-based missile defence to protect our populations would be a major step. It would make our territorial defence even more effective and it would bind the allies even stronger together. And the decision to reform and rationalise our command structures, our agencies, and our headquarters will make the Alliance fit for purpose and ready to meet the security challenges of the 21st Century.

All of that will be enshrined in the new Strategic Concept. The new Strategic Concept will guide the Alliance for the next decade. It will serve as a lever for continuous reform towards a more effective, efficient and flexible Alliance so that our taxpayers get the most security for the money they invest in defence. Which makes the new Strategic Concept a key outcome of the Summit.

(The full Press Conference can be seen here.)

Significant problems remain before the Summit Communique can be issued. One of the trickiest is missile deefence. Turkey will only agree to allow the missile defence programme to go ahead if NATO says nothing about potential missile threats - while the US is intent on naming Iran as the source of potential missile threats to NATO. Turkey must also agree to host a radar for the system to be effective for the whole of NATO territory, something so important to the Alliance that it broke the proposed mid-course missile defence system the Bush administration wanted to deploy in Europe.

"We do not perceive any threat from any neighbor countries and we do not think our neighbors form a threat to Nato," says Turkish foreign minister Ahmet Davutoglu.

Turkey fears that Iran, an important trade partner will be angered if it goes ahead with the NATO missile defence programme. They also want the US to put pressure on Germany and France to allow an advance on Turkish negotiations for EU membership in return for concessions in NATO - something very unlikely to succeed. You can read about their position in depth here.)

However, even if a deal can be done with the Turks, there are other problems to solve. Notably, the French are insistent that the missile defence programme is not in any way seen as replacing nuclear weapons as a deterrent to attack. France. The US sees BMD programmes as enhancing deterrence, France does not. It fears that pressure to reduce and eliminate its nuclear forces will grow if it accepts that missile defences can play such a role. Dealing with this objection will be a difficult part of the Summit's work. A discussion of the French-German talks on the topic can be found here.

More later.

NATO Summit Opens in Lisbon

2010-11-19T16:20:00.000Z

After a few months out of business we'll be commenting on the Lisbon Summit this weekend. The NATO website has good coverage here.

NATO Nuclear Policy Discussed in Tallinn

2010-04-23T11:21:00.000+01:00

NATO Monitor has been quiet of late, but returns to the fray to discuss developments at the NATO Foreign Ministers meeting in Tallinn.

As the NATO website says:

Ministers discuss future of NATO's nuclear policy and prospects for missile defence

In itself, this is fairly unusual. Issues of NATO force structure are the province of Defence Ministers, and Foreign Ministers rarely if ever get involved. Even the once significant Nuclear Planning Group has been reduced from biannual two day meetings to an annual hour long check-in. Nuclear weapons have a very low salience in day to day NATO affairs. Strange for weapons which are said by the Alliance to be essential for trans-Atlantic unity.

So to have a North Atlantic Council debate reported in a banner headline on the NATO website makes this a far from ordinary occasion. The report is short, and fairly anodyne (see below). One point that NATO chose to highlight does strike the Monitor as strange.

a broad sharing of the burden for NATO's nuclear policy remains essential

The Alliance has 28 members. Three are nuclear weapons states with their own arsenals. Four other states participate in NATO sharing programmes – The Netherlands, Belgium, German and Italy – and their air forces are equipped and trained for nuclear missions. In addition, Turkey has US weapons based on its soil.

This hardly represents a broad sharing of the nuclear burden. Less than 1/3^rd of NATO nations have any direct involvement in nuclear defence. More than 2/3rds of NATO members turn up for the NPG once a year and rely on the

nuclear umbrella for their defence.

If this is so important to NATO, why is it so little discussed and why do so few participate? Just asking.

The NATO website report reads:

NATO Foreign Ministers discussed in Tallinn how to take forward the Alliance's nuclear posture, with an eye to the new Strategic Concept, as well as issues surrounding missile defence.

Ministers agreed that the nuclear issue is important in NATO's work on the Strategic Concept, and that the Alliance remains, as always, firmly committed to maintaining the security of its members, but at the lowest possible level of nuclear weapons.

They stressed that a broad sharing of the burden for NATO's nuclear policy remains essential and that decisions on the Alliance's nuclear policy will be made together. NATO's unity will remain absolutely firm.

Allied ministers highlighted that NATO must continue to maintain a balance between credible deterrence, and support for arms control disarmament and non-proliferation.

According to the Secretary General, in a world where nuclear weapons exist, "NATO needs a credible, effective and safely managed deterrent. Nevertheless, the Alliance must also do what it can to support arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation". Foreign Ministers stated that missile defence, while not replacing deterrence, can complement it.

Allied representatives considered during a dinner discussion issues related to missile defence, including cost, command and control, as well as how to engage Russia on this issue “to the benefit of Europe’s security and its political unity”, as the Secretary General has said.

At the Lisbon Summit in November, NATO nations will decide whether to take on Alliance missile defence as a NATO mission.

Is Poland Ready to Agree the Removal of US Nuclear Weapons from Europe?

2010-01-21T13:11:00.000Z

An interesting piece of analysis from the Polish Institute of International Affairs has come to my attention. It dates from last March, and is entitled “Reduce US Nukes in Europe to Zero, and Keep NATO Strong (and Nuclear). A View from Poland.”

The Polish government is a strong supporter of the maintenance of US nuclear weapons in Europe, and as such is beginning to find itself at odds with most of its allies. Poland has even mooted privately the possibility of deploying US nuclear forces to Poland if those countries which currently host such weapons which them to leave.

This paper is unusual in that it comes from Poland (usually considered a hardline supporter of US nuclear basing in Europe) but is rooted much more firmly in the European mainstream. It suggests that Polish interests and opinions are also much more nuanced than is generally thought outside Poland. As the author writes:

The usefulness of nuclear weapons is perceived by Poland within the wider context of assuring the viability of the transatlantic link and the credibility of NATO’s Article 5 (mutual defence clause). Russia is often mentioned in the context of Article 5 commitments, but it should be stressed that safeguarding the political cohesion of the Alliance and strengthening its conventional military capabilities are currently much more important for Poland’s interpretation of Article 5 than is the nuclear factor.

This is interesting, and there is another extremely significant paragraph in the paper:

The conventional wisdom holds that the countries of Central Europe, and especially Poland, would strongly object to any changes in the NATO nuclear posture because of their fear of Moscow. This is an oversimplification. Certainly, Poland, as well as other Central European nations, is interested in an alliance which can credibly fulfill its defence and deterrence function. As a consequence, as long as NATO is serious about remaining a military alliance (and not a kind of global crisis management organization), and counts three nuclear weapon states among its members, the nuclear component should be an integral part of the “Article 5 package”. The extended deterrence, especially that provided by the United States to its European allies, both in its conventional and nuclear forms, remains a significant reason to treat the Alliance as the most important guarantee of the security of Poland. Does it mean that any changes in the nuclear strategy of NATO are a taboo for Warsaw? Not necessarily, but such changes would need to be conducted in a way that does not weaken the transatlantic link nor the image of the Alliance as a credible security provider in the eyes of outside actors, including Russia.

If the article is a genuine reflection of the full range of debate on the role of nuclear weapons in ensuring NATO’s Article V commitments to the defence of NATO territory, then it is most welcome. It indicates that Poland is ready to sit within an emerging consensus in the Alliance, and possibly paves the way for the removal of all US nuclear weapons from Europe.

Missile Defences Unite NATO Internally, and with Russia

2009-12-23T14:04:00.000Z

NATO Monitor has covered the ongoing debate over missile defences. When the Bush administration proposed siting elements of its mid-course ballistic missile defences (BMD) in Poland and the Czech Republic, the Alliance was badly divided.

Many in Europe were dismayed that the future of a strategic programme with obvious security implications for the entire alliance was being dealt with at a bilateral level. For many this was yet another blow against NATO by the US, and the political damage caused by this and other unilateral Bush administration actions will take years to heal.

There was deep concern at deteriorating relations with Russia, and the reduction in security that a hostile relationship entails, something fundamentally at odds with the stated intention of deploying a BMD system to Europe in the first place. Also, the Europeans stressed the indivisibility of Alliance security since, even if the mid-course BMD system worked as advertised (which it has never done), it would not cover south-Eastern Europe. Worse, debris from intercepted warheads would likely fall on Belgium and the surrounding area (just as debris from the Pacific system intercepting a missile from North Korea would fall on western Canada).

There were abortive attempts to link Russia in with the BMD proposals, as the Russians proposed the use of some of their radars. The Bush administration rejected these ideas – claiming (against the advice of scientists) that the Russian systems weren’t well placed. There was a stated intention to somehow merge the strategic system with the incipient NATO theatre missile defence system. But the whole thing looked like (and indeed was) a desperate attempt ex post facto to justify Bush administration actions through an Alliance lens.

Then, this September, to the dismay of Poland and the Czech Republic and the delight of other Alliance members, the Obama administration announced that it was halting the European deployments. This has formed part of summer discussions with Russia on strategic issues. In place of the mid-course BMD system, the Obama administration announced an intention the existing ship-based Aegis defense system in the Mediterranean. This is designed to intercept short- and intermediate-range missiles with a range of up to 2,000 kilometers, and the deployment is clearly aimed at Iran. The mid-course proposal has been pushed off into the future. There are technical problems with the new proposal, as the Union of Concerned Scientists noted:

A key technical problem with this approach is that the Aegis interceptors (current and planned) also are designed to intercept missiles above the atmosphere and therefore, would be vulnerable to decoys and other countermeasures, just like the current ground-based interceptors.

However, the main purpose of the system is reassuring Allies about US intent to defend Europe, and to do so in a NATO framework. A side-benefit in this case is to be non-threatening to Russia. In this, the new system has been remarkably successful. As NATO Monitor reported back in October, Allies have been reassured by the consultations that the Pentagon has undertaken on this issue, in stark contrast to the previous administration. Their concerns about relations with Russia have also been answered.

Indeed, as Ria Novosti reports:

NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen expressed hope on Thursday that the alliance and Russia would establish a joint missile defense system by 2020. Addressing students at the Moscow State University of International Relations, Rasmussen said the joint shield would unite Russia and NATO politically and ensure nuclear security between the two parties.

They had previously reported after the NATO-Russia Council meeting on December 4, that:

Russia

and NATO have formed a working group on missile defense issues and the first meeting will be held in January, Russia's envoy to the military alliance said on Friday. Dmitry Rogozin was speaking after a Russia-NATO Council meeting in Brussels."A program on military cooperation, including the creation of a working group on missile defense, was adopted," he told journalists. He said the first meeting would take place "straight after the Christmas holidays."

At NATO HQ, on the trip for bloggers just after the Ministerial and another trip a few days later, I heard several suggestions from national delegations and from international HQ staff, that missile defence would be the best way to show Iran that the Alliance is serious about its defence. Some went so far as to suggest that the deployment of the new Obama missile defences, and other elements, would be the best way to show US commitment to Europe if the Alliance agrees the withdrawal of US nuclear weapons in 2010 – and that indeed in the post-9/11 world, they are the most useful way to do so.

It’s hardly surprising therefore that the text on missile defence in the Foreign Ministers’ Final Statement says:

14. The proliferation of ballistic missiles poses an increasing threat to Allies’ populations, territory and forces. Given the central importance of the Alliance’s collective defence mission to ensure our security and protect our populations, territory and forces against the threat of armed attack, including from ballistic missiles, missile defence plays an important role for the Alliance as part of a broader response to counter ballistic missile threats. We welcome the new phased adaptive approach of the United States to missile defence, which further reinforces NATO’s central role in missile defence in Europe. This approach would further anchor European missile defence work in NATO, which continues to bear in mind the principle of the indivisibility of Alliance security as well as NATO solidarity.

15. NATO’s current Theatre Missile Defence programme (ALTBMD) will facilitate the integration of missile defence elements from nations in order to protect deployed troops. Heads of State and Government, at their last Summit, tasked the Council in Permanent Session to identify and undertake the policy, military and technical work related to a possible expanded role of the Theatre Missile Defence programme beyond the protection of NATO deployed forces to include territorial missile defence. Such a role would be a key milestone towards providing territorial missile defence in Europe.

16. Heads of State and Government, at their last Summit, tasked the Council in Permanent Session, taking into account the Bucharest Summit tasking, to present recommendations comprising architecture alternatives for consideration at the next Summit; these should draw upon the work already done and the United States’ phased adaptive approach. If the Alliance decides to develop a NATO missile defence capability in Europe to protect populations and territory, the United States’ phased adaptive approach would provide a valuable national contribution to that capability and, thus, to Alliance security.

17. We continue to support increased cooperation between NATO and Russia on missile defence including maximum transparency and reciprocal confidence-building measures. We reaffirm the Alliance’s readiness to explore the potential for linking United States, NATO and Russian missile defence systems at an appropriate time. The United States’ new approach provides enhanced possibilities to do this.

As Secretary of State Hilary Clinton told the press after the Ministerial “On missile defense, our allies strongly expressed their support for the new American approach, and NATO officially noted the important role missile defense plays in the protection of our population, territory, and forces.”

On this issue, at least, the Alliance is once again, united.

The Latest Word on NATO Nukes

2009-12-10T14:55:00.000Z

This week I traveled to NATO for a a Public Diplomacy Division-sponsored visit to HQ for bloggers. I was favourably impressed that our speakers were open and honest, not at all like previous such PR visits. While Afghanistan was the main topic, and I'll come back to that later, there was a lot of talk about the new Strategic Concept in general, and nuclear policy in particular.

We learned that German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle did raise his coalition's policy of withdrawal of US nuclear weapons from Germany with his colleagues at the North Atlantic Council last week. there was no immediate reaction from his colleagues, but the issue will be discussed as part of the Strategic Concept negotiations next year. Several people told the group that they would not be at all surprised to see an end to US nuclear deployments in Europe as the end result of those talks.

This matches with information coming from elsewhere. Oliver Meier at the Arms Control Association has published an interesting review of the debate in Germany. It stresses that Germany expects a positive reaction from allies (which indeed seems to be the case), and that several nations engaged with germany in the margins of the NATO meeting on the future of nuclear sharing. Meier also discusses the problems that remain.

Amongst others, Westerwelle has held discussions with his Polish colleague during a visit to Warsaw in early November. Unlike other visits, there was no mention of the nuclear issue at the press conference on that occasion. A comment by the German Defence Minister at a CSIS event in Washington DC explains why:

Last point, because I’ve been asked here again: Some of you have read the coalition treaty of the CDU/CSU and FDP. A remarkable piece of paper. (Laughter.) And there was one sentence that led to, let’s call it, mild disturbances over here. And that was the question of how we handle possible – because it’s still a secret, as we all know – possible nukes on German grounds. And to give you one answer, because I’ve been asked here again, as well, this is not a question we would like to see treated unilaterally or just bilaterally, but it has to be treated, if at all, within the coalition. And it has to be treated within NATO as such, and we have to keep in mind what any step means, as a consequence. And what the consequence could be is – for instance, the three nays within NATO, we could have partners in mind who probably would be glad to offer their grounds and their soil for any weapons. But the question is whether that makes sense, then, for the security structures within Europe.

Guttenberg is clearly referring to Poland, which is known to have explored with NATO colleagues the possibility of its inclusion in NATO nuclear sharing, and the basing of US nuclear weapons on its soil. NATO gave assurances to Russia, when Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary were brought into the Alliance, that such deployments would not happen - the so-called 'three nos'. These were reinforced in the US Senate debate during the debate on that round of NATO enlargement.

There is clearly no way that the US will consider deploying nuclear weapons to Poland currently, certainly not at the expense of a renewed confrontation with Russia that would certainly ensue. Moreover, the mood in the Alliance is moving in the other direction. Arms Control Wonk recently reported that a senior advisor to the Turkish Prime Minister had told them that: As for his own personal opinion, Kalin said, Turkey “would not insist” that NATO retain forward-deployed nuclear weapons. Conventional forces are sufficient, he added, to meet Turkish security needs. NATO Monitor has reported the debate stirring in Turkey, but that is a truly remarkable statement from such a well connected policy analyst.

There is a shift in the political mainstream opinion on forward basing of nuclear weapons. Poland and the Baltic States have to decide whether they want to stand with the new European mainstream inside NATO, or against it. Opinion is forming that says that at best these weapons do not contribute to European security, and may actually decrease it. Diplomats have begun to look for other ways that the US commitment to Europe can be visibly signaled.

The North Atlantic Council last week was only the opening salvo in this debate, but the NAC (and NATO Monitor) will be returning to the question in the Spring.

No Public Statements on Nuclear Weapons and the Strategic Concept

2009-12-05T19:58:00.000Z

Germany, Belgium and other nations recently committed to seeking the withdrawal of US nuclear weapons from their soil had promised they would raise the question of NATO nuclear strategy this week. Foreign Ministers gathered at NATO HQ did discuss the future NATO Strategic Concept, but little was revealed of their discussions. If anything to do with NATO’s nuclear posture was raised, no-one was talking about it afterwards. The Final Statement of the meeting stated:

19. We are committed to renewing our Alliance to better address today’s threats and to anticipate tomorrow’s risks. At their Strasbourg/Kehl Summit, our Heads of State and Government tasked the Secretary General to develop a new Strategic Concept and submit proposals for its implementation for approval at the next Summit, keeping the Council in Permanent Session involved throughout the process. We have discussed the preliminary work of the Group of Experts which is helping to lay the ground for the Alliance’s new Strategic Concept. This work has so far covered the changing international security environment; NATO’s fundamental tasks; relations with other nations and organisations; and internal reform. We thank the Group for the work it has done until now, and encourage its continued close consultations with all Allies. We look forward to discussing the Group’s findings at our informal meeting next April in Tallinn. We encourage all our partners to continue to present their views on our new Strategic Concept during its elaboration. The new Strategic Concept will play an important role in guiding and shaping a 21st century Alliance to face existing and emerging threats and challenges, while maintaining strong collective defence.

Certainly the role of nuclear weapon sin NATO strategy, and the posture of forward deployment of some weapons from the US to Europe may have been raised in a discussion of “NATO’s fundamental tasks” the statement says were discussed, but no detail is forthcoming.

However, in the wider context, there are continued suggestions that change may be on the way. The Italian Atlantic Committee has published a discussion paper on the Strategic Concept review, in which they write that:

6. Nuclear Forces

· In a troubled world, the nuclear deterrent remains the indispensable support for NATO conventional forces when facing serious dangers;

· However, it is inevitable that the nuclear posture be considered afresh on the basis of agreed criteria, in order to ensure its continued relevance in our era with special mention to its connections with the vitality of the Transatlantic Link.

This paper was discussed at a seminar held in Rome by the IAC and the Italian Foreign Ministry on November 23^rd. it certainly leaves room for considering the removal of US nuclear weapons from Europe, while maintaining a strategic nuclear deterrent for NATO.

In the UK, the government was questioned in the House of Lords recently on the NATO Strategic Concept. On November 25, Lord Hannay asked the government about possible changes to NATO nuclear strategy.

Lord Hannay of Chiswick: My Lords, will the Minister confirm that this review of the strategic concept will include NATO's nuclear posture? What input will the British Government make on that aspect? Will they ensure that any revision of NATO's nuclear posture is firmly in line with the unanimous decision of the UN Security Council under President Obama's chairmanship to work towards a world free of nuclear weapons?

Lord Brett: My Lords, yes.

It is thought that the UK government has expressed a private willingness to see all US nuclear weapons removed from Europe. This answer is in line with that position. The UN Security Council resolution calls for further efforts on nuclear arms reductions and disarmament, so any revision of the nuclear paragraphs of the Strategic Concept would need to move in that direction.

The German opposition SPD issued a call through MDB Uta Zapf, the SPD spokesperson on foreign policy in the Bundestag, for the government to make good on its promise to discuss nuclear withdrawal at the NATO ministers meeting, and also called on NATO to discuss a tactical nuclear weapons ‘zero option’ with Russia.

It is really too early, at least in the framework of the Strategic Concept revision, to expect much substance from NATO ministers. The US Nuclear Posture Review has not yet been reported to Congress, and that will send a major signal to US allies. The calls for withdrawal of US nuclear forces from NATO Europe have sent a signal of support to those in the Obama administration who support that goal. Undoubtedly NATO foreign ministers will return to this topic in the near future, perhaps as early as their informal Spring meeting in Tallinn.

Former Dutch Prime Minister Lubbers Calls for Withdrawal of US Nukes from Europe

2009-12-04T13:27:00.000Z

Following the example of Sam Nunn, William Perry, Geroge Schulz and Henry Kissinger, a group of leading Dutch politicians has called in the newspaper NRC Handelsblad for the Netherlands to actively work for a nuclear weapon free world, and in particular, the revision of NATO's Strategic Concept to include the withdrawal of US nuclear weapons from NATO. Led by former Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers, the group wrote that:

As a member of Nato the Netherlands should make itself heard in the upcoming revision of its Strategic Concept. We have gratefully benefited from the nuclear protection of the United States. Now we must show ourselves a strong ally by supporting Obama’s goal of achieving a world without nuclear weapons according to the faithful implementation of Article VI of the NPT.

Given the clear indications the United States takes nuclear disarmament very seriously and that the original objective of deterrence has lost its validity, we need to ensure that neither the United States nor the other Nato allies wait for each other. The Netherlands should play an active role, so that the revision of the Strategic Concept will lead to the withdrawal of American nuclear weapons from the territories of non-nuclear weapon states.

The signature of Lubbers on this piece is especially significant, since he worked hard in the teeth of fierce opposition in the 1980s to force the deployment of US nuclear cruise missiles to the Netherlands. There were reports in the Dutch media last year that Lubbers had told the Dutch anti-nuclear group, IKV, that the US nuclear weapons deployed at Volkel air base in the Netherlands were obsolete and should be removed. Now, Lubbers has publicly called for their withdrawal.

Lubbers was joined by Max van der Stoel, a former Minister of Foreign Affairs; Hans van Mierlo, a former Minister of Defense and of Foreign Affairs; and Frits Korthals Altes, a former Minister of Justice.

Their piece in NRC Handelsblad comes after the Dutch government gave its support to the German government's initiative to have NATO affect just such a withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Germany, a move also supported publicly by Belgium and Norway.

No Membership Action Plan for Georgia

2009-12-04T12:07:00.000Z

Georgian Foreign Minister Grigol Vashadze held a bilateral meeting with NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen before a meeting of the NATO-Georgia Commission (NGC).

The Bush administration tried and failed to have NATO leaders approve a Membership Action Plan (MAP) for Georgia. And since the rash Georgian attack on South Ossetia gave Russia a reason to put military forces in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the MAP process has been on hold. In an effort ot move things forward Georgia has continued to work hard to earn NATO's favour. They have offered 900 soldiers, with no caveats on their use, to the NATO ISAF mission in Afghanistan. The Chairman's summary of the NGC meeting recognised this, stating:

NATO Ministers expressed strong appreciation for Georgia’s decision to make a substantial contribution to ISAF, to include an infantry company and an infantry battalion without national caveats.

However, in the absence of any agreement with Russia, and continuation of the territorial dispute with the breakaway territories, there is no sign that NATO ministers are ready to approve an MAP for Georgia in the foreseeable future.

As Secretary General Rasmussen told the NGC meeting, NATO will continue to work closely with Georgia:

Allies, collectively and bilaterally, are committed to Georgia's sovereignty and territorial integrity. But we all know that security climate in the region which is home to Georgia remains fragile. This puts a particular responsibility on the shoulders of all relevant parties, Georgia included. We all understand that your country has suffered a lot during the last years. There is much hardship to overcome, many human wounds have to heal. But reforms and modernization, and a determination to improve neighbourly relations, offer the best prospects of a better future for the Georgian people. NATO will continue to support your reforms, and stand by your territorial integrity.

Having welcomed progress, Rasmussen also warned Georgia that NATO attaches “great importance to the conduct of free and fair local elections in Georgia in spring 2010” and the need to continue and deepen other reforms reforms.

Georgia continues to pay the price for the recklessness that President Saakashvili showed in sparking conflict with Russia in 2008. There is little likelihood that they will given an invitation to join the Alliance for a long time, whatever the Alliance says about keeping the door open.

NATO Foreign Ministers Meet in Brussels

2009-12-04T11:19:00.000Z

NATO Foreign Ministers are in Brussels for the regular December meeting of the North Atlantic Council. They met yesterday in the NATO Ukraine Commission and the NATO Georgia Commission. The NATO Russia Council will also meet later today. NATO Monitor will post a series of reports on different aspects of the meeting today and tomorrow.

Pierre Harmel Has Died

2009-11-16T17:06:00.001Z

At 98 years old, Pierre Harmel has died. The Belgian was famous as the author of the 1967 Harmel Report, formally known as The Future Tasks of the Alliance. As well as advocating a strong defence of western Europe, the report advocated detente with the Soviet Union. His report also ushered in the nuclear doctrine of Flexible Response, which at the time was seen as being progressive - as it moved away from the massive strategic use of nuclear weapons at the start of a general war. By the 1980s, it had become controversial as it threatened a tactical nuclear war that would leave Europe devastated and the United States and Soviet Union largely untouched. It would be interesting to know what Harmel would have made of recent moves to discuss the withdrawal of the last US nuclear weapons from Europe. NATO's statement on his death can be found here.

Netherlands Joins German Effort to Oust US Nukes

2009-11-02T19:00:00.002Z

German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle traveled to the Netherlands today, where he met with his Dutch counterpart Maxime Verhagen, in what were described as 'getting to know you talks'. At the press conference afterwards the ministers were asked a whether they had discussed the new German coalition's policy of asking for withdrawal of US nuclear weapons, and replied that this was something they would work on together.

Westerwelle will soon discuss the issue with Belgian Foreign Minister Yves Leterme, and is also due to follow Chancellor Merkel to Washington for talks with Secretary of State Clinton that will touch on the nuclear issue.

For those who read Dutch, you can read an account here.

Benelux Countries to Discuss Nuclear Withdrawal

2009-10-31T08:45:00.004Z

Following the inauguration of a new German centre-right coalition government calling for the removal of US nuclear weapons from Germany, the discussion is spreading to involve the Benelux countries.

This week, Belgian Foreign Minister Yves Leterme told the Belgian Senate that he will discuss the issue with German, Dutch and Luxembourgeois colleagues in the course of the coming week. He said that Belgium is a partisan for a nuclear weapon free world and that removing US nuclear weapons from Europe is a crucial step towards that goal. Like Germans, Leterme advocates achieving this goal in a NATO framework. Leterme said that he would like the NATO ministerial meeting this December to discuss the issue.

That may be a little quick for the Germans who have talked about nuclear negotiations as part of the Strategic Concept debate, currently in a reflection phase and due to move into serious negotiations next Spring.

Obstacles to withdrawal remain. In mid-October the Dutch government had rejected resolutions in the Dutch parliament for the withdrawal of nuclear weapons based at Volkel airbase. However, privately the foreign ministry has been more amenable to discussing the issue and the German government action has changed the debate significantly.

It is not known how Turkey will react to this new initiative, but they have not been notably positive in the past on denuclearisation, despite ending their role in nuclear sharing. Also, some countries in the 'new Europe' like Poland may well have a strong reaction against the removal of this visible symbol of US commitment to Europe.

Bilateral Belgian-German discussions will take place this coming Tuesday when German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle visits Brussels.

More details in Dutch and French.

Ministers on Defence Transformation

2009-10-26T15:03:00.000Z

The transformation of NATO for the 21^st century has been a major topic at ministerial meetings for some time, and the Alliance has a military command dedicated to transformation based in Norfolk, Virginia.

Ministers discussed transformation at their working dinner in Bratislava, and a major part of that discussion was the prioritisation of resources. In the midst of recession, and deep cuts in government spending in years to come, the debate for NATO is no longer how to increase defence spending, but how to do more with less. Ministers agreed the Secretary General´s decision to appoint a high-level group of officials from defence ministries to address this question directly at the NATO level. One way that NATO adds value to national defence budgets is with collective projects, which include initiatives such as Allied Ground Surveillance and Strategic Airlift Capability.

In fact the core of the transformation debate is how NATO can acquire the capability to project forces quickly across the globe. This means military transformation, but also major change sin the decision-making structures at a NATO level which were not designed for an Alliance of 27 states, and are increasingly unwieldy.

NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen gave a speech prior to the opening of the Defence Ministers meeting, in which he addressed defence transformation from the NATO perspective:

.. the new Strategic Concept will need to urge continued military transformation – to allow us to cover the full spectrum of tasks, from collective defence to peace support operations. It should also encourage Allies to work more closely together in acquiring key capabilities and in funding operations. Needless to say, the current financial crisis and the budgetary problems faced by all our nations only make this a more pressing requirement. This is also about taxpayer’s money. We have to make efficient use of our resources, through better cooperation, through better coordination and through collective solutions.

He also dealt with the issue during the question and answer session:

[On] modernization of NATO. Actually, it's my ambition that the Strategic Concept as such, should serve as the leverage for modernization, transformation and reform of NATO. And I fully agree that we need such transformation. Let me just mention a few areas. Firstly, militarily. It strikes me that 70 percent of the armed forces in Europe are stationary. I spoke about our core task territorial defence, but I also ask myself, how can we make territorial defence critical if we cannot deploy military forces, if we cannot move them around, if they are not flexible?

So we need transformation in a direction of more flexibility, more mobility, more deployability. Which leads me to my second point. We also need to streamline our structures. Our command structures, our Headquarters, of course, including civil headquarters in Brussels. And recently I had the opportunity to present to the NATO Ambassadors in Brussels some of my ideas as to how I would like to gradually modernize and reform our Headquarters.

As far as our military headquarters are concerned, I also think there is a potential for streamlining. However, I also think this should be an integrated part of our Strategic Concept exercise.

And finally, it's my ambition to ensure that NATO can become an efficient decision-making body. If we are to ensure NATO relevance on the international stage then we also have to speed up our decision-making processes. You touched upon the number of committees, but even more important than the exact number of committees, and I agree with you, we should look closer into that. Actually we have an ongoing exercise, a review of our committee system. But even more important than the number of committees, is the procedure as to how we use the committees. I don't think they should delay decisions, but they should improve the quality of decisions. So it's a very important point.

The ministers debate at the dinner was discussed by NATO Spokesman James Appathurai earlier in the day. He was quite blunt about the financial situation:

The bottom line, when it comes to money, is this: In the next few years we foresee a shortfall of several hundred million euros between what governments have committed to do within NATO budgets when it comes to operations and capabilities, and what they have allocated in terms of money to pay for that. That shortfall will only grow as NATO's responsibilities grow as well. The Secretary General is going to draw attention to that this evening and ask allies to look at where we can do a number of things. One is to prioritize the things that we do, the things that are more important, the things that are less important. Second, to see how we can pool resources, pool assets, do better at being cost effective in the way in which we acquire equipment, in the way in which we do our logistics.

Appathurai also addressed the question of deployability:

A second aspect is capability. In essence less than half of our forces are deployable outside of the country which provides them. Less than 10 percent are sustainable outside of the country for any extended period of time. There has been a lot of improvement in the last four or five years in raising those numbers, but it is still not enough, because not only can forces that can't move not be sent very far out of area, for example, to Afghanistan, they're also quite limited in the kind of support they can provide even to allies in an Article 5 contingency. So more deployable forces, more sustainable forces make sense, both for collective defence and for out-of-area operations and the Secretary General is basically going to want to put before allies the idea of having more concrete timelines for reaching higher targets for deployability and sustainability of their forces.

For NATO, the bottom line is, as the Secretary General told the press following the meeting “To me, the discussion on transformation is very simple: we need more capability for the money we spend on defence. And we are not doing well enough.”

On can question whether the idea of NATO as a global security provider, ready to intervene across the globe is a good one. Opinion is divided. However, it is undeniable that NATO is not well suited to the role at present. The experience in Afghanistan has cruelly highlighted that fact. However, it has also shown that however good the decision-making procedures, however well adapted and trained the military, whatever resources are provided, the main ingredient that is necessary is political will to do what is necessary for operational success. In Afghanistan the Alliance is seen as united in theory, but divided in practice, and all the transformation in the world won’t compensate for that.

Germany Will Press for Nuclear Withdrawal - Will Not Act Unilaterally

2009-10-26T08:59:00.004Z

There are a couple of updates on the German coalition decision to seek the withdrawal of US nuclear weapons from Germany.

Agence France Presse notes that the withdrawal of the nuclear weapons may become an issue when Merkel addresses a joint session of Congress next month:

But he has said Berlin should start by demanding the removal of the estimated 10 to 20 US nuclear missiles on German soil -- a stance that could raise a few questions when Merkel travels to Washington next month to deliver an address before both houses of Congress.

Deutsche Welle reports that FDP leader Guido Westerwelle said that he will personally take up the challenge, while Chancellor Merkel said there will be no unilateral action:

Speaking at a meeting of his business-friendly FDP party in Berlin on Sunday, Westerwelle said the new German government would support the vision of US President Barack Obama for a world free of nuclear weapons.

"We will take President Obama at his word and enter talks with our allies so that the last of the nuclear weapons still stationed in Germany, relics of the Cold War, can finally be removed," Westerwelle said.

"Germany must be free of nuclear weapons," he said, adding that he would personally make efforts towards that purpose.

No unilateral move to remove nuclear arms

His comments came a day after his FDP party reached agreement with Chancellor Angela Merkel's conservatives for a new center-right government scheduled to take office on October 28.

The coalition agreement reached by the two sides calls specifically for talks with NATO and the US to remove the weapons.

Chancellor Angela Merkel confirmed this goal, but emphasized no unilateral action would be taken to remove the nuclear warheads. "We do not want any independent action here," Merkel said on Saturday in Berlin.

The website dedefensa.org notes (in French) that while the sentiment for withdrawal has regularly welled up in Germany, this initiative is more important than past ones as it is written into the government programme. That programme has been endorsed by the members of both parties, giving it extra political force.

This insistence on agreement within NATO before any withdrawal can take place reflects the general pro-atlanticist tone of the coalition. It also mirrors wider opinion in Europe that President Obama’s commitment to disarmament means that negotiations are the best way to achieve progress on reductions at present, and that a move such as this by the coalition will be better received in Washington DC than was the case under Presidents Clinton or Bush.

Time Magazine reports that the coalition document endorses the German presence in Afghanistan as in the ‘German national interest’. This removes one potential area of major disagreement with the White House, and removes a shadow that has hung over US German relations, smoothing the path for discussions on nuclear weapons.

Overall the level of coverage is still low, but more and more news organisations are beginning to report the coalition policy on nuclear weapons. However, economic policy reporting far outweighs that on foreign policy. Some examples of coverage include: Bloomberg; Associated Press; Iranian government English language Press TV; and the Irish Times.

There will be other obstacles. It is far from clear that Turkey will be ready to accept US extended deterrence without the physical presence of nuclear weapons on Turkish soil. Turkey’s region makes it much more nervous on this issue than other NATO nations, although Turkey has given up its participation in nuclear sharing programmes.

Secondly, some nations in central and eastern Europe, notably Poland and the Czech Republic have been agitating for a greater role in NATO nuclear strategy – with Poland privately requesting the right to participate in nuclear sharing.

Given the lack of coverage in the press, it would seem that when Chancellor Merkel visits Washington DC there will be an opportunity to make the new coalitions withdrawal policy better known, and also a need to offer strong support to prevent the DoD suffocating this initiative at birth, as has done in the past – notably in 1998 when all Germany was calling for was debate inside NATO on the continued need to deploy these weapons to Europe.

It's Official - German Coalition Wants US Nukes Out

2009-10-25T11:54:00.002Z

Confirmation from Oliver Meier of the Arms Control Association that the the new German government is committed to working for the withdrawal of US nuclear weapons from Germany. Oliver’s translation of part of the arms control section of the new government’s agreed programme reads:

"We emphatically support President Obama’s proposals for new far-reaching disarmament initiatives – including the goal of a nuclear weapons-free world.

....

We observe with concern the erosion of the international disarmament and arms control architecture. We are convinced that follow-agreements to those treaties that expire have to be negotiated and that the missing ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty or the adapted CFE-Treaty have to be completed.

We will support the conclusion of new disarmament and arms control agreements. We want to use the 2010 NPT review conference to initiate a new dynamic for treaty-based accords.

….

Against this background, and in the context of the talks on a new Strategic Concept for NATO we will advocate within NATO and towards our U.S. allies a withdrawal of remaining nuclear weapons from Germany. With a view towards preserving the agreements within the CFE-regime, we are ready on our part to ratify the adapted CFE-treaty."

(You can read the german version at the Der Spiegel website.)

This represents a major development in Christian Democrat policy – as Chancellor Merkel’s party has steadfastly defended the small remaining deployment of US nuclear weapons in Germany. (It is worth remembering that the CDU will likely control the defence ministry in the new government.)

The question of these deployments will now have to be raised in the context of the NATO Strategic Concept Review – currently in a research phase as a series of seminars are held exploring the issues that the review must address. Germany is likely to seek withdrawal in the context of an Allied policy, rather than as a unilateral action.

A series of questions are also raised by this new policy. If US nuclear weapons are withdrawn from Germany, will the storage facilities for the bombs remain, so they could return? Will Germany end its participation in NATO nuclear sharing, under which German pilots are trained and equipped to deliver nuclear weapons in the vent of ‘general war’, despite Germany’s nominal status as a non-nuclear weapon state under the Non-Proliferation Treaty?

It is clear that many NATO states still have security concerns that lead them to continue to rely on a US policy of extended deterrence. However, in the Obama administration’s Nuclear Posture Review, the ways in which that extended deterrence are provided are being considered, and it is by no means certain that the US will wish to maintain a small number of Cold War weapons in Europe indefinitely. Concerns over extended deterrence can be met in the short term, while the Obama goal of a nuclear weapon free world is pursued, by US and UK Trident forces allocated to the Alliance. The relevance of free fall nuclear bombs intended for use in a central European bloc-to-bloc conflict, for attacks on large Soviet tank armies, and rear base areas like then Leningrad, is not at all clear today.

While the small number of residual free-fall bombs are in no way sufficient to be part of a negotiation with Russia over tactical nuclear weapons, their withdrawal would help open the way for the inclusion of those weapons in future US-Russia arms control talks to which those parties are committed, and which the US wishes to use to involve other nuclear weapons states.

To NATO’s south, there is no nuclear threat. The countries of Africa have brought the Pelindaba Treat into force. This creates a nuclear weapon free zone in Africa, and there is no reason to doubt, with the end of Libya’s abortive nuclear weapons programme, that any nation is developing nuclear weapons in Africa.

NATO nations, as many others, have concerns about Iran. And, bearing in mind the African example, that is precisely why a commensurate effort should be placed in achieving successful negotiations with Iran individually, and in the Middle East WMD Free Zone in general.

There is still a long way to go. Until recently, the nuclear planning staff at NATO were advocating a widening of the role for nuclear weapons in NATO strategy, mirroring the policies of the Bush administration. That gained no traction with European allies. The German coalitions new policy document is an excellent contribution to the Strategic Concept debate on deterrence and the future of US nuclear weapons in Europe.

NATO Agreement on Obama BMD Proposals Deepens

2009-10-25T10:40:00.001Z

It seems that the NATO Monitor suggestion that there was still deep divisions amongst European allies on the Obama administration BMD plans may have been overdoing it- notwithstanding the outspoken statement by Slovak prime Minister Robert Fico this week.

On Thursday, Fico met with NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen this week, and came out of the meeting declaring to journalists that “As long as I'm the Slovak Prime Minister, Slovakia will never agree to any anti-missile shields being placed on our territory”. This was somewhat strange, since no-one had asked Fico to allow basing in Slovakia of any element of BMD, nor are they going to.

This statement has much more to do with Slovak internal politics than with any NATO plans. And Fico also welcomed the reorientation of NATO and US plans for missile defences in Europe. This chimed with the statement of the Secretary General to the press after the meeting:

On missile defence, Secretary Gates kicked off the discussion with a short briefing on the new US approach to European missile defence. Ministers welcomed the fact the new US approach puts European missile defence more in a NATO context. That is good for the Alliance. It is good for solidarity. And to my mind, it is important for the defence of Europe that we are talking about rolling out a system within a couple of years that can provide European and North American citizens defence against a real and growing missile threat.

A major element in European willingness to support the Obama administration’s proposals is that they do not antagonize Russia, and that there remains a possibility of NATO-Russia collaboration.

The Bush administration had intended to deploy mid-course BMD interceptors in Poland and a radar in the Czech Republic. Russia claimed the system was deeply dangerous to its national security, and all independent scientific experts agreed that the system would have been very ill-suited to dealing with threats from its claimed target – Iran -, and very well suited to monitoring and countering launches from Russia.

In the context of the administration’s desire to counter potential launches from Iran, the proposed system that will see a phased deployment across south-eastern Europe as part of an integrated NATO system, is actually targeted at shorter range systems than the ICBMS the mid-course system targets (and that, incidentally, Iran does not possess). US Defense Secretary Robert Gates also told journalists that radars in southern Russia could make a useful contribution to this new proposed system.

From a NATO Europe perspective the new system has several advantages. It is far more developed than the proposed mid-course system, which simply doesn’t work. It poses no strategic threat to Russia, and thus does nothing to harm relations. Finally, in contrast to President Bush whose administration virtually ignored NATO and pursued bilateral negotiations with Poland and the Czech Republic, the Obama administration has briefed and consulted with allies at a NATO level regularly. They are rebuilding faith in the US commitment to the Alliance which was severely eroded by President Bush.

A number of NATO ministers made supportive statements after the meeting and during the course of this week, while Vice-President Biden has been visiting Europe. Notably, Bulgaria and Romania supported the new proposals, when they had been deeply skeptical of the Bush proposals which would not have covered south-eastern Europe – even supposing it worked. Ministers did insist again that the indivisibility of security of the Alliance was a vital principle and that BMD must cover all NATO nations.

This system remains at the proposal stage, and a lot of work is still to be done. NATO has been discussing whether or not to develop an Alliance wide BMD system since the 1990s. However, Secretary General Rasmussen told the press conference after the meeting that:

I think NATO Foreign Ministers will look to take this forward in December. And I hope that, by our Lisbon Summit next fall, we can agree to make European missile defence fully a NATO mission.

The intention is to have the proposed system up and running by 2015. NATO Monitor suggests that it would be sensible to put as much effort as has gone into brokering this deal into working with NATO’s neighbours to end fears of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons attack. Arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament can play a major role in enhancing Alliance security in this field, perhaps rendering unnecessary the billions in spending that will be needed to put this NATO BMD system into the field.

Will Germany Call for Removal of US Nuclear Weapons?

2009-10-23T12:46:00.003+01:00

Just as NATO Ministers began to meet in Bratislava, the German press was full of stories yesterday about the new coalition and it's likely policy on the remaining US nuclear weapons stored in Germany.

A Reuters report, picked up at Forbes.com said that the foreign policy section of a draft coalition agreement that is expected to be approved by Chancellor Angela Merkel's conservatives and the Free Democrats (FDP) later this week, states:

....

DISARMAMENT

"... we will strive within (NATO) and with our American allies for a withdrawal of the last U.S. nuclear weapons from Germany."

The head of the Free Democrats, Guido Westerwelle, is likely to become Foreign Minister in the new government. During the election campaign, he had committed his party to negotiating the withdrawal of the US nuclear weapons on German soil. In recent years, as numbers of nukes deployed to Europe has fallen, they have already been removed from the UK and Greece. Turkey has ended its participation in NATO nuclear sharing programmes, and the presence of the weapons has become more and more controversial.

If this coalition agreement does contain this commitment, it will mark a change in policy by Chancellor Merkel's Christian Democrat party which had, up to now, remained supportive of the nuclear deployment. Such a move would also be very interesting in the context of the US Nuclear Posture Review (NPR).

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton gave a speech on non-proliferation this week in which she talked of the need to provide assurance to allies while meeting non-proliferation goals:

.. the ongoing Nuclear Posture Review will be a key milestone. It will more accurately calibrate the role, size, and composition of our nuclear stockpile to the current and future international threat environments. And it will provide a fundamental reassessment of U.S. nuclear force posture, levels, and doctrine. Carried out in consultation with our allies, it will examine the role of nuclear weapons in deterring today’s threats and review our declaratory policies with respect to the circumstances in which the United States would consider using nuclear weapons.

As part of the NPR, the Nuclear Posture Review, we are grappling with key questions: What is the fundamental purpose of the U.S. nuclear weapons arsenal? Will our deterrence posture help the United States encourage others to reduce their arsenals and advance our nonproliferation agenda? How can we provide reassurance to our allies in a manner that reinforces our nonproliferation objectives?

Behind the scenes it is clear that the withdrawal of US nuclear weapons from Europe is on the agenda, and the question is how to provide extended deterrence without keeping the symbols of that policy on the continent?

This German statement is most interesting. The new Norwegian government has committed itself to a similar debate within NATO. With major figures like former Dutch Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers (who championed the unpopular arrival of nuclear armed Cruise missiles in the Netherlands in the 1980s) stating that the US nuclear deployments to Europe should be ended, the debate on deterrence in the NATO Strategic Concept review should prove extremely interesting.

NATO Defence Ministers Meet in Bratislava

2009-10-22T14:12:00.002+01:00

NATO Defence Ministers are gathering in Bratislava for their regular Autumn informal meeting.

The meeting starts this evening with dinner, at which ministers will discuss defence transformation. Investment in military technology and maintaining defence budgets is a difficult, if not impossible, task in the current economic climate. The UK is considering cancellation of major programmes, like future aircraft carriers. The US will next year cut its defence budget for the first time in a decade, and Defense Secretary Robert Gates has begun to eliminate some spending programmes. Overall, it is unlikely that the mood for this discussion will be positive. The NATO announcement for the meeting says that Ministers will focus on resources prioritisation in a difficult economic environment. This puts a premium on collective solutions, with an important role for common funding arrangements and common projects where appropriate. Participants are also likely to discuss how best to ensure the availability of usable and sustainable forces for NATO missions. Ministers will also discuss the tasks assigned to the NATO Response Force, including its role in enhancing Allied collective defence and overall cohesion of NATO.

(The NATO Bratislava meeting page is here)

Tomorrow morning, the main discussion will be on Afghanistan, as well as other NATO missions such as Kosovo. NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen says that:

I believe we need a general agreement on the approach we need to take in Afghanistan: and that should mean an endorsement of the approach set out by General McChrystal. To my mind, it is clear. Hoping that Taliban extremists will never again host Al- Qaeda is not a strategy. They did it in the past. We can only assume they will do it in future. Which means that Afghanistan needs to be made strong enough to resist the insurgency, if it is to be able to resist terrorism. It’s as simple as that. And that is the essence of the McChrystal approach. What does that mean? It means more and better reconstruction and development. It means holding the new Afghan Government to account, to deal with corruption effectively and visibly. And it means building Afghan Security forces strong enough to provide security in Afghanistan, with us in a supporting role.

(You can read his full briefing here)

This will also be a difficult discussion. Political support for the mission is sapping away. There is an intense debate in the UK as to whether Afghanistan is worth British dead and British investment. Australia is considering the withdrawal of its 1500-strong troop contingent. Even in the US the public mood is swinging strongly against future involvement in Afghanistan. The commitment of much of Europe has been in doubt for a long time. So Ministers have their work cut out to justify the future NATO role, especially with the massive corruption evident in Afghan elections and the increasingly obvious failings of the Karzai government.

The abandonment of the mid-course ballistic missile defence deployments in Poland and the Czech Republic, together with proposed deployments of shorter range systems as part of NATO BMD proposals will also be discussed. The handling of this issue by the Bush and Obama administrations has left many in Eastern Europe angered, and the political fallout with Russia had previously angered many in the west. NATO is divided on BMD, and much work will be needed to overcome these divisions.

NATO Launches Strategic Concept Review Process

2009-07-07T12:23:00.002+01:00

In a major conference in Brussels, NATO is today launching the process of reviewing its Strategic Concept. The NATO website says:

The aim of this Secretary General’s conference on July 7th is to formally launch the process leading to the new Strategic Concept and begin a dialogue between NATO and a wide range of experts from the strategic community as well as the broader public. The conference will examine how the Alliance relates to the rest of the world, as part of a wider network of security actors. It will also look at NATO’s role in addressing new threats and challenges.

The event can be followed at the NATO website.

A Russian View of the NRC Meeting

2009-06-28T19:22:00.002+01:00

Itar-Tass News Agency has carried a very interesting report of the NATO Russia Council meeting.

In his speech at the meeting Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said that Russia would brief NATO on Russia’s new national security concept and would expect NATO to do the same.

Rogozin said that NATO had responded immediately. On July 7 the Russian envoy to NATO will be invited to attend an internal seminar of high-ranking NATO experts who are responsible for developing the alliance’ s strategic concept.

“We noted and appreciated the alliance’s readiness to dialogue. We will take our return step on July 22 when a representative of the Russian Security Council arrives in Brussels to participate in a meeting of the Russia-NATO Council at an ambassador level. He will brief the alliance on a new concept of Russia’s national security,” Rogozin went on to say.

Russia and NATO agreed to resume military and political contacts, and this is another vital outcome of the Corfu meeting.

“A political will to resume military cooperation was expressed today,” Rogozin emphasized, commenting on the outcome of a ministerial meeting of the Russian-NATO Council that was held in Corfu.

This agreement to consult on strategic concepts is very interesting, and would be a real first. A commitment to transparency would be a genuine step-up in confidence building between the two sides. NATO Monitor will watch this development with interest.

NATO, Russia and Missile Defence

2009-06-28T14:32:00.004+01:00

In the wake of the resumption of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC), and in preparation for the Obama-Medvedev meeting on July 6 on arms control, it has been announced that US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen will visit Moscow to discuss missile defence.

The plan to deploy a missile defence radar and interceptor missiles in the Czech Republic and Poland was launched under former US president George W. Bush, causing relations between the two sides to plummet to a post-Cold War low. Experts have demonstrated that the proposed system of mid-course European interceptors to destroy missiles from Iran, is fundamentally flawed for that purpose. It would however be ideally placed to intercept missiles from Russia. As Russia works with the US to reduce nuclear warheads and missiles, this will increasingly become an issue.

It is certainly a major issue in the NRC, and will now be addressed directly.

"We expect missile defense issues to come up," Captain John Kirby, a spokesman for Mullen told journalists after the NRC meeting this weekend.

In all this, one thing has not changed. The Bush administration tried to make missile defence a bilateral matter with Poland and the Czech Republic, angering Russia and dismaying many in NATO Europe.

The Obama administration, while claiming to consult more, will deal directly with Russia on missile defence as part of its bilateral strategic relations. NATO is, once again, the loser. Its much vaunted reputation as the preeminent venue for western security cooperation slips a little more.

State Department Briefing on NRC Meeting

2009-06-28T07:18:00.002+01:00

The State Department gave a background briefing before the NRC meeting, with its main concern being Afghanistan. Here are the sections of the briefing on the NRC.

..

Also in Corfu will be a meeting of the NATO-Russia Council, as I mentioned, which will mark the resumption of high-level dialogue between NATO allies and Russia. As you know, the NRC hasn’t met at this level since Russia’s military action in Georgia in August 2008. After the Secretary’s March 5th ministerial in Brussels, it was decided to resume the NRC at ambassadorial level, the perm reps in Brussels. This’ll be the first ministerial, it’ll be an informal ministerial held in Corfu. And it will also be a useful opportunity to discuss areas of potential cooperation between NATO and Russia, a genuine debate and dialogue, but also areas where we disagree. And that includes the question of Georgia and there are some others. But we hope that it’ll be a constructive meeting where we can talk about areas in which NATO and Russia can cooperate, including on terrorism, piracy, and Afghanistan.

..
QUESTION: Arshad Mohammed with Reuters. One just practical scheduling matter and then a more substantive question: On the scheduling, do you expect Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov to, in fact, be there at the NATO-Russia ministerial? And do you expect Deputy Secretary Steinberg to have a bilat with him?
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: The answer to both questions is yes.

…

QUESTION: Okay. Got it, thanks. What – can you shed any more light on what – you know, the United States, after (inaudible) its allies at NATO for a number of years for additional troops and fewer caveats, you know, seems to have acknowledged that it is unlikely to get much more on that side of the equation. And I wonder if you can shed some light on what exactly you are looking for in concrete terms from your partners and allies on Afghanistan and Pakistan.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: I think there’s a lot they can do. Already, at the NATO summit, of course, we did work together on military and nonmilitary aspects of cooperation. They did pledge some 3,000 troops for election support and established a NATO monitoring mission – training mission in Afghanistan, which was a very useful contribution that goes beyond the military deployments that they’ve already made, which at present constitute more than 30,000 troops. So it’s far from nothing what they’re already doing militarily.
In terms of further contributions, we will continue to hope that allies are willing to lessen the caveats and the restrictions that they placed on their forces in Afghanistan, and we’ll put a particular focus at this meeting on what they can do to help Pakistan, in particular, to bolster Pakistan’s civilian government and its efforts to combat Taliban and extremists both in Pakistan and in Afghanistan. Our assumption, and that’s why we now talk about Af-Pak and Afghanistan-Pakistan together, is that you can’t really deal with Afghanistan unless you deal successfully with Pakistan.

And we’re working on this as a region now, and that’s why Special Representative Holbrooke is responsible for both countries. It really is a global theater. It’s a region of operations. The EU had a conference on Pakistan – I believe it’ll be its first one in history – last week and came up with a significant amount of money, I think $100 million, getting us towards the goal of $500 million for Pakistan. That’s an important contribution of a nonmilitary sort, the likes of which we’ll be looking to build on at the G-8 meeting.

..

QUESTION: Could you shed any more light on the new agreement with the Krygyz (inaudible) base? Any – there are reports that the rent has gone up three times. And I also wonder whether there has been any talk with the Russians about this, because the foreign ministry in Moscow commented on this today.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Well, I can briefly -- I don’t know if Ian wants to add anything on that. This is a matter between Kyrgyzstan and the United States. So I don’t believe there’s been discussions with Russia about it. It’s in our common interest to use the base for transit in Afghanistan, and we’re pleased that we’ve reached an agreement with them on it. And it’s really not a Russian issue. Kyrgyzstan is a sovereign country.

QUESTION: Did you raise the amount of money that you’re paying now to the Kyrgyz Government for use of the base?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: I don’t have anything on that. Ian, do you --

MR. KELLY: No, I –

…

NATO-Russia Council Back In Action

2009-06-28T06:45:00.004+01:00

The NATO-Russia Council (NRC) met informally at Ministerial level Saturday in Corfu, bringing an end to the body suspension, in place since the Russian military intervention in Georgia last Summer. The NRC had been due to hold this meeting in late May, but Russia cancelled that meeting angry at NATO holding joint exercises with Georgia.

Before the meeting, James Appathurai the NATO spokesman told reporters that: It means we are back to business. It was not the business that was totally frozen. But at the political level and at the military-to-military level, I expect we will leave Corfu back to business.

In fact, the Council had only ever been suspended at the insistence of former President George Bush. Many European nations had wanted to use the NRC to talk with Russia about Georgia, but the US insisted on gesture politics instead. President Obama has sought better relations with Russia to move his arms control and disarmament agenda along. Restoration of the NATO-Russia Council was part of this policy.

The NRC has been meeting regularly at Ambassadorial level for some time. At a meeting a week ago, Russian Ambassador to NATO Dmitry Rogozin told Itar-Tass that the NRC ministerial meeting “will make it possible to re-launch the full format political dialogue that was interrupted on the NATO initiative after the Russian response to Georgia’s aggression against South Ossetia.” The restoration of the political dialogue will also “open the way for the resumption of military cooperation, including interaction on Afghanistan, resumption of Russia’s participation in the NATO antiterrorist operation in the Mediterranean “Active Endeavour,” as well as cooperation in the fight against pirates near the Somalia coast.”

Re-engaging with Russia on Afghanistan is another key Obama objective. With Russian support the possibility grows of more robust northern supply lines into Afghanistan to provide logisitics for the ever growing US and NATO mission. Given the uncertain nature of southern supply routes through Pakistan, this is likely to be essential to any NATO success in Afghanistan.

After the meeting, outgoing NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer said to journalists that: Despite the fact that there are differences ... the spirit (of the meeting) was one of wanting to cooperate.. The NATO-Russia Council, which has been in the neutral stand for almost a year, is now back in gear. The 29 ambassadors in Brussels will very quickly get back to work to agree on new procedures to make the NATO-Russia Council function more effectively.

The Russian view of the meeting was a little less positive. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov told reporters that the meeting was ".. a positive development", but that there was a "frank exchange of views" at the table. As de Hoop Scheffer said, the disagreements focused on Georgia, where NATO nations refuse to accept Russian recognition of breakaway regions South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which they now support militarily. Scheffer said that: No one tried to paper over our differences, on Georgia for example. But we agreed not to let those disagreements bring the whole NRC train to a halt.

Lavrov, on the other hand, insisted that Russia's recognition of the separatists could not be reversed: All have to accept the new realities and the decisions taken by Russia after the conflict are irreversible.

This is a first step, but the most positive factor is that both sides have agreed that talking about problems is better than a new East-West face-off. The Bush administration wa sprepared to push NATO into a new Cold War to make a point to Russia about Georgia. Cooler heads have prevailed, and a range of issues from missile defence and arms control to Afghanistan are now on the table for future cooperation.

(Note that the full NATO web pae on the meeting can be accessed here)

"Wise Men" Update

2009-06-14T19:26:00.004+01:00

Turkish newspaper Hurriyet reports that Turkey has appointed former NATO Ambassador Umit Pamir to the 12-strong group of "wise men" that will shape the future Alliance Strategic Concept. The group will have its first meeting in July in Brussels and is tasked with creating "more partnerships in the world, to empower military capacity, to develop further relations with international organizations, to be able to execute its missions and operations, to solve the problems with Russia."

NATO Transformation Demonstrated

2009-06-14T19:01:00.003+01:00

NATO Ministers debated the transformation of the Alliance - which essentially means developing its ability to project military power beyond Europe, and as NATO reports:

Ministers reviewed and provided guidance on a wide-range of intra-Allied initiatives, including, inter alia, Allied Ground Surveillance (AGS), strategic airlift, helicopters project and usability of forces enhancement. Two subjects were discussed in depth. First, Ministers agreed on a new structure and arrangements for NATO Response Force (NRF). It will include a core element, a command and control part, as well as forces available on call. Moreover, the new force generation mechanisms will allow for more sustainable and “user-friendly” contributions from individual Allies. Second, they focused on various ideas presented by the Secretary General to make the NATO Headquarters in Brussels better fit to serve the Alliance in the years to come.

Little detail was available in the wake of the meeting, but the best evidence for the changes the Alliance has undergone in the past decade were shown through its ongoing missions. Ministers agreed a plan to draw down forces in Kosovo, a mission that would have been controversial as 'out of area' 15 years ago, but which is now seen as traditional peace-keeping. Troop numbers in the province will decline from 15,000 to 10,000 by early 2010, if Kosovo stays calm. beyond that, if things go well, troop numbers will eventually decline to 2,500. Many obstacles remain, not least the vitriolic hatred between the Albanian and Serbian Kosovans, and the semi-recognised state of independence that Kosovo declared in 2008.

At the same time, Ministers agreed to prolong Operation Allied Protector, their naval mission off the coast of Somalia, under which NATO warships escort World Food Programme ships into Somalia, and hunt for pirates on the sea. This mission has been seen by some, even within the Alliance, as a step too far in globalising NATO - but continued hijacking of shipping in the region means that western nations see the mission as a national security interest. There are also arguments about the effectiveness of the Operation, which has displaced much piracy from Somalia to neighbouring regions, such as off Oman.

At the same time, Defence Ministers supported a US plan to reorganize the military command in Afghanistan, to better handle an influx of new troops. NATO has nearly 60,000 troops in Afghanistan, and that number will increase still more during the coming months as some 21,000 additional American soldiers arrive. NATO officials also briefed that the Alliance will send up to 10,000 extra troops for enhanced security during Afghan presidential elections this August.

Ministers met with the new US commander in Afghanistan, General McChrystal, and approved plans to increase the training of Afghanistan security forces to allow them to work with the alliance in combating the rising Taliban insurgency.

These actions will have some significance for the future credibility of the Alliance - if NATO fails in Afghanistan it will find it difficult to build a role as a 'global security provider', as many in the Alliance wish. It will also have consequences for the development of the new Alliance Strategic Concept, which was ordered by the Summit of Heads and State and Government meeting in Strasbourg and Kehl earlier this year.

Poles Resent Lack of Progress on Missile Defence, Welcome New NATO Unit

2009-06-14T09:19:00.003+01:00

Poland had a mixed time at NATO this week. The Poles, having resisted Bush administration efforts to deploy missile defence interceptors for a year, jumped enthusiastically into an agreement when Russia moved military forces into Georgia last Summer.

The Poles had calculated that they needed to attract military infrastructure from the US and from NATO into Poland, to be sure that the Alliance’s Article V guarantee would be effective against a resurgent Russia. Unfortunately for them, they had failed to allow for the election of President Obama (somewhat short-sighted in September 2008), and for changes in policy resulting from that election.

And now, the Poles are resentful that the missile defence agreement signed with the Bush administration is in limbo, and that the Patriot batteries they had asked for as a quid pro quo have not been deployed. Polish spokesman Pawel Gras told Polish media on June 12 that “We're still lacking an essential, clear response as to whether the U.S. will go ahead with the shield plan. It's a fundamental question to which we need a definite answer. On our side we've met the pledges in this deal. The land is ready and waiting.”

Polish and US sources have told the media that US Defense Secretary Robert Gates told his Polish counterpart Bogdan Klich that the Patriot batteries would be deployed in Poland on a rotating basis only for training and exercise purposes, for which they need not be armed. The Polish government is most unhappy.

This is a clear concession to Russia, which has strongly opposed both the deployment of US missile defences in Eastern Europe, and the build-up of NATO military infrastructure close to its borders. Since NATO-Russia are on a calmer trajectory, there seems little point in antagonizing Moscow with an infrastructure build-up on the NATO side.

The Poles, however, are much happier with another development this week. Klich was able to announce that “NATO has decided to form a new unit, the communications regiment. Under this decision the command of one of three battalions making up the regiment will have its headquarters in Bydgoszcz. This decision, combined with Thursday's decision to allocate fresh general's posts to Polish officers, including the post of deputy commander at the strategic command of transformation headquartered in Norfolk, points to Poland's growing importance in NATO. It is the result of our participation in NATO's foreign missions.”

Polish concerns about full integration into NATO were clearly uppermost in Klich’s mind, as he told a press conference that "The more allied institutions are in Poland the greater our sense of security.” This is a clever political compromise, which helps Poland and does so without annoying Russia.

However, while the US Congress has prohibited development of the missile defence sites in Poland and the Czech Republic, the outcome of the Obama administration’s missile defence review may change things, although Congress and the administration agree that the system (which has never had a realistic test and has failed 50% of its simplified tests) must be proven to work before it can be deployed. Poland will continue to press Washington on this issue, but some in Warsaw are probably beginning to realize that jumping into an agreement with an unpopular President in the last weeks of his term in office wasn’t a sensible move. For now, the communications HQ will need to satisfy their desire for proof that NATO really wants them.

Nuclear Planning Group Meets

2009-06-12T07:22:00.002+01:00

The NATO Nuclear Planning Group used to meet for two days twice each year, with many Ambassadorial level meetings in between. Since the end of the Cold War this function of the Alliance has atrophied, and yesterday the NPG held its only meeting for 2009. It was scheduled to last one hour and all NATO had to say on the meeting was that "members of the Nuclear Planning Group held consultations on key current issues related to the Alliance’s nuclear policy."

It is known that the NPG was briefed on the US Nuclear Posture Review, which includes an International Issues Working Group, and in which the deployment of US nuclear weapons in Europe will be discussed. But the extent of consultations on this, and any other issues, remains unknown. No-one was talking about it last night.

Despite reintegration into NATO military structures, France remains outside the NPG.

US Legislators Introduce Bill to Keep US Nukes in Europe

2009-06-12T07:03:00.002+01:00

Rep. Michael Turner (R-OH) and Rep. Jim Marshall (D-GA), two conservative lawmakers, have introduced the NATO First Act in the House of Representatives. They hope to be able to attach the Act to the National Defense Authorization Act as it makes it way through the House.

This Act is a conservative attempt to constrain the options of the Obama administration as it rebuilds its relationship with Russia, or as the two cosponsors put it "This legislation will continue American´s strong commitment to European defense while taking steps to strengthen our NATO allies and partner nations".

The legislation would force the President to spend $500 million on building ballistic missile defence sites in Poland and the Czech Republic, something the administration is very reluctant to go ahead with and which Russia strongly opposes.

Notably, the draft legislation would prohibit any action taken to reduce United States nuclear forces based in Europe (thought to be reduced already to around 250 free fall B61 bombs), unless required by law and the President makes a series of certifications. The cosponsors also want to spend $50 million for upgrading the safety, security, and reliability of the nuclear forces in Europe. They say that:

As the United States moves forward with a Russia reset policy, it is vital that we maintain our commitment to extended deterrence. The nuclear alliance of NATO is an important component for ensuring the security of our European allies. Thus, United States forward-deployed nuclear forces shall remain based in Europe in support of the nuclear policy and posture of NATO.

It is thought that the removal of US nuclear weapons from Europe may well form part of the Nuclear Posture Review and the NATO Strategic Concept Review. The US Ambassador to NATO Ivo Daalder is known to favour this course, as are several key administration figures.

Other provisions of the legislation would prevent the administration reducing US forces in Europe, and prevent the reduction of US strategic nuclear forces under a new START agreement unless the Russians cut their tactical nuclear forces. (More detail here)

This thoroughly retrograde piece of legislation is unlikely to pass a House in which pro-Obama Democrats have a large majority, but it is indicative of the continuing support for unilateralist, Bush-era policies amongst conservatives.

Senate Confirms Stravridis as SACEUR

2009-06-12T06:36:00.002+01:00

Admiral James Stavridis has been confirmed by the US Senate as commander of U.S. forces in Europe and the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), the top NATO military job.

At his confirmation hearing on June 2 before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Stravridis gave a comprehensive overview of the main challenges that he (and the Obama administration) believe NATO faces:

As Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, one major challenge to be confronted is successfully conducting the Alliance military operations in support of Trans-Atlantic Security, including International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, Kosovo Force (KFOR), OPERATION ACTIVE ENDEAVOR, and OPERATION ALLIED PROTECTOR. All of NATO’s forces, from Kosovo to ISAF to those conducting counter-piracy and other missions, deserve the best guidance and planning as well as the necessary resources and support to conduct operations. Of these operations, ISAF will likely prove to be most important to our security as well as pivotal to the Alliance’s further adaptation of strategies, capabilities, and internal processes to address the myriad of 21st century risks and threats confronting our nations. ISAF not only reflects the Alliance’s will to address the instability in a country destabilized by extremism and terrorism, but it reflects the Alliance’s will and capability to conduct operations at strategic distance outside the traditional NATO area. Success in Afghanistan will contribute to stabilizing a very important region and demonstrate that NATO in the 21st century is politically prepared and militarily capable of dealing successfully with risks and threats to Trans-Atlantic Security at strategic distances far from the borders of the US or European members.

Secondly, we face the challenge of resetting the NATO-Russia relationship and building a predictable, mutually-beneficial relationship that strengthens security. Military cooperation with Russia should figure prominently in the reset of this strategic relationship. This relationship has been stressed by policy differences over the years, and continues to be a complex relationship given the comprehensive nature of US-Russia engagement across the full spectrum of regional and global security matters. It is a strategic relationship that we must get right, and one that the Russians must demonstrate that they value in both words and deeds. There is great opportunity in the US-Russia relationship as well as great challenge. In many cases we share common strategic challenges that present opportunities for beneficial engagement, such as countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. I look forward to working in support of overall US national security objectives to help forge a constructive, reliable, and predictable relationship with Russia.

Thirdly, the Heads of State and Government tasked the NATO Secretary General to develop a new strategic concept for the Alliance. The last concept was developed in 1999. A new NATO strategic concept is crucially important to forging a common perspective on the regional and global security environment; the risks and challenges we face in the 21st century such as energy security, cyber defense, or counter proliferation; the role Alliance members want NATO to play in addressing these risks based on a common perception and common goals; and the strategies, capabilities, and internal processes necessary to successfully be prepared. The Alliance will engage in debate on these important issues. My initial assessment is that the military authorities will seek a balance of collective defense and global operations. Once the political leaders reach consensus, further development of military tasks and defining capabilities will be no easy task and must be done with a realistic understanding of the means available. I look forward to contributing my military advice to the development of a new NATO Strategic Concept, a concept that will drive and frame NATO’s role in the international security sphere for years to come.

Finally, French reintegration into the NATO military structure would also be a key area of focus. As France has always been a very active partner in NATO’s ongoing operations, their reintegration is nominally only a “formal” step to capture their current participation. Their further involvement in NATOs military command structure will provide an avenue for greater involvement – especially in the planning processes.

In addition to the above stated challenges, I believe there will be additional challenges facing the next EUCOM Commander such as defense cooperation in Eastern Europe and further progress in the Balkans, especially Kosovo.

As the focus of European security continues to shift from Central to Eastern Europe, EUCOM strategic plans and activities to address the challenges in Eastern Europe and Eurasia complement NATO efforts to strengthen new Alliance partner capability in this region. EUCOM efforts to stage U.S. forces in Bulgaria and Romania will focus on military-to-military activities that continue to build the military capacities of new NATO Alliance and prospective Alliance countries along with strategic partners in Eastern Europe and Eurasia. Ukraine and Georgia, considered exceptionally important countries in the EUCOM AOR, will continue the trend of bilateral relationships and capacity building. EUCOM continues to assist both countries with their NATO-oriented defense transformation and institution-building efforts, which have begun to bear fruit with peacekeeping presences in Kosovo, Operation Active Endeavor, and Africa.

(The full transcript can be read here)

France Defence Minister At NATO HQ

2009-06-12T06:21:00.002+01:00

French Defence Minister Herve Morin joined his colleagues for the Defence Planning Committee yesterday, for the first time since France reintegrated into NATO's military.

In addition, President Sarkozy has proposed Gen. Stephane Abrial to head the NATO transformation command in Norfolk, Va., and Gen. Phillippe Stoltz to lead an operational command of rapid reaction forces in Lisbon. The appointment of french officers to these posts was part of the bargain when France agreed to rejoin the integrated military structure of the Alliance.

France remains outside the Nuclear Planning Group.

De Hoop Scheffer Opens Ministerial Meeting

2009-06-11T21:40:00.004+01:00

In his last Ministerial meeting at NATO, Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer opened the Defence Planning Committee this afternoon, discussing the topics to be covered by Ministers, and those that had previously been covered in informal sessions.

This morning we discussed operational issues with a special focus on our engagement in Kosovo and NATO’s role in counter piracy. Thanks in no small part to the presence and engagement over the past 10 years of KFOR, as well as work done by the UN and most recently the work done by EULEX, the security situation in Kosovo is steadily improving. Allies discussed and decided how to adapt KFOR to this environment.

The threat posed by piracy and armed robbery at sea off the Horn of Africa is clearly increasing, with at least 80 pirate attacks counted this year to date. Through Operations Allied Provider and Allied Protector, NATO has made and continues to make an important contribution to the security of maritime traffic passing through this affected zone. Ministers took stock of our successful efforts to date and discussed the scope of NATO’s possible longer-term involvement in counter-piracy.

Tonight’s dinner and tomorrow’s session of the North Atlantic Council will provide an opportunity to review NATO’s defence transformation efforts following up on the decisions taken by our Heads of State and Government at the Strasbourg/Kehl Summit. In that context we will address the NATO Response Force, how to make our forces more usable, the value of multinational approaches to building capabilities and efforts to increase interoperability.

We will also continue the important discussion on Headquarter Reform.

NATO-Russia Council to Meet on June 27

2009-06-10T11:02:00.002+01:00

NATO Foreign Ministers and their Russian counterpart will hold a ministerial session of the NATO-Russia Council on Corfu on June 27, following a meeting of the OSCE. There had been plans to hold a meeting in Brussels on May 20, but it was postponed by Russia in protest at a military exercise conducted by the alliance in Georgia, and after NATO expelled two Russian diplomats. An Ambassadorial meeting of the NRC will be held in Brussels to complete preparations, the date of which is still to be confirmed.

Russian Ambassador to NATO Dmitri Rogozin recently told Trend News that “There is probability that document on new quality of work of Russia-NATO council will be prepared by ministers' meeting” and that the “topic of the meeting will be summarizing of results and discussion of actions happened after August events in Georgia”. “Ministers are free to exchange opinions concerning various issues and cover questions that were not included in agenda before, i.e. there is specific character Russia-NATO”.

NATO Ministers Meet in Maastricht, Brussels

2009-06-10T09:31:00.003+01:00

NATO Defence Ministers will meet in Maastricht today and tomorrow morning to discuss the Allied mission in Afghanistan. They will reconvene for meetings of the Defence Planning Committee and the Nuclear Planning Group tomorrow and Friday in Brussels at NATO HQ.

According to a Pentagon briefing after the Afghanistan meeting, which will include non-NATO troop contributors such as Australia and others, the focus of the ministers in Brussels will be on relations with Russia, missile defense, Kosovo and Georgia. Ministers will receive a briefing on the US Nuclear Posture Review.

France Will Take Top Planning Post

2009-04-28T10:34:00.003+01:00

The Nouvel Observateur reports that France has landed a top job at SHAPE. The French had, unofficially, been angling to have a one of the Deputy SACEUR jobs allocated to them. However, neither the UK or Germany were willing to cede their place.

Instead, a French officer will succeed his British counterpart at the head of the J-5 operational planning cell when the time for rotation comes.

Analysis: Cooperation with NATO in Russian Interest

2009-04-27T09:41:00.003+01:00

The Daily Telegraph carried an interesting analysis piece on April 24, concerning NATO-Russia relations. It is written by Fyodor Lukyanov, the editor-in-chief of Russia in Global Affairs, an interesting website and journal.

Lukyanov makes the point that, since the 1990s, NATO's cohesion and thus influence has been declining. He adds that grandiose dreams of a global structure linking NATO with security structures across the Pacific are unlikely to happen, not least because NATO members can't agree on what their Alliance is for. He concludes that Russia should cooperate with NATO, for example, in creating supply routes to Afghanistan, because it is in the Russian interest to do so.

There is much in the article that is persuasive, especially when he talks about the confusion or profusion of new roles that Alliance is being asked to take on:

But can one organisation effectively embrace the roles of global emergency team, the FBI, a rapid response task force and a peacekeeping headquarters while still remaining a closed club within a rigid ideological framework?

This is especially true since NATO has been so weakened since 1999. The Kosovo War first showed how the political interference in military missions at the lowest tactical level reduces Alliance inefficiency (something SACEUR General Craddock has railed against); the Bush administration chose to go into Afghanistan with a 'coalition of the willing', despite an invocation of the Article V mutual defence guarantee, precisely because the Americans did not want to hampered by NATO bureaucracy; the subsequent ISAF mission has shown the political divisions inside the Alliance, and its inability to act together decisively when not under threat itself; and finally, the wide enlargement this decade has divided Europe in two, the old members who value stability and the new members, who look to NATO as a bulwark against Russia, even if it means the recreation of the Cold War in some form.

As Lukyanov writes, these divisions mean that NATO is not the all-encompassing global threat that some in Russia perceive, but neither is it about to fade away. Positive engagement on both sides will be the most beneficial course in the long run.

Summit Wrap-Up

2009-04-06T12:11:00.001+01:00

I have written a full Summit Wrap-Up, which can be read at the Acronym Institute Website.

Obama on NATO and Afghanistan

2009-04-05T11:55:00.002+01:00

President Obama spoke at some length about the NATO endorsement of his plan for Afghanistan during his press conference following the President spoke at length about his new plan for Afghanistan announced a week ago and the agreements reached in the meeting:

We start from a simple premise: For years, our efforts in Afghanistan have lacked the resources needed to achieve our goals. And that's why the United States has recommitted itself to a clear and focused goal -- to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to prevent their return to either country in the future.

This effort cannot be America's alone. All of NATO understands that al Qaeda is a threat to all of us, and that this collective security effort must achieve its goals. And as a signal of that commitment, I am pleased that our NATO allies pledged their strong and unanimous support for our new strategy. Keep in mind it was only just a week ago that we announced this new approach. But already with Secretary Clinton's work at The Hague and with the success at today's summit we've started to match real resources to achieve our goals.

We're leaving Strasbourg and Kehl with concrete commitments on NATO support. Our allies and partners have already agreed to provide approximately 5,000 troops and trainers to advance our new strategy, as well as increased civilian assistance. To support critical elections for August 20th, NATO will fully resource our election support force to maximize security. And our allies have committed additional funds to an Afghan elections trust fund that will provide the necessary resources for free and fair elections.

To accelerate and enhance our training of Afghan security forces, a new NATO mission, a new NATO training mission, will focus on high-level support for Afghan army, and training and mentoring for the Afghan police. And many of our allies and partners have also pledged support for a new trust fund to sustain Afghan national armies going forward.

And to strengthen Afghan institutions and advance opportunity for the Afghan people, we are working with our NATO allies and partners to achieve substantial increases in non-military assistance and to provide the kind of doctors, engineers, educators and agricultural specialists that are needed to make a difference on the ground.

NATO has agreed the plan, but it is far from clear that the resources will be made available to carry it through. If Europe doesn't come through then the US will act increasingly on its own, and NATO will be weakened. There is also a risk that the plan will not work, and NATO will be weakened. Obama is forcing the pace, and Europe will have to follow.

Analysis of the Declaration on Alliance Security

2009-04-04T20:45:00.004+01:00

The NATO Summit today adopted the Declaration on Alliance Security. This is intended to be a kind of negotiating blueprint for the full-scale review of the Alliance Strategic Concept that is now underway. NATO will adopt the Concept at its next Summit, which will be held in Portugal, probably in late 2010 or early 2011. There are a number of points of interest in the Declaration.

The Importance of NATO as an Institution

In an early paragraph the Declaration states: NATO continues to be the essential transatlantic forum for security consultations among Allies. During the Cold War, and into the 1990s this was true. But NATO has been bypassed in some fairly important security discussions since then. For example, trans-Atlantic coordination on Iran's nuclear programme is a bilateral US-EU affair. Even though Iran presents a legitimate security concern for Turkey, a NATO member; and even though NATO as a whole is in a position to give the Iranian government the kind of security guarantees they require to negotiate with confidence; NATO is not involved. Twenty years ago that would have been inconceivable. After 9/11, although NATO invoked Article V, the US under President Bush was deeply reluctant to accept any assistance. Partly because the US did not need help, and partly because Bush did not want to have to work with the North Atlantic Council in making decisions on war or peace. Only later did he invite NATO into Afghanistan. Perhaps, under President Obama this can change. Or perhaps NATO is rebalancing, particularly with France reentering the integrated military command. Perhaps the US and the EU will do far more security cooperation in the future.

Nuclear Weapons

Deterrence, based on an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional capabilities, remains a core element of our overall strategy. This is a standard expression of the role of nuclear and conventional forces in Alliance policy, and suggests that the new Strategic Concept will not abandon nuclear deterrence. However, it may be significant to note the absence of the normal formulation (or some variant of it) that: Nuclear forces based in Europe and committed to NATO provide an essential political and military link between the European and the North American members of the Alliance. The Alliance will therefore maintain adequate nuclear forces in Europe. Will the new Concept give less salience to nuclear weapons? Will it allow for the withdrawal of the few remaining free fall bombs from Europe? It is interesting that the juxtaposition of nuclear deterrence with action on arms control in this statement mirrors the national policy expressed by the Obama administration in its joint statement with Russia. This may well allow NATO to downgrade and reduce nuclear forces, perhaps only relying on Trident, while negotiating away some potential external threats.

Enlargement

Enlargement is slow-tracked by this declaration. The Alliance maintains its open doors policy, but new members must: contribute to common security and stability. It is very hard to see how The Ukraine and Georgia could fulfil that criterion for the foreseeable future, although Macedonia would have an easier time if it can strike a deal with Greece over its name. The Bush policy of pushing NATO quickly to the southern border of Russia is gone.

Power Projection

The Declaration states that: We will improve our ability to meet the security challenges we face that impact directly on Alliance territory, emerge at strategic distance or closer to home. Allies must share risks and responsibilities equitably. It seems clear that power projection, as in Afghanistan or off Somalia will continue. It is equally clear, as President Obama has made abundantly obvious this weekend, that European NATO members will be expected to do their bit in any missions that NATO agrees to take on. This is the 21st Century version of the old burdensharing argument from the Cold War, and will probably never be completely resolved. However, it will be incumbent on Europe to do more, more efficiently, with the money it spends on defence.

Multilateralism

In another change of tone from recent years, multilateral cooperation is given a prominent part in the Declaration: We aim to strengthen our cooperation with other international actors, including the United Nations, European Union, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and African Union...

NATO and the EU

France and the United States are together in their desire to see the EU play a greater role in European defence policy and practice. The Declaration reflects this.We are determined to ensure that the NATO-EU relationship is a truly functioning strategic partnership ... Can the EU step up into this role? Will the Conservative government that is likely to be elected in the UK go along? The UK is such a major defence player in the EU that its agreement will be essential. Tony Blair tried to move this way at the St Malo Summit with France in 1998, only to fail because France remained semi-detached from NATO. NATO-EU relations have been fraught with difficulty for years, but supporters of deeper European unity will be pleased to try to make this work, and Obama still has enough credit in Europe that it just may.

Russia

And finally, relations with Russia are deemed extremely important to European stability and security, as they should be. A strong, cooperative partnership between NATO and Russia, based on respect for all the principles of the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act and the 2002 Rome Declaration, best serves security in the Euro-Atlantic area. While difficult discussions over Georgia lay ahead, and undoubtedly there will be other areas where Russian and NATO interests do not align, this weekend has already been a positive restart. Obama has done enough in the short term to defuse Russian anger at the way NATO has pressured them (as they see it) over the years. Backing the good words with action will be harder, although new and deep cuts in nuclear weapons will help, as will the back-tracking on missile defence. A desire for true cooperation through the NATO-Russia Council will be vital.

Conclusion

There is enough of the 1999 Strategic Concept in this declaration that, if things go badly, nothing much will change. However, there is enough that is new and positive that, if things go well, NATO could be substantially reformed.

There are immense problems to be overcome. The Afghan mission is far from a guaranteed success. The scission in views of Russia between old and new NATO is very deep. The reluctance to even discuss the role of nuclear weapons in Alliance strategy has enormous inertia that makes change very hard. These are only some of the difficulties. But in Strasbourg President Obama proved adept at negotiating the shoals of the Alliance, and this will serve NATO well over the coming year or more of negotiating a new Strategic Concept.

Full Text of the Declaration on Alliance Security

Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Strasbourg / Kehl on 4 April 2009

We, the Heads of State and Government of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, met today in Strasbourg and Kehl to celebrate the 60th anniversary of our Alliance. We have reaffirmed the values, objectives and obligations of the Washington Treaty which unite Europe with the United States and Canada, and have provided our transatlantic community with an unprecedented era of peace and stability. We have also reaffirmed our adherence to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

NATO continues to be the essential transatlantic forum for security consultations among Allies. Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and collective defence, based on the indivisibility of Allied security, are, and will remain, the cornerstone of our Alliance. Deterrence, based on an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional capabilities, remains a core element of our overall strategy. NATO will continue to play its part in reinforcing arms control and promoting nuclear and conventional disarmament in accordance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, as well as non-proliferation efforts.

NATO’s enlargement has been an historic success in bringing us closer to our vision of a Europe whole and free. NATO’s door will remain open to all European democracies which share the values of our Alliance, which are willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership, and whose inclusion can contribute to common security and stability.

Today, our nations and the world are facing new, increasingly global threats, such as terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery and cyber attacks. Other challenges such as energy security, climate change, as well as instability emanating from fragile and failed states, may also have a negative impact on Allied and international security. Our security is increasingly tied to that of other regions.

We will improve our ability to meet the security challenges we face that impact directly on Alliance territory, emerge at strategic distance or closer to home. Allies must share risks and responsibilities equitably. We must make our capabilities more flexible and deployable so we can respond quickly and effectively, wherever needed, as new crises emerge. We must also reform the NATO structures to create a leaner and more cost-effective organization. We will strengthen NATO’s capacity to play an important role in crisis management and conflict resolution where our interests are involved.

We aim to strengthen our cooperation with other international actors, including the United Nations, European Union, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and African Union, in order to improve our ability to deliver a comprehensive approach to meeting these new challenges, combining civilian and military capabilities more effectively. In our operations today in Afghanistan and the Western Balkans, our armed forces are working alongside many other nations and organisations. In Afghanistan, our key priority, we are committed to helping the Afghan Government and its people to build a democratic, secure and stable country that will never again harbour terrorists who threaten Afghan and international security.

NATO recognizes the importance of a stronger and more capable European defence and welcomes the European Union’s efforts to strengthen its capabilities and its capacity to address common security challenges. Non-EU Allies make a significant contribution to these efforts in which their fullest involvement possible is important, as agreed. We are determined to ensure that the NATO-EU relationship is a truly functioning strategic partnership as agreed by NATO and by the EU. Our efforts should be mutually reinforcing and complementary.

We will develop our relationships with all our partners, both in our neighbourhood and beyond, with whom we have a joint commitment to cooperative security. Our partners are key in enabling us to implement our vision of a community of shared values and responsibilities. We value the support that many of our partners bring to our operations and missions.

A strong, cooperative partnership between NATO and Russia, based on respect for all the principles of the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act and the 2002 Rome Declaration, best serves security in the Euro-Atlantic area. We stand ready to work with Russia to address the common challenges we face.

We are committed to renovating our Alliance to better address today’s threats and to anticipate tomorrow’s risks. United by this common vision of our future, we task the Secretary General to convene and lead a broad-based group of qualified experts, who in close consultation with all Allies will lay the ground for the Secretary General to develop a new Strategic Concept and submit proposals for its implementation for approval at our next summit. The Secretary General will keep the Council in permanent session involved throughout the process.

The Guardian Calls for US Nukes Out of Europe

2009-04-04T16:19:00.007+01:00

The Guardian editorialised this morning in favour of removing US free fall nuclear bombs from Europe.

Nuclear disarmament: Bombs away

The Guardian

On his return home, Dmitry Medvedev hailed Barack Obama as "my new comrade". The Russian president said he was not seeking the end of Nato by proposing a new security pact for Europe, and his Nato ambassador, Dmitry Rogozin, a hardwired nationalist, said he would not rule out joining the transatlantic alliance one day. And this from the land which greeted Mr Obama's election with the announcement that it would deploy short-range missiles in Kaliningrad if America installed a missile defence battery over the border in Poland. What a difference a 70-minute meeting in London makes. Meanwhile, comrade Obama will outline in Prague tomorrow an agenda for a world without nuclear weapons. Yesterday world prosperity. Today world peace. Not a bad week's work.

Nothing of substance has changed - the core differences between Nato and Russia remain. But the tone of the dialogue has changed and that does matter. Instead of winding each other up, the two most important nuclear powers are finding ways to talk about each other in less belligerent ways. Getting to zero, or getting to the point of eliminating nuclear weapons, has been around as an idea almost as long as the weapons themselves have been. It has bipartisan support in America, with backers including George Shultz, Henry Kissinger, William Perry and Sam Nunn. Recently, however, the zero option has received fresh impetus. One of Mr Obama's first acts was to end development work on a "reliable replacement warhead" which critics said was a cover for designing new weapons. Reaffirming Britain's decision to replace Trident, Gordon Brown said Britain would reduce the number of missile tubes on each submarine from 16 to 12. Nothing new there, but he added an intriguing rider. He said that if it was possible to reduce the number of UK warheads further, "consistent with the progress of multilateral discussions", Britain would be ready to do so. These are straws in the wind.

It is not known what progress Mr Obama and Mr Medvedev made on the numbers of warheads that would be negotiated in a replacement for the Start treaty, which expires at the end of the year. Under a different treaty which governs warheads that are "operationally deployed", Russia has an arsenal of 2,700 warheads which would be reduced to between 1,700 and 2,200 by 2012. The US has already met that requirement, but both countries are still thought to hold thousands of additional warheads which are not deployed. The scope for deep cuts in the nuclear arsenal is huge.

Other measures could lower the temperature further. One legacy of the cold war is the forward deployment of between 200 and 350 US nuclear bombs in Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and Turkey. Nato's nuclear umbrella was designed as a deterrent against Soviet conventional invasion. But the boot is now on the other foot. Russia's conventional forces have been so weakened in relation to Nato's that they will be more resistant to the zero option than the US will be. Getting rid of an obsolete stockpile of freefall bombs in Nato countries would be an important first step. It would also put Nato in a stronger position to demand stronger non-proliferation mechanisms.

Nato has other problems, like how to defeat a resurgent Taliban in Afghanistan. The question of burden-sharing between Europe and America will be of greater and more immediate consequence in Afghanistan - now that American troops will be double the size of the force from other Nato members - than it will be on the issue of nuclear stockpiles. Nato could use Russia's help in the transit of non-lethal military supplies, as convoys through Pakistan are coming under attack. But the bigger picture of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation does affect the smaller one. Together it creates a world where security is shared. This is a vision worth fighting for.

Turkish Conditions for Accepting Rasmussen

2009-04-04T16:07:00.003+01:00

According to the Anatolian News Agency, during the meeting today between President Obama and President Gul, Turkey won several concessions in return for its reluctant support for the appointment of Anders Fogh Rasmussen as the next NATO Secretary General.

These conditions included a promise that one of Rasmussen's deputies would be a Turk; that there would be additional posts within the NATO command structure for Turkish officers; that Kurdish station Roj TV would be banned; and that certain unspecified conditions about Afghanistan will be met.

The full report is here.

Summit Communique on Arms Control and Disarmament

2009-04-04T15:38:00.002+01:00

Communiqué language on arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation is somewhat disappointing. There had been hopes that, with the Obama administration publicly committed to ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, that would be mentioned in the communiqué. Also, with the US and Russia issuing a joint declaration on strategic arms control this week, it would have been better had some greater detail on those issues emerged from Strasbourg.

During the Bush years, NATO’s commitment to arms control and disarmament has dwindled, as the consensus rule for NATO decision-making meant that nothing opposed by the Bush administration (more or less all arms control) could be mentioned. However, the strong language on the NPT, and the promise to work constructively for the success of the 2010 NPT Review Conference gives some hope for future NATO activities in this field.

Similarly it is to be hoped that the new atmosphere of cooperation with Russia can lead to progress on restoring the CFE Treaty to full operation.

Summit Communique on Arms Control and Disarmament

55. In Bucharest we reaffirmed that arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation will continue to make an important contribution to peace, security, and stability. In response to our tasking to the Council in Permanent Session to keep these issues under active review, we note its report on raising NATO’s profile in this field. The report displays a broad range of activities being undertaken, including continuing efforts in preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and destruction of excess small arms and light weapons and surplus munitions. The Allies continue to seek to enhance security and stability at the lowest possible level of forces consistent with the Alliance’s ability to provide for collective defence and to fulfil the full range of its missions. NATO and Allies should continue contributing to international efforts in the area of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. We aim at achieving a higher level of public awareness of NATO’s contribution in these fields. We task the Council in Permanent Session to continue to keep these issues under active review, as part of NATO’s broad response to security challenges.

56. NATO Allies reaffirm that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), with its three mutually reinforcing pillars, remains important and Allies will contribute constructively with a view to achieving a successful outcome of the 2010 NPT Review Conference. Alliance nations have dramatically reduced nuclear weapons and delivery systems, and remain committed to all objectives enshrined in the Treaty. We call for universal compliance with the NPT and universal adherence to the Additional Protocol to the International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguard Agreement and full compliance with UNSCR 1540. We will intensify our efforts to prevent state and non-state actors from accessing WMD and their means of delivery. In this regard, we endorse NATO’s comprehensive strategic-level policy for preventing the proliferation of WMD and defending against Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear threats. We remain deeply concerned about the Iranian nuclear and ballistic missile programmes and related proliferation risks and call on Iran to comply with relevant UNSCRs. We are also deeply concerned by the programmes and proliferation activities of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and call on it to fully comply with relevant UNSCRs.

57. We place the highest value on the CFE Treaty regime with all its elements. We underscore the strategic importance of the CFE Treaty, including its flank regime, as a cornerstone of Euro-Atlantic security. We reiterate our endorsement at the Bucharest Summit of the statement of the North Atlantic Council of 28 March 2008 and fully support the December 2008 statement of our Foreign Ministers. We reaffirm the Alliance’s commitment to the CFE Treaty regime, as expressed in the Alliance’s position contained in paragraph 42 of the 2006 Riga Summit Declaration, the final statement by Allies at the CFE Extraordinary Conference in Vienna, and Alliance statements reflecting subsequent developments. We are deeply concerned that, since 12 December 2007, Russia has continued its unilateral “suspension” of its legal obligations under the CFE Treaty. Furthermore, Russia’s actions in Georgia have called into question its commitment to the fundamental OSCE principles on which stability and security in Europe are based: principles which underpin the CFE Treaty. These actions run counter to our common objective of preserving the long-term viability of the CFE regime and we call upon Russia to resume its implementation without further delay. Because of our commitment to cooperative security and fulfilment of international agreements as well as the importance we attach to the confidence that results from military transparency and predictability, we have continued fully to implement the Treaty despite Russia’s “suspension”. However, the current situation, where NATO CFE Allies implement the Treaty while Russia does not, cannot last indefinitely. We offered a set of constructive and forward-looking proposals for parallel actions on key issues, including steps by NATO Allies on ratification of the Adapted CFE Treaty and by Russia on outstanding commitments related to Georgia and the Republic of Moldova. We continue to believe that these proposals address all of Russia’s stated concerns. We continue to urge Russia to work cooperatively with us and other concerned CFE States Parties to reach agreement on the basis of the parallel actions package so that together we can preserve the benefits of this landmark regime.

NATO and Missile Defence

2009-04-04T15:19:00.003+01:00

The Summit Communique has several paragraphs on missile defence. The language on the controversial proposed US mid-course ballistic missile defence deployment to Poland and the Czech Republic has softened considerably since last year.

Under President Bush, the communique in Bucharest read:

We therefore recognise the substantial contribution to the protection of Allies from long-range ballistic missiles to be provided by the planned deployment of European-based United States missile defence assets. We are exploring ways to link this capability with current NATO missile defence efforts as a way to ensure that it would be an integral part of any future NATO-wide missile defence architecture.

By contrast, the Strasbourg-Kehl communique reads:

In response to our tasking at the Bucharest Summit to develop options for a comprehensive missile defence architecture to extend coverage to all European Allied territory and populations, several technical architecture options were developed and subsequently assessed from a politico-military perspective. We recognise that additional work is still required. In this context, a future United States’ contribution of important architectural elements could enhance NATO elaboration of this Alliance effort.

This is clearly a much less supportive wording, which reflects the doubts of the Obama administration about the value of deploying unproven and ineffective missile defences, doing little beyond irritating Russia. This is not least because, saying that missile defences are part of the response to missile threats places it squarely in an arms control context, and positions missile defences as something of a last resort.

This new communique is also strong on involving Russia:

We support increased missile defence cooperation between Russia and NATO, including maximum transparency and reciprocal confidence-building measures to allay any concerns.

This is something that has, up to now, been vetoed by the Czech Republic and Poland.

In short, NATO will not be endorsing a political decision to go ahead with missile defences any time soon. Those NATO members who pursued a ‘delay and hope’ strategy last year before the US elections have been vindicated. They pushed off a political decision until this year, hoping that President Obama would be elected, and that they would thereby be saved the need to go ahead with major BMD deployment and the confrontation with Russia that seemed inevitable.

Summit Text on Missile Defences

50. Ballistic missile proliferation poses an increasing threat to Allies’ forces, territory, and populations. Missile defence forms part of a broader response to counter this threat. We therefore reaffirm the conclusions of the Bucharest Summit about missile defence.

51. In response to our tasking at the Bucharest Summit to develop options for a comprehensive missile defence architecture to extend coverage to all European Allied territory and populations, several technical architecture options were developed and subsequently assessed from a politico-military perspective. We recognise that additional work is still required. In this context, a future United States’ contribution of important architectural elements could enhance NATO elaboration of this Alliance effort.

52. Based on the technical and political military analysis of these options, we judge that missile threats should be addressed in a prioritised manner that includes consideration of the level of imminence of the threat and the level of acceptable risk. We received a comprehensive analysis of the technical architecture options and agree to its overall assessment that, even though some of these options do not meet the Bucharest tasking, each of them has its strengths and shortcomings.

53. Bearing in mind the principle of the indivisibility of Allied security as well as NATO solidarity, we task the Council in Permanent Session, taking into account the Bucharest Summit tasking, to present recommendations comprising architecture alternatives, drawing from the architectural elements already studied, for consideration at our next Summit. To inform any future political decision on missile defence, we also task the Council in Permanent Session to identify and undertake the policy, military and technical work related to a possible expanded role of the Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (ALTBMD) programme beyond the protection of NATO deployed forces to include territorial missile defence.

54. We support increased missile defence cooperation between Russia and NATO, including maximum transparency and reciprocal confidence-building measures to allay any concerns. We reaffirm our readiness to explore the potential for linking United States, NATO and Russian missile defence systems at an appropriate time and we
encourage the Russian Federation to take advantage of United States’ missile defence cooperation proposals.

Initial Notes From Final Press Conference

2009-04-04T14:49:00.004+01:00

There was a belated and short final press conference. It began with the introduction of Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen as the next Secretary General of the Atlantic Alliance. I will post a more considered reaction to the various communiques later.

Mr Fogh Rasmussen

Today is truly historic, not just because a Dane has the job of NATO Secretary General for the first time, but because we celebrate the 60th anniversary of the most successful peace movement the world has ever seen....

Then Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer made a few remarks, joined by President Sarkozy and Chancellor Merkel.

De Hoop Scheffer

Albania and Croatia have joined our Alliance. France has joined the military command to our great advantage and to that of the European Union.

The Summit has engaged in substantive work, notably in Afghanistan. The NATO Training Mission Afghanistan has been established. We will manage a trust fund to sustain the enlarged Afghan army. There is apolitical and strategic agreement to carry work forward.

We also discussed NATO’s relations with Russia. We share common security interests. We want to use the NRC for the fullest possible cooperation. We will also air our differences, as on Georgia and the CFE Treaty.

Heads of State and Government have agreed to launch a review process to update the Strategic Concept. This will be agreed at the next Summit.

President Sarkozy

Is very pleased that Prime Minister Rasmussen has been named to the Secretary Generalship. Pleased to work with President Obama. Europe will have a larger place in the Euro-Atlantic institutions.

Chancellor Merkel

Welcomed the new Secretary General, and reiterated all that had previously been said.

There was a very short question and answer session.

Questions

All three speakers denied, as one would expect, that there is a breach between the US and Europe on contributions to ISAF in Afghanistan. All three try to protest that European allies are making large contributions, although when measured against the enormous US troop surge, the European contribution is small.

One journalist raised questions about the ability of Anders Fogh Rasmussen to overcome all the difficulties that Turkey has raised about him, and whether he can represent NATO well. All speakers brushed off this question.

Anders Fogh Rasmussen has the Job

2009-04-04T14:23:00.001+01:00

After more than an hour of delay, the final NATO press conference has now begun. Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen has been appointed as NATO Secretary General.

Now it remains to be seen what price Turkey has extracted for this climbdown.

Toronto Star Editorial Calls for Denuclearised NATO

2009-04-04T14:09:00.004+01:00

President Obama has called for a nuclear weapon free world, but there hasn't otherwise been much discussion of nuclear weapons at the NATO Summit. Now the Toronto Star is carrying an excellent editorial calling for NATO to modernise itself by denuclearising, a NATO's nukes are now a hindrance to building global security.

Quite Right!

NATO's dated nukes

Toronto Star

The 60th anniversary this weekend of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was supposed to be a well-orchestrated and tame affair. The Americans arrived in Strasbourg hoping to get Canada and the 26 other NATO allies to pony up a few more military trainers for Afghanistan, and more aid. Fractious relations with Russia were to be patched up. And NATO was to launch a strategic rethink.

But with his push to reduce nuclear arsenals and restrict the spread of weapons, U.S. President Barack Obama has challenged the alliance to update its strategic thinking. Obama wants to lower the American and Russian strategic stockpiles to about 1,500 warheads each, a 40 per cent cut. He has a longer-term vision of "a world without nuclear weapons." That is ambitious, given the 23,000 warheads that still exist, a tempting target for terrorists. And tomorrow in Prague he plans to unveil a new non-proliferation strategy.

This is a healthy course correction from George W. Bush's recklessness. He favoured greater U.S. reliance on nukes. He quit the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty. And he pushed to deploy missile defences.

During the Bush era, Canadian policy-makers went largely silent on nuclear issues. With Washington under new management, Prime Minister Stephen Harper has an opportunity to make Canada's voice count again, as a member of NATO's non-nuclear caucus. Ottawa was once an active advocate for disarmament. It can be again.

Obama wants existing weapons taken off hair-trigger alert. He's not keen on developing new weapons. He favours ratifying the treaty banning nuclear tests. He's prepared to negotiate a global ban on producing fissile materials. And he's skeptical of missile defence.

Suddenly, NATO's insistence that nuclear weapons "continue to fulfill an essential role," as its 1999 "strategic concept" dictates, seems debatable, and dated. The International Court of Justice back in 1996 described nuclear weapons as "the ultimate evil."

While there's no likelihood the U.S., Russia, Britain, France, China, Israel, India or Pakistan will dismantle their arsenals any time soon, Obama says a world rid of bombs "is profoundly in America's interest." Certainly, a world in which countries such as North Korea and Iran scramble to build nuclear weapons is profoundly not in America's best interest. Yet the U.S. and other nuclear powers look hypocritical in demanding that others forswear The Bomb.

Given all this, why should Canada and the 24 other non-nuclear NATO allies continue to play cheerleader for a nuclear doctrine that hasn't made a lot of sense since the Cold War ended 20 years ago? NATO's large non-nuclear bloc should question the premise that nuclear weapons are "the supreme guarantee of the security of the allies," as if the alliance's massive conventional forces count for naught.

At 60, NATO should have the maturity to acknowledge the fact that far from being "essential," nuclear weapons are not even desirable. Fewer is better, as the Americans and Russians now agree. None at all would be best.

Final Press Conference Late

2009-04-04T13:06:00.008+01:00

The final press conference for the Strasbourg-Kehl Summit will be delayed by around an hour, at a minimum. No official reason has been given, but speculation is that a last ditch attempt to have Turkey agree to the appointment of Anders Fogh Rasmussen as the new Secretary General of the Alliance is behind this delay.

Incidentally, the website of the Turkish Weekly has just posted a strong denouncement of Rasmussen by Prime Minister Erdogan:

.. we do not want NATO to lose power. The media organ of the terrorist organization in my country broadcasts from Denmark. We submitted documents four years ago, but he still could not or did not stop them. We had a cartoon crisis as well. We asked them how to overcome the situation, but they still did not approach positively. Indeed, I take a dim view of his candidacy.

They also say that German Chancellor Angela Merkel has threatened to delay any consideration by the EU of the long-standing Turkish membership bid if the crisis is not resolved by Rasmussen's appointment today.

Another rumour, carried by the Associated Press, has for the first time in several weeks named former UK Defence Secretary Des Browne as a candidate. this is probably unlikely as a second British labour Defence Minister (Lord Robertson held the post before de Hoop Scheffer) taking the post in a decade would be unlikely to find favour with many other countries.

How many of these circulating rumours are true is open to question. However, it is obvious that this issue has caused divisions within the Alliance and problems at this meeting. It might have been sensible for Heads of State and Government to have focused on this problem earlier and, in the event Turkey was clearly unpersuadable, chosen someone else in advance.

Obama, Gul Meet With Rasmussen

2009-04-04T11:32:00.005+01:00

The NATO Secretary General appointment saga continues. It has emerged that President Obama and Turkish President Abdullah Gul spent an hour discussing the issue, and that for at least part of the meeting they were joined by Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen.

Clearly, while the US has publicly said that there is "no urgency" to the issue, President Obama wants it solved in Strasbourg if at all possible.

Italian media have also been reporting that when Prime Minister Sivio Berlusconi snubbed his colleagues during their symbolic link-up on a bridge across the Rhine, he was in fact talking to Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan on his cellphone about Rasmussen.

Obama Wants Stronger European Defence

2009-04-04T11:00:00.003+01:00

Speaking at a press conference with French President Sarkozy, President Obama called for Europeans to do more to strengthen their defence capabilities yesterday. This is a long-term US aim, and a message that has long been unwelcome. However, with France re-entering the NATO integrated military command, there is now a possibility of much greater NATO-EU cooperation and the enhancement of defence cooperation within the EU itself. President Obama said:

NATO is the most successful alliance in modern history. And the basic premise of NATO was that Europe's security was the United States' security, and vice versa. That's its central tenet that is a pillar of American foreign policy that has been unchanging over the last 60 years. It is something that I am here to affirm. And with France's reintegration into the highest command structures of NATO, that principle will continue to be upheld.

I want to echo what President Sarkozy just said. We want strong allies. We would like to see Europe have much more robust defense capabilities. That's not something we discourage. We're not looking to be the patron of Europe. We're looking to be partners with Europe. And the more capable they are defensively, the more we can act in concert on the shared challenges that we face.

And so, you know, one of my messages to our NATO allies is going to be the more capability we see here in Europe, the happier the United States will be, the more effective we will be in coordinating our activities.

Combined, EU nations spend about two-thirds of what the United States spends on defence, and get much less for it, since that spending is fragmented across many nations. Deeper EU cooperation could achieve better results for less spending, while strengthening the EU's Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).

Better coordination by Europe in defence and foreign policy needs a common strategic outlook, and common risk and threat assessment. This will be hard to achieve in the EU, but not impossible. In the long run, it could allow Europe to match US influence in Europe's near abroad, as well as reducing the risk that defence policy would ever be renationalised in Europe. Those are goals worth striving for.

Rumour: Liberation says Obama Could Announce Withdrawal of US Nukes From Europe

2009-04-04T09:44:00.003+01:00

On Sunday morning in Prague, President Obama will deliver a major speech on disarmament and non-proliferation. The French news paper Liberation is reporting that he may announce the withdrawal of the 200 or so US nuclear bombs left in Europe.

La «défense collective» a été longtemps assurée par la présence d’armes nucléaires américaines sur le sol européen. Dimanche, en visite à Prague, le président Obama pourrait annoncer le retrait des quelques 200 dernières bombes, basées dans cinq pays [Allemagne, Belgique, Italie, Pays-Bas et Turquie). Une décision essentiellement symbolique qui devrait toutefois être apprécié par Moscou: ce sont de armes anciennes, dont la sécurité fait l’objet de critiques au sein même du Pentagone.

NATO Monitor will be watching and listening with keen interest.

Turkey Still Opposes Rasmussen

2009-04-04T09:29:00.004+01:00

Turkish website TurkNet is reporting that Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan continues to oppose the candidacy of Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen for the job of NATO Secretary General.

Erdogan said that he expressed his opinion regarding Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen's candidacy for North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) secretary-general during his talks with the leaders.

"I told them that I would assess the issue with President Abdullah Gul again and I also said that they would have the chance to discuss this matter with Mr. Gul during the (NATO) summit," he said.
...
Upon a question on his opinion regarding Rasmussen's candidacy for NATO secretary-general, Erdogan said Turkey had no personal problems with Rasmussen or Denmark.

"Our only goal is to protect NATO from being harmed. NATO has a role aiming to establish peace in the world, we do not want such role to be harmed," he said.

Erdogan also said that terrorist organization PKK's broadcasts from Denmark were annoying for Turkey and the cartoon crisis in the past caused uneasiness in the Islam world.

"So why are we stuck at only one candidate. Don't we have any other alternatives? Let us discuss them and find a more appropriate person," he said.

At the same time, Reuters reports that the US is backing away from Rasmussen, saying that there is "no urgency" to resolve the issue at this Summit. Germany has briefed reporters that 27 nations support Rasmussen and that discussions with Turkey continue.

NATO Spokesman's Briefing, With Commentary

2009-04-04T09:25:00.001+01:00

Late last night NATO Spokesman James Appathurai gave a short briefing to the media. He said that three issues had been discussed during the Heads of State Working Dinner.

On the Strategic Concept Review – Appathurai said that all who had spoken were in favour of a review. There is a perceived need to update the current Concept to allow for new missions, like cyber-defence, the anti-piracy effort off East Africa and the Afghan mission, none of which are reflected in the 1999 Strategic Concept. He added that NATO leaders also want to reflect possible future missions of the alliance in the Concept. Theory needs to accord with practice, he said. There must be a balance between collective defence and the responsibility to protect the Euro-Atlantic area by projecting force. Appathurai also said that all reiterated the core principle - collective defence must be indivisible.

There is a notable point here. First, the ‘responsibility to protect’ concept has been used by the UN to mean the responsibility of the international community to protect the lives and human rights of those who are threat from genocide, civil war and other threats; and who are actually at threat from their own government. Stretching that principle to allow for Western power projection to defend interests beyond the NATO area will be extremely controversial.

Appathurai continued that the next major issue discussed was Russia. All shared view that Russia is a great power and a partner with whom NATO wants to cooperate, and must cooperate with. This is mutually beneficial. There was also general agreement that NATO and Russia must continue discussion through good times and bad, that the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) must not just be a fair weather organization. That said, there will always be some issues where NATO and Russia do not see things the same way, said Appathurai. NATO will not compromise on core principles – that there can be no spheres of influence, and that the territorial integrity of Georgia must be respected.

This is a clear change of position from the Bush years. The Bush administration pushed for strong action by NATO against Russia during the war with Georgia, and achieved the suspension of the NRC. There is an implicit criticism of the Bush policy in the decision that the NRC must not be a ‘fair weather body’. Also, Russians will chuckle at the idea that the territorial integrity of Georgia is sacrosanct, and point to Kosovo where NATO’s war in 1999, and subsequent political and peacekeeping involvement, has facilitated the break-up of Serbia and the creation of a new republic that not even all NATO members recognize and support. And further back, the German recognition of Croatia (later supported by NATO) that precipitated the break-up of the former Yugoslavia. Somehow, territorial integrity is always a core NATO principle. Perhaps it should be, and the Kosovo question should be subject to international mediation, as should the status of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

Finally, Appathurai said that leaders had discussed the appointment of a new Secretary General. He said the discussion would continue on Saturday, and that no decisions had been made or were, indeed, yet necessary (which is a common NATO spokesman’s code for ‘we can’t agree’).

Appathurai did not brief on the seperate discussions at working dinners of the Foreign and Defence ministers.

Scheffer Denies NATO Role in Iran Crisis, Misses Opportunity

2009-04-04T08:32:00.004+01:00

Yesterday at the NATO Youth Forum NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer was asked about Iran.

Question: My question was, what could NATO do to aid in talks with Iran? Not just with regards to its nuclear program, but also in helping the country reintegrate into the international community, having been isolated so long?

His answer was disappointing in some ways. He did allow that NATO and Iran, who recently had their first official contact in 30 years, could work together to stabilise Afghanistan. But beyond that he said NATO doesn’t have a role: NATO is not involved and should not be involved in the Iranian nuclear dispute.

This is deeply disappointing. NATO is supposedly a body for coordinating political-military policy across the Atlantic. And yet it is ignoring a problem where it could have a fundamentally positive effect.

If Iran is seeking, and eventually obtains, nuclear weapons, then NATO will be called upon to deter and counter Iran. NATO member Turkey borders Iran, they would want Article V guarantees against a nuclear-armed Iran. So this is a security situation in which all NATO members have a profound interest.

If NATO were to make a declaration that it wishes peace with Iran, and enter into talks on confidence and security building measures, it could have a positive effect on Iran's engagement with the West. If NATO issued assurances that no non-nuclear state would ever be the subject of attack by NATO nuclear forces, then this could help move Iran down a more positive path. eventually, NATO could remove the small amount of forward-based tactical nuclear weapons from Europe, and its nuclear posture would become much less threatening to states in Europe's periphery, like Iran. This could only contribute to a more positive atmosphere. Let there be no mistake. If we are to achieve safety and security through a WMD Free Middle East, including Israel and Iran, NATO has a role to play.

Of course, any final agreement with Iran will require a bilateral deal with the US. The US must promise not to overthrow the government of Iran, and to deal with it in mutual respect. President Obama has made a start on this with his Nowruz message to Iran. But as a coordinating body for western strategic defence policy, NATO should have a role to play. That it doesn't shows how much it has declined as a forum for discussions of security issues since the end of the Cold War.

De Hoop Scheffer's Full Answer

De Hoop Scheffer:

Anyway, NATO is not involved. Let me start with the negative answer I have to. NATO is not involved and should not be involved in the Iranian nuclear dispute. We have other organizations for that, as you know, the IAA, the UN, the EU is playing a role. My friend and colleague Javier Solana is very active in this regard.

But—here comes the but—also with Iran, and I think your president is proof of this, also with Iran, and that's one of the things I've learned in a long, long career in foreign policy, it is always better to talk than not to talk.

Coming back to this Iron Curtain and the Cold War, we always talk to the Soviet Union before the Berlin Wall disappeared and the Iron Curtain fell. We always talked to the Soviet Union, despite huge differences. So that is the reason that, I think, President Obama set on the very right course by trying to reach out to Iran. And Iran was represented, as you know, at the meeting in The Hague I referred to in my speech. And I hope these contacts might intensify.

No misunderstanding, Iran should stop and make transparent a nuclear program, but NATO
doesn't play a role there. Where is Iran relevant for NATO? Iran is an important neighbour of Afghanistan. And stability in Afghanistan is dependent, to a large extent, on stability in the region. First of all, stability in Pakistan, but also in the region in a more wider sense.
So in that regard Iran is relevant for NATO and that's the reason that only a few weeks ago, for the very first time, there was a very informal discussion between one of the Assistant Secretaries General of NATO, for Political Affairs, and the Iranian ambassador in Brussels. That was not a formal conversation. It was just to talk to each other. But let us keep things in the box, and that box is called Afghanistan. And that box is not called nuclear or any other element in the discussions and debates going on with Iran. But talking is always better than not talking.

Obama Calls for European Support, is disappointed by NATO Response

2009-04-04T07:59:00.009+01:00

It has been a consistent and (at least in Europe) largely overlooked part of President Obama's plans to fight the war in Afghanistan that Europe should do more. Even as the adulatory crowds cheered him in Berlin last Summer, it was clear that he was going to ask European leaders for help that would not be popular with their publics. And in Strasbourg Obama took that message to a Town Hall-style meeting.

The President explained that Afghanistan matters to the US because of the 9/11 attacks, and that Europe has just a s much interest as the US in ensuring that Afghanistan cannot be the base for such attacks again. And then, in a blunt statement, he said that Europe should not simply expect the United States to shoulder that burden alone. We should not because this is a joint problem and it requires joint effort. Then he added that the closure of Guantanamo, and an end to torture by the US, in turn, will allow the Europeans, I think, to feel good about our joint efforts, and also not to have excuses not to participate in those joint efforts.

This is the most direct appeal for support and additional troops for ISAF that the President has made, but it fell largely on deaf ears. Spain has said it will add a small number of troops for training purposes. Belgium will add two F-16 aircraft and a handful of soldiers. The UK will add a few hundred troops in the run-up to this summer's elections. (Even that was less than the MOD had planned for, they were expecting to send 2,000) France refused to add to its contingent of forces, and a number of other countries (Germany, Italy, Poland, Canada and Denmark)are considering their options. In truth, the President and his team have given up on getting more European troops for the present. There is a an underlying mood of frustration in Obama's team on this, but they don't want the Summit ruined over the question.

In the short term the cracks will be papered over. The controversy over the new Afghan law limiting women's rights and legalising rape in marriage has provided an excuse for Europeans to say they can't commit troops to defending a government that supports such a blatant abuse of human rights. But in the longer term, American scepticism about NATO is being reinforced and the Alliance weakened by Europe's actions.

Obama's Remarks on Afghanistan in Full

And as we restore our common prosperity, we must stand up for our common security. As we meet here today, NATO has still embarked on its first mission overseas in Afghanistan, and my administration has just completed a review of our policy in that region.

Now, I understand that this war has been long. Our allies have already contributed greatly to this endeavor. You've sent your sons and daughters to fight alongside ours, and we honor and respect their service and sacrifice.

And I also know that there's some who have asked questions about why are we still in Afghanistan? What does this mean? What's its purpose? Understand we would not deploy our own troops if this mission was not indispensable to our common security. As President, I can tell you there's no decision more difficult, there's no duty more painful, than signing a letter to the family of somebody who has died in war.

So I understand that there is doubt about this war in Europe. There's doubt at times even in the United States. But know this: The United States of America did not choose to fight a war in Afghanistan. We were attacked by an al Qaeda network that killed thousands on American soil, including French and Germans. Along the border of Afghanistan and Pakistan, those terrorists are still plotting today. And they're -- if there is another al Qaeda attack, it is just as likely, if not more, that it will be here in Europe in a European city.

So I've made a commitment to Afghanistan, and I've asked our NATO partners for more civilian and military support and assistance. We do this with a clear purpose: to root out the terrorists who threaten all of us, to train the Afghan people to sustain their own security and to help them advance their own opportunity, and to quicken the day when our troops come home.

We have no interest in occupying Afghanistan. We have more than enough to do in rebuilding America. (Applause.) But this is a mission that tests whether nations can come together in common purpose on behalf of our common security. That's what we did together in the 20th century. And now we need an alliance that is even stronger than when it brought down a mighty wall in Berlin.

And then in answer to a follow-up question from the audience he made his major point.

So here's the bottom line. The United States has reviewed and redesigned its approach to Afghanistan. We believe that we cannot just win militarily. We have to win through development aid. We have to win through increasing the capacity of the Afghan government to provide basic services to its people and to uphold rule of law. We have to work with the Pakistani government so that they are more trusted by their population and have more control so that they can then go -- help us go after these terrorists. We have to encourage diplomacy in the region.

So it can't just be a military strategy and we will be in partnership with Europe on the development side and on the diplomatic side. But there will be a military component to it, and Europe should not simply expect the United States to shoulder that burden alone. We should not because this is a joint problem and it requires joint effort.
…

So we are going to conduct our operations in a way that reflect our best selves and make sure that we are proud. And that, in turn, will allow the Europeans, I think, to feel good about our joint efforts, and also not to have excuses not to participate in those joint efforts. All right?

Romanian Summit Objectives

2009-04-03T18:03:00.002+01:00

Romanian media are reporting a speech by Romanian President Traian Basescu. His main objectives for the Summit are listed as:

The final statement of the summit must include a message of opening towards Serbia's accession to the NATO structures;
The statement must mention the Black Sea area as a region of interest and a strategic security element within NATO's security policy;
Maintaining the commitments the Alliance made on full coverage of the NATO territory by the anti-missile shield;
Maintaining the commitment to protect the energy infrastructure;- Romania supports the re-launching to the NATO - Russia cooperation;
The final document must encourage Montenegro and Bosnia in their intention to join NATO.

It is notable that these objectives identify Romania as a consumer of, not a contributor to, NATO security. all the objectives are regional. There is no sign that Romania has seriously engaged in the major issues affecting NATO as a whole.

Pre-Summit Briefing Analysis III - NATO Reform

2009-04-03T14:40:00.002+01:00

One interesting point in the briefing was on NATO reform. Appathurai said:

They will be asked to endorse a reform package for NATO Headquarters. The Secretary General, after five and a half years as Secretary General is convinced that we could do things better in the Headquarters in terms of the flexibility in funding our various activities, flexibility in terms of how we use the staff in the Headquarters. Better coherence between the military and the civilian sides. Internal reform. But hopefully something that will be signed up to by the allies.

There have been a number of issues debated over the past year that fall into this category. In October last year NATO Monitor reported on a speech given by SACEUR, General Craddock, on transforming the Alliance. In particular, at the time, we noted that:

One proposal that General Craddock advanced would see a radical shift in the way that operations are funded and organized. He suggested that in future, rather than each troop providing nation paying the cost of their operations, NATO should at least explore the possibility of:.. the use of common funding. With a system of common funding – deployment costs can be shared – thereby reducing the strain on national defence budgets.He also proposed a major shift in NATO’s decision-making. One where political decision would continue to be taken by consensus, but operational decisions would not:More flexible and rapid decision-making processes are needed if we are to address the challenges we face today and tomorrow. Our alliance has long operated under the system of consensus – and at the political level – this system has proven powerful in garnering international support and legitimacy. But do we really need to achieve consensus at every level of committee within the NATO structure? In my judgement this policy stands squarely in the path of agile decision-making.

These proposals do make sense. NATO currently operates with a system that was designed for 16 members and the conditions of the Cold War. Fundamental reform of the control of operations, and of the incredibly laborious procedures of the HQ (which de Hoop Scheffer wants to change) will make the Alliance more effective. It will be much better equipped for today's missions, like the nation building in Afghanistan or peace support as in Kosovo.

We'll look for the reform programme that emerges from the Summit. NATO monitor will be particularly interested to see whether good rhetoric on arms control can be a basis for action. Will NATO work with neighbours to build common security, including through an end to NATO forward basing of nuclear forces? That would be a reform worth seeing.

Pre-Summit Briefing Analysis II - Afghanistan

2009-04-03T14:31:00.002+01:00

Appathurai's briefing also covered the question of Afghnaistan in some detail. This is central to the success of the Summit, and is now key to NATO's future credibility as an alliance. In addition, President Obama has made it a key part of his Presidency, adopting the 'good war' as is own, while doing everything he can to distance himself from the Iraq War.

However, even before leaders meet, Obama has given up on the idea that Europe will match his surge in troops for Afghanistan. The Americans have also accepted that Germany and other nations will not be lifting the caveats on the use of the troops they have deployed to ISAF.

All of this has caused some discontent in Washington DC. However, NATO is now focusing on training and equiping the Afghan army with the likely creation of a NATO Afghan Training Mission for that purpose. They are also focused on getting the elections held this Summer.

The Hague meeting on Afghanistan this week, where a NATO official had a first meeting with an Iranian representative for 30 years, made a good start in 'regionalising' the security situation. But it didn't answer the big questions. Can NATO do enough to pacify the south of the country? Can it even secure Kabul, where the situation has been deteriorating for some months?

From the briefing journalists were given, it seems that this Summit will work around the edges of the problem, with the real work happening in Washington DC and in ad-hoc meetings, such as the Hague.

We have a strategy in NATO, a comprehensive political military plan, they will endorse, that has been constantly revised. It will always be revised. It is a living document. They will endorse it. But they will also wish to have a discussion, of course, of President Obama's strategy, the initiatives that he has announced and how those fit in with the overall NATO approach, how the overall NATO approach should take account of the U.S. strategy, and the different investments that the United States is making.

That broad strategic discussion will take place with a separate but much more practical discussion and that is how do we meet the immediate requirements that we as an Alliance have to meet our commitments with regard to Afghanistan. What does that mean? The Secretary General would like to see NATO meet its requirements for election support. We need, in essence, four battalions of extra forces, above and beyond what the United States is providing, for the election period, in the run-up to the elections, through a potential run-off, which might take place after Ramadan, if that's necessary, so in October.

So election support forces - we need them, the Secretary General would like to see them.
OMLTs, embedded training teams, as the United States calls them, though NATO's are slightly different. Small training teams that are embedded with Afghan battalions. We are short 13. We have 52. we're short 13 OMLTs, Mentoring and Liaison Teams. We would like to see those also provided by allies by the Summit.

Third, police training. This will be a theme of the year, I am quite sure. All of the allies believe, and I think the United Nations believe, the Afghan authorities also believe, that we need to invest much more in police training. That has to include gendarmerie training, paramilitary training and that it should be done in a coherent way.

The Secretary General has said he wishes to see the creation by the Summit of a... or an agreement to create by the allies, a NATO Training Mission Afghanistan similar to what we have in Iraq. We have a NATO training mission in Iraq. Which would bring together the various training initiatives for the various different security bodies, Afghan security bodies in Afghanistan, to ensure that there is a coherent and effective approach.

This, of course, would have, I believe will have a very strong European element. I don't know what exactly the modalities will be, but he would like to see a NATO Training Mission Afghanistan, which as I say, would bring together the relevant training efforts, if not all, then most of the relevant training efforts in Afghanistan - army and police.

Finally, he would like to see, and this is not necessarily by the time of the Summit, but certainly in the coming weeks if there will be other international bodies, such as the European Union, the OSCE or others, the UN, who might be deploying observers for the election, that NATO would find a way to provide the necessary support to them.

Though I'm not sure that this will necessarily be a Summit deliverable, not least because the other bodies have not yet firmed up exactly what it is that they will do and how they will do it. But certainly that is a desire of his.

There will be a Summit declaration on Afghanistan. There will be a communiqué, which goes through all the various issues. All of these are being drafted now, so you will have a declaration on Alliance security, which will, we believe, we hope, launch a strategic concept process. There will be a stand-alone statement on Afghanistan and there will be a third document, that is the communiqué, which obviously doesn't repeat what's in the other two.

Pre-Summit Press Briefing Analysis I

2009-04-03T09:04:00.006+01:00

NATO Spokesman James Appathurai has briefed journalists on the upcoming Summit. (The full briefing is available online.) The first order of business will be at a series of working dinners, for Heads of State and Government; for Foreign Ministers and one for Defence Ministers. Appathurai said that:

The main two topics will be the Alliance's future and its approach to meeting new security challenges. That's topic one. Topic two will be NATO's relations with Russia. On the Alliance's future, you will recall that in Bucharest Heads of State and Government requested the Council to prepare a declaration on Alliance security for adoption at this Summit. That is what they are working on now.

Ministers of Foreign Affairs may give the final tweaks or not, depending on whether it's necessary at the Summit, but in essence it will reiterate NATO's fundamentals, collective defence. It will also set out a vision of NATO's partnerships, its future missions, and it should also give the green light to start work on revising the Strategic Concept, to have a new adapted Strategic Concept to be adopted at the next Summit, the one following this one.

The NATO review will happen in tandem with two US reviews. The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), which is due to report in early 2010, and the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) due in 2011. The NPR could have a strong bearing on NATO's own nuclear deterrent posture. US nuclear weapons have been significantly reduced in Europe during the Bush Presidency, and it will be important for other fora (including the 2010 Non-Proliferation treaty Review Conference) that the US and NATO make progress in reducing and eliminating forward based tactical nuclear weapons. There is also room for a reduction in the importance of deterrence in NATO defence strategy. The QDR, which shapes the strategy and military forces of the US, will also be key to shaping NATO's own strategy, as the Alliance will (as always) take a lead form its largest member. Is the anti-insurgency fourth generation warfare paradigm to prevail, or will the old pattern of preparing for massive regional wars be maintained. How exactly will NATO have to adapt. These are big questions, and a year is not much time to answer them.

This discussion, the Strategic Concept discussion, will, of course, range across all the issues relating to what NATO should do and what NATO should be in the 21st Century. And that will, of course, not just affect NATO, but NATO's relations with other international organizations, other countries. And the discussion on the Friday night will start that reflection.
President Obama was very clear to the Secretary General when the Secretary General visited him last week and that is that he wishes to have a substantive discussion about the future of NATO on Friday evening.

Secretary General de Hoop Scheffer is getting some of what he wanted here. he has been pressing a strategic concept review since at least 2006, and finally that will happen. The Declaration of Alliance Security will not meet his exact goals. he had asked leaders to issue a new Atlantic Charter, but they rejected that request at Bucharest last year. (The original Atlantic Charter was issued by Winston Churchill and President Roosevelt in 1941, and presaged the creation of the United Nations, NATO and the world's financial institutions.) NATO's leaders will do nothing so far-sighted or grand this week.

Appathurai continued:

The second topic of discussion will be the nature and substance of NATO's relations with Russia. Following the December and March foreign ministerial decisions on political re-engagement with Russia what the Heads of State and Government will do will be to examine the political and practical steps that need to be taken.

Where can our core cooperation be strengthened? Are there new areas of additional cooperation that can be sought? How can the NRC be made better use of to address differences, to work on issues of common interest? And clearly there are issues of common interest, on Afghanistan where we share the interest in stability, on fighting terrorism, perhaps on the fight against piracy.

And I should be clear that in looking for strengthening cooperation NATO is in no way moving off of its disapproval of what has happened in Georgia, both in terms of the conduct of the conflict in August, but in particular, or also the recognition of the two Georgian republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent and the building of Russian infrastructure on those... or in those republics and on Georgian territory against the will of the Georgian government.

This is a promising area at present. The Obama-Medvedev statement on arms control at the G20, following all the 'push the reset button' rhetoric, appears to have had a very positive effect. NATO Monitor reported on this yesterday. While there are numerous problems to be resolved, and the future of Georgia is a major one, at least Russia and NATO are talking again and are beginning to cooperate in other vital areas. Both sides have stepped back from the confrontation that was developing last year, and this has to be welcome.

In addition: there will be two other dinners: Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Ministers of Defence will be meeting to discuss different issues. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs will discuss, alongside the Declaration on Alliance Security, if that's necessary, the situation in the Western Balkans and including Kosovo.

The Spanish through a wrench into the Kosovo picture a while ago, when their Defence Minister Carmen Chacon visited the province and told the troops that their mission was over, all without consultation with NATO. While some NATO nations have recognised Kosovo's independence, others have not; and for the foreseeable future the NATO mission will continue as the only means to ensure stability.

Defence Ministers will have the opportunity to discuss defence transformation. In other words, how do we ensure that we have the forces that we need to do the things that we have to do.

It will be interesting to see whether the UK proposal for a reaction force to operate within NATO boundaries, something that emerged from Eastern European concerns over territorial defence during the Georgia crisis last Summer, will be taken up at the Summit.

All in all, this is a substantive agenda, but with the hard decisions left until the next Summit which is likely to come in late 2010 or early 2011.

Diplomacy Works

2009-04-02T21:35:00.002+01:00

There are a couple of signs emerging that the Obama administration's reset button is working. Russia appears to be responding to American diplomatic overtures with a softening of their own line in a couple of areas.

Ria Novosti are reporting that: Russian President Dmitry Medvedev said on Thursday there is a good chance Russia will not have to place Iskander missiles in the Kaliningrad Region in response to the U.S. missile shield in Europe. "We had a talk on this issue with the U.S. president. At a minimum I can say that today the U.S. has a desire to listen to our argument. They are not trying to cut off [talks] and say that the decision has already been made."

President Obama and his team have been backing away from the Bush line on missile defences in Europe for some time, and now that approach appears to be earning some reciprocation from Russia. The last thing NATO or anyone wants is a new nuclear dividing line in Eastern Europe. And this statement makes that less likely.

And a second positive signal has come over Afghanistan. The US has been seeking northern supply routes into the country for military supplies. While Russia has allowed non-lethal supplies to transit its territory, it has also been pressuring its neighbours to cut off US and NATO supply routes - hence the announced closure of by Kyrgyz authorities of the Manas air base, a key part of US logisitics infrastructure in the region.

Now, Russia has offered to discuss the transit of military supplies through their airspace. As the BBC says:

Russia has agreed to discuss the transit of American military supplies to Afghanistan across its territory. The foreign ministry in Moscow said Russia was ready to co-operate if asked by the US. Last month, Russia began allowing the movement of non-lethal supplies to US and Nato forces in Afghanistan. The new offer of discussions comes a day after Russia and the US agreed to resume negotiations on reducing their nuclear arsenals.

All this makes for a good start to the Obama-Medvedev relationship. Hopefully, the positive signals will carry through the Summit and into a meeting of the NATO-Russia Council in May.

Secretary General Update

2009-04-02T13:59:00.005+01:00

Is US support for Anders Fogh Rasmussen as the next Secretary General of the Alliance faltering? Berlingske Tidende from Denmark reports that the US does not want to offend Turkey, which opposes Rasmussen's nomination.

However, with President Obama due to travel to Turkey for an official visit just after the NATO Summit, Ankara doesn't want to push things too far, so that a crisis or controversy would hang over Obama's visit.

There's still plenty of time to work this out, and Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan held talks with other NATO leaders on the topic during the G20 meeting today.

Watch this space.

NATO Tone on Russia Softens From Last Year

2009-04-02T13:19:00.003+01:00

The Russian Interfax news agency has an interview with NATO spokesman, James Appathurai. It is revealing to review some of his answers as they highlight major differences between NATO in Bucharest a year ago, and NATO in Strasbourg in 2009.

Noting that NATO-Russia relations are extremely important to the Alliance, Appathurai is asked about the prospects for Georgia and The Ukraine joining the Alliance, and he answers It could come up. But it is not very likely to be the main topic. .. There is neither controversy nor urgency within NATO with regard to this.

Compare this with statements from last year, when the Bush administration was pressuring Allies to accept the two into NATO. At that time Appathurai was quoted as saying that, when NATO leaders met for the pre-Summit dinner, Enlargement will be at the top of the agenda. (See NATO Monitor for details)

The whole tone of the interview is conciliatory to Russia, emphasising the need for NATO-Russia partnership - for example, in the use of an air corridor to resupply NATO ISAF forces in Afghanistan. A year ago, on the question of enlargement, the NATO Secretary General was telling journalists that:

NATO chief Jaap de Hoop Scheffer later said the Russian leader's talks with alliance leaders were "frank and open" and ended on a good note, although there were no major breakthroughs. "It would be wrong to describe it as a clash of views," de Hoop Scheffer said. But he conceded: "It is true that NATO enlargement is a contentious issue. The minds do not exactly meet, to put it mildly."

What a difference a year (and an American election) can make.

Take the NATO Test

2009-04-02T13:16:00.002+01:00

The Summit Special Edition of NATO Review is online, and it has a 20-question test to determine whether or not you are a NATO expert.

NATO Monitor scored 18/20 and is declared an official NATO expert!

Take the test.

Canada - Out of Step With its Allies?

2009-04-02T12:58:00.002+01:00

Some interesting reading in the Toronto Star, in the form of an analysis of Canada's role with the Atlantic Alliance. The Star says that:

It's not quite NATO's rogue state, but Canada is increasingly out of step with allies who are touting a new path to Afghan peace that leans heavily on regional powerhouses Russia and Iran. .. Defence Minister Peter MacKay's branding of Moscow as an Arctic provocateur and Prime Minister Stephen Harper's decision to characterize the Iranian regime as "evil" in recent weeks is glaringly out of line with the efforts of U.S. President Barack Obama and other member countries in the Western military alliance who seek to draw in the sometimes-renegade states.

Of course, the current Canadian government is deeply conservative, and was ideologically far more in step with the Bush administration and its Manichean world view than it is with the more cooperative, less stark outlook of President Obama.

And at least for Canadian Defence Minister Peter Mackay, this matters. He has hopes, even now, that he might be the next NATO Secretary General. But with such a strong political divergence between Ottawa and Washington, not to mention Ottawa and Brussels, his chances look slimmer by the day.

New York Times on NATO and Dysfunction

2009-04-02T12:29:00.003+01:00

Judy Dempsey has a thoughtful piece in the New York Times on NATO's current situation. Looking at the discussions on the appointment of the next NATO Secretary General she writes:

Contentious issues, in any case, have rarely been discussed at NATO headquarters in Brussels. Member states’ ambassadors have not broached the issue of the next secretary general. Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, the outgoing Dutch NATO chief, did not place it on the agenda of the weekly meeting, knowing full well that some of the big countries, Britain, Germany, France and the United States, would not be pleased. “The job of a secretary general is to cajole, placate, convince and broker,” said Tomas Valasek, a defense expert at the Center for European Reform in London.

Interestingly, it is the first time an acting prime minister, Anders Fogh Rasmussen of Denmark, is seeking the job that in the past was given to bureaucrats or, at most, former foreign ministers. What a surprise then that in the days leading up to summit meeting, it is not clear that Rasmussen would win the race.

Turkey, which is a leading member of NATO, is opposing Mr. Rasmussen’s candidature. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan said Muslim countries had asked him to block Mr. Rasmussen’s appointment because of his refusal to apologize for Danish newspaper cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad that provoked riots in several Muslim states in 2006. “Whether Erdogan is opposing Rasmussen’s appointment for domestic reasons is not clear,” said Karl-Heinz Kamp, director of Research at the NATO College in Rome. “But the more Erdogan talks publicly about it, the more it will be difficult for him to climb down.”

Turkey’s public objections have punctured NATO consensus. But by focusing on Mr. Rasmussen’s past, the Turks have lost a great opportunity to look toward the future and ask what kind of secretary general Mr. Rasmussen would make. ..

But the main reason why NATO is not prepared to have an open discussion about who should lead and modernize the alliance is that it is afraid: afraid of having its divisions exposed; afraid of the future; afraid of the possibility of failure in Afghanistan.

She is right in many ways. The consensus about NATO's role began to fracture with the end of the Cold War. Then, as NATO has expanded, it has brought in many players with differing opinions about what NATO is, and what its role should be in contributing to European security. And the more members there are, the harder it is to have the difficult discussions and take tough decisions. As a case in point, the debate on a new Strategic Concept would probably have begun in Riga in 2006, if only NATO member states had not so feared the outcome of opening up long-cherished principles to discussion.

Even today, NATO sources have often told the NATO Monitor that when the Strategic Concept is discussed, the nuclear paragraphs may remain untouched. Not because people think they are a true reflection of current needs, but because there is no consensus about what those needs are. So NATO may avoid a debate on the role of nuclear deterrence and whether it is still necessary for Alliance defence just because the debate will be difficult.

Whatever else NATO leaders decide in Strasbourg and Kehl, if the Alliance is to continue to operate into the long term, they need to end the dysfunction.

Items on the Summit Agenda

2009-04-02T11:08:00.003+01:00

NATO has let journalists know the list of topics that will be debated by Heads of State and Government in Strasbourg and Kehl.

Croatia and Albania, which formally joined the Alliance today, will be welcomed as new members.

The leaders will debate the common and strategic challenges for NATO, and NATO's role in the Euro-Atlantic security context and issuing a Declaration on Alliance Security. NATO sources have told journalists that the Declaration on Alliance Security will enunciate reasons for NATO to continue in existence, provide political guidelines for the new strategic concept and show the orientation or the way forward for its development. It is hoped that the Strategic Concept will be ready for adoption at the next Summit.

Other significant topics will include: NATO strategy in Afghanistan and US new government’s strategy on ISAF; the NATO KFOR mission and the situation in Kosovo; the alliance’s missile defense system and transformation of mechanisms of arms control; relations with Russia and the NATO-Russia Council; French re-entry to the NATO integrated military command, and NATO-EU relations.

Finally, according to NATO sources there is still a 50-50 chance that a new Secretary General will be named to replace the retiring Jaap de Hoop Scheffer.

Let the Strategic Concept Debate Begin

2009-04-01T22:14:00.002+01:00

There have been some thought-provoking comments recently on the need for a new Strategic Concept debate within NATO. Notably, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, speaking to the Bundestag on March 26, made some good points.

Chancellor Merkel said that as the new concept is developed NATO should try "as much prevention as possible, so that we don't reach the point where only military assistance helps.” She also said that NATO’s decade-old strategy needs rewriting to reflect the impact of the September 11 terrorist attacks and the expansion of the alliance’s mission beyond its historic role of defending Europe during the Cold War. Merkel added that the work should be finished inside a year.

NATO sources have indicated that if NATO heads of State and Government do order a Strategic Concept revision, that it will probably be finished in time for the next Summit, currently projected for late 2010 or early 2011.

Importantly, with many people talking about NATO as a ‘global security provider’, Merkel said that "I don't see a global NATO." This reflects German reluctance to engage fully in Afghanistan, where their troops have been relegated to a non-combat role in relatively peaceful areas of the country.

NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, echoed this call for a new Strategic Concept during his recent trip to Washington DC, saying that:

NATO's future will be discussed, as well. The question: Is NATO going to have a new strategic concept, which brings to the surface a number of questions President Obama already spoke about - NATO's expeditionary capabilities, never forgetting NATO's core function, the integrity of the NATO territory, NATO's relations with Russia. We have many things on which we disagree, but NATO needs Russia and Russia needs NATO, so let's work on the things we agree on, and let's not hide our disagreements and let us realize that also this relationship can and in my opinion should be - should be strengthened.

De Hoop Scheffer and Merkel’s views on relations with Russia are, however, anathema to new NATO members. For example, Poland has a much harder line on their Eastern neighbours, and a much more traditional view of NATO’s raison d’être. Witold Waszczykowski, deputy head of Poland's National Security Bureau, recently told Reuters:

There is a discussion about the possibility of NATO dealing with climate change, but not about real problems. In Western Europe, a number of countries prefer to discuss the attacks in Mumbai and have a tendency to forget about other issues, for example Russia and Georgia.

This attitude is common in the East. Many of the newer NATO members joined the old NATO of common defence, not the new NATO of power projection and humanitarian intervention.

Still, it is clear now that the debate will be joined. As British Foreign Secretary David Miliband told the House of Commons on March 31. Answering Mike Gapes MP, chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee, he told the Commons:

The summit on Friday and Saturday marks the 60th anniversary of the foundation of NATO, and it is an important chance to look forward. One of the foundations of NATO's future, whatever the debates about how it should combine the defence of its members with operations beyond its borders, is that it must embody the transatlantic alliance that has served Europe and North America so well over the past 60 years. I hope that the meeting on Friday and Saturday can be more than a "celebration". First, it needs to be a chance to chart the future in respect of Afghanistan, the biggest and most important NATO mission currently under way. It should also start the debate about how NATO can look forward, in the next 10 or 20 years, to working in a very different context from that in which it was created.

Now we await the formal decision of the Summit to begin the Strategic Concept review.

Downgrading Missile Defence

2009-04-01T11:32:00.005+01:00

Aviation Week carries an article entitled Europe Warms to Missile Defense as US Cools. Based on interviews with primarily European industry people, it is somewhat pessimistic about the prospects for further developments of continent-wide missile defences.

.. for European missile defense efforts, the summit had been regarded as a key venue in which to urge members to embrace the concept of continental defense. The Pentagon’s push for a European site for the ground-based midcourse system—with a radar in the Czech Republic and interceptors in Poland—would be the centerpiece. But the Obama administration has yet to articulate a clear path forward on the third site, which Russia has strenuously opposed. As a result, the Czech government this month decided not to seek parliamentary endorsement for the radar construction. In addition, it was hoped that working groups would be asked to study architectures for expanding the alliance’s current emphasis on theater missile defense into a network covering all of Europe, and to begin cooperatively developing key new components such as early warning systems and interceptors.

Both Congress and the Obama administration are, at best, now sceptical about the need for or value of the deployment of the mid-course BMD system to Europe. Indeed, last year Congress passed legislation prohibiting spending on the European sites until the Missile Defense Agency could prove that the system worked under operationally realistic conditions, and would provide value for money.

Eastern Europeans in particular are now discovering that it is not enough, when dealing with the US, to know the position of the administration. The wishes of Congress must also be taken into account. And, it isn't wise to make deals on controversial programmes with administrations in the final months before they leave office. The Obama administration now has to make sure that its slowing of the BMD deployments do not antagonise European allies too much, and that means making sure that they understand their security is being provided for in other ways. An emphasis on non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament (the direction the administration anyhow wishes to take) is more sensible than spending billions on a last-ditch defence that probably wouldn't work anyway.

And of course, what the Eastern Europeans are really nervous about is Russia. Slowing or stopping the BMD deployment will improve relations with Russia in the short term. In the longer term, it has to be about building trust. and that is the best kind of security to have.

Russian Ambassador Rogozin on NATO-Russia Relationship

2009-03-31T19:57:00.002+01:00

Russian Ambassador to NATO Dmitri Rogozin published a piece on relations with the Alliance in the Moscow Times today. He makes some good points, and proposes once again the Russian idea of a pan-European security treaty.

The crisis in Georgia last August tested Europe's security system, and the system failed to fulfill its core task of ensuring common security for the continent as a whole. As a result, Europe must re-examine its current security arrangements, analyze what happened, and take this analysis into account in reforming those arrangements.
..

When the NATO-Russia council (NRC) was created in 2002, it was devised as a mechanism for dialogue, cooperation, and joint decision-making on issues of mutual interest, including non-proliferation and arms control, the fight against terrorism, civil emergency planning, and military-to-military cooperation. The NRC also was supposed to act as a forum for "holding prompt consultations" in crisis situations and to prevent such crises by "early identification of emerging problems." Unfortunately, the Georgian crisis demonstrated that Russia's dialogue with NATO was less substantial than it should have been. Yet NATO-Russia cooperation is of the utmost importance to global security. We need NATO and NATO needs us in order to face common threats and challenges. .. Indeed, Russia's foremost foreign-policy goal is a real, strategic partnership with the West in which we work together to solve the multitude of modern security problems. (My emphasis)
..

Europe needs an integrated, solid, and indivisible system of comprehensive security. We are not calling for abolishing everything and starting from scratch. On the contrary, we must build on existing institutions. In short, we need to retain the hardware, but update the software. Russia's initiative for a pan-European security treaty should be the new operating system.

All of this is very conciliatory sounding. There are some sections of the piece that are less so. Russian fears about US and NATO enlargement around its borders are clearly stated:

Russia has tried for years to get away from Cold War thinking and to persuade our partners to drop their stereotypes. After the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, Russia quickly extended a helping hand to the Americans. But the West did not appreciate this gesture. Military bases have been impetuously established along Russia's perimeter. The United States plans to establish part of its global missile defense system in the Czech Republic and Poland. The Warsaw Pact ceased to exist 20 years ago, but NATO still proceeds eastward, adding new member states for reasons other than enhancing security and democracy.

And when he offers NATO a choice between Russian support in the international struggle against terrorist groups, and NATO support for Georgia, there are few in the Alliance who would agree with him:

A real, working NATO-Russia relationship could provide the Alliance with solutions to problems that it cannot tackle on its own. It would also give new impetus to the European security system. This is what we want to see in the future – and it is a future that is not possible without Russia. To see why, simply compare the importance of combating international terrorism with the value of nurturing Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili's personal ambitions; things soon fall into place.

All in all, for an Ambassador whose appointment was widely seen as a Russian hard line snub to NATO, this represents an unclenching of the fist, or a pushing of the reset button - or whatever current metaphor one wants to use. NATO and Russia need to work together in mutual respect to create true security in Europe. It seems the signs on this score are more positive than they have been for some time.