Senate Confirms Stravridis as SACEUR

Admiral James Stavridis has been confirmed by the US Senate as commander of U.S. forces in Europe and the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), the top NATO military job.

At his confirmation hearing on June 2 before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Stravridis gave a comprehensive overview of the main challenges that he (and the Obama administration) believe NATO faces:

As Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, one major challenge to be confronted is successfully conducting the Alliance military operations in support of Trans-Atlantic Security, including International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, Kosovo Force (KFOR), OPERATION ACTIVE ENDEAVOR, and OPERATION ALLIED PROTECTOR. All of NATO’s forces, from Kosovo to ISAF to those conducting counter-piracy and other missions, deserve the best guidance and planning as well as the necessary resources and support to conduct operations. Of these operations, ISAF will likely prove to be most important to our security as well as pivotal to the Alliance’s further adaptation of strategies, capabilities, and internal processes to address the myriad of 21st century risks and threats confronting our nations. ISAF not only reflects the Alliance’s will to address the instability in a country destabilized by extremism and terrorism, but it reflects the Alliance’s will and capability to conduct operations at strategic distance outside the traditional NATO area. Success in Afghanistan will contribute to stabilizing a very important region and demonstrate that NATO in the 21st century is politically prepared and militarily capable of dealing successfully with risks and threats to Trans-Atlantic Security at strategic distances far from the borders of the US or European members.

Secondly, we face the challenge of resetting the NATO-Russia relationship and building a predictable, mutually-beneficial relationship that strengthens security. Military cooperation with Russia should figure prominently in the reset of this strategic relationship. This relationship has been stressed by policy differences over the years, and continues to be a complex relationship given the comprehensive nature of US-Russia engagement across the full spectrum of regional and global security matters. It is a strategic relationship that we must get right, and one that the Russians must demonstrate that they value in both words and deeds. There is great opportunity in the US-Russia relationship as well as great challenge. In many cases we share common strategic challenges that present opportunities for beneficial engagement, such as countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. I look forward to working in support of overall US national security objectives to help forge a constructive, reliable, and predictable relationship with Russia.

Thirdly, the Heads of State and Government tasked the NATO Secretary General to develop a new strategic concept for the Alliance. The last concept was developed in 1999. A new NATO strategic concept is crucially important to forging a common perspective on the regional and global security environment; the risks and challenges we face in the 21st century such as energy security, cyber defense, or counter proliferation; the role Alliance members want NATO to play in addressing these risks based on a common perception and common goals; and the strategies, capabilities, and internal processes necessary to successfully be prepared. The Alliance will engage in debate on these important issues. My initial assessment is that the military authorities will seek a balance of collective defense and global operations. Once the political leaders reach consensus, further development of military tasks and defining capabilities will be no easy task and must be done with a realistic understanding of the means available. I look forward to contributing my military advice to the development of a new NATO Strategic Concept, a concept that will drive and frame NATO’s role in the international security sphere for years to come.

Finally, French reintegration into the NATO military structure would also be a key area of focus. As France has always been a very active partner in NATO’s ongoing operations, their reintegration is nominally only a “formal” step to capture their current participation. Their further involvement in NATOs military command structure will provide an avenue for greater involvement – especially in the planning processes.

In addition to the above stated challenges, I believe there will be additional challenges facing the next EUCOM Commander such as defense cooperation in Eastern Europe and further progress in the Balkans, especially Kosovo.

As the focus of European security continues to shift from Central to Eastern Europe, EUCOM strategic plans and activities to address the challenges in Eastern Europe and Eurasia complement NATO efforts to strengthen new Alliance partner capability in this region. EUCOM efforts to stage U.S. forces in Bulgaria and Romania will focus on military-to-military activities that continue to build the military capacities of new NATO Alliance and prospective Alliance countries along with strategic partners in Eastern Europe and Eurasia. Ukraine and Georgia, considered exceptionally important countries in the EUCOM AOR, will continue the trend of bilateral relationships and capacity building. EUCOM continues to assist both countries with their NATO-oriented defense transformation and institution-building efforts, which have begun to bear fruit with peacekeeping presences in Kosovo, Operation Active Endeavor, and Africa.

(The full transcript can be read here)

Analysis: Cooperation with NATO in Russian Interest

The Daily Telegraph carried an interesting analysis piece on April 24, concerning NATO-Russia relations. It is written by Fyodor Lukyanov, the editor-in-chief of Russia in Global Affairs, an interesting website and journal.

Lukyanov makes the point that, since the 1990s, NATO's cohesion and thus influence has been declining. He adds that grandiose dreams of a global structure linking NATO with security structures across the Pacific are unlikely to happen, not least because NATO members can't agree on what their Alliance is for. He concludes that Russia should cooperate with NATO, for example, in creating supply routes to Afghanistan, because it is in the Russian interest to do so.

There is much in the article that is persuasive, especially when he talks about the confusion or profusion of new roles that Alliance is being asked to take on:

But can one organisation effectively embrace the roles of global emergency team, the FBI, a rapid response task force and a peacekeeping headquarters while still remaining a closed club within a rigid ideological framework?

This is especially true since NATO has been so weakened since 1999. The Kosovo War first showed how the political interference in military missions at the lowest tactical level reduces Alliance inefficiency (something SACEUR General Craddock has railed against); the Bush administration chose to go into Afghanistan with a 'coalition of the willing', despite an invocation of the Article V mutual defence guarantee, precisely because the Americans did not want to hampered by NATO bureaucracy; the subsequent ISAF mission has shown the political divisions inside the Alliance, and its inability to act together decisively when not under threat itself; and finally, the wide enlargement this decade has divided Europe in two, the old members who value stability and the new members, who look to NATO as a bulwark against Russia, even if it means the recreation of the Cold War in some form.

As Lukyanov writes, these divisions mean that NATO is not the all-encompassing global threat that some in Russia perceive, but neither is it about to fade away. Positive engagement on both sides will be the most beneficial course in the long run.

Pre-Summit Briefing Analysis III - NATO Reform

One interesting point in the briefing was on NATO reform. Appathurai said:

They will be asked to endorse a reform package for NATO Headquarters. The Secretary General, after five and a half years as Secretary General is convinced that we could do things better in the Headquarters in terms of the flexibility in funding our various activities, flexibility in terms of how we use the staff in the Headquarters. Better coherence between the military and the civilian sides. Internal reform. But hopefully something that will be signed up to by the allies.

There have been a number of issues debated over the past year that fall into this category. In October last year NATO Monitor reported on a speech given by SACEUR, General Craddock, on transforming the Alliance. In particular, at the time, we noted that:

One proposal that General Craddock advanced would see a radical shift in the way that operations are funded and organized. He suggested that in future, rather than each troop providing nation paying the cost of their operations, NATO should at least explore the possibility of:.. the use of common funding. With a system of common funding – deployment costs can be shared – thereby reducing the strain on national defence budgets.He also proposed a major shift in NATO’s decision-making. One where political decision would continue to be taken by consensus, but operational decisions would not:More flexible and rapid decision-making processes are needed if we are to address the challenges we face today and tomorrow. Our alliance has long operated under the system of consensus – and at the political level – this system has proven powerful in garnering international support and legitimacy. But do we really need to achieve consensus at every level of committee within the NATO structure? In my judgement this policy stands squarely in the path of agile decision-making.

These proposals do make sense. NATO currently operates with a system that was designed for 16 members and the conditions of the Cold War. Fundamental reform of the control of operations, and of the incredibly laborious procedures of the HQ (which de Hoop Scheffer wants to change) will make the Alliance more effective. It will be much better equipped for today's missions, like the nation building in Afghanistan or peace support as in Kosovo.

We'll look for the reform programme that emerges from the Summit. NATO monitor will be particularly interested to see whether good rhetoric on arms control can be a basis for action. Will NATO work with neighbours to build common security, including through an end to NATO forward basing of nuclear forces? That would be a reform worth seeing.

All Change in NATO's Leadership

If the Danish newspaper Politiken is correct in this article, then the US has dropped the possibility of supporting Canadian Defence Minister Peter Mackay as the new NATO Secretary General. They are now, along with major European powers, supporting Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen.

That should about sew things up for Rasmussen, but will leave some important constituencies to be mollified, notably Turkey which has opposed the appointment. The Eastern Europeans will also be somewhat miffed, as they are beginning to feel like second class citizens within the Alliance. The Poles, in particular, were convinced that their man should get the job.

Another big change is the American announcement of a new Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), the Alliance's top military post. The current SACEUR, General Craddock, is widely perceived as being too close to ex-President Bush's political outlook. His replacement, Admiral James Stavridis of SOUTHCOM, was a surprise. (Here is the Pentagon press release about him).Most observers were expecting Admiral Mattis of NATO's Allied Command Transformation to get the job.

According to Der Spiegel, some in Germany at least were upset that the Pentagon made the appointment out of the blue without reference to European sensibilities. However, I certainly don't recall big debates in the Alliance about this in the past, and this job is in the gift of the US President. Any potential fights about the next Secretary General will be more significant in the short and longer term.

Israeli Links With NATO

NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue includes Israel, one of the few fora where Israel and Arab nations sit down together, possibly the only one were security questions are the topic of conversation. Now this relationship is being taken up a level. Ha'aretz reports that the Individual Cooperation Programme "allows for an exchange of intelligence information and security expertise on different subjects, an increase in the number of joint Israel-NATO military exercises and further cooperation in the fight against nuclear proliferation." One can hope that this might include discussion of Israel's nuclear arsenal, or even simply discussion of a potential WMD Free Zone in the Middle East (Israel has allowed participation in SOAS meetings on that topic), but I doubt it.

This enhanced cooperation is interesting. There have been numerous reports that NATO could be involved in guaranteeing Israeli and Palestinian security in the event of a peace deal. (For example, here is a Jerusalem Post report on then-NATO SACEUR General Jones visiting Israel to scope out a potential West Bank deployment back in February 2008) This kind of cooperation could make that eventuality more likely. General Jones, now about to become National Security Advisor to Barack Obama, thought the idea might have legs. Will he pursue it once in the new administration?

SACEUR Speaks on NATO Reform, Ignores Role of Nuclear Forces

NATO’s General Craddock, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), spoke at RUSI in London on Monday. His speech, and the question and answer session that followed, were thought provoking. The issues that the General raised have a strong bearing on the future of the Alliance, and in particular the any revision of the Strategic Concept following the Strasbourg-Kehl Summit next spring. The headlines that the press gave to the speech concerned mostly narrow tactical issues facing the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) that NATO leads in Afghanistan. Craddock talked about Afghanistan, but the significance of his remarks lay more in their long tern strategic implications. He began by saying that:

… the Center for Strategic and International Studies [and] RUSI recently published a compelling article about NATO’s future in view of its current operation in Afghanistan. The authors argue that 'the troubles the Alliance has encountered in Afghanistan are not specific to the ISAF mission. They reflect very real changes in the global security environment – issues that to date NATO has failed to address'. In short, they see the operation in 'Afghanistan as a symptom, not the cause', and ask some hard-hitting questions that I believe our Alliance must answer. Questions such as: what are the long-term consequences if nations remain uncomfortable with far away missions like Afghanistan? Will NATO permanently opt to scale back missions outside the Euro-Atlantic area? What are the consequences of undertaking more missions like Afghanistan in light of varying beliefs within the alliance about the use of military force? These are important questions – questions that rightly belong at NATO’s political level. However, the answers to these questions are undoubtedly shaped by what we do at the military strategic, operational, and tactical levels.

The truth is that NATO has failed to manage the transition from the Cold War to the Long War with any measure of success. The military structure that integrated forces ready for a potential battle on the Central Front has been dismantled (although the command structure remains), and the ad-hoc arrangements for operations that were used in Kosovo have not stood up to the rigours of a much longer and more complicated campaign in Afghanistan. Allowing nations to decide on a case by case basis what troops and equipment they provide, and how those forces are used has placed huge constraints on NATO operations in theatre. Craddock continued:

NATO’s role and credibility as a security provider in the post-cold war era will be judged by how we respond to emerging crises, and if committed, how well we perform in our operations.

This presupposes an answer to one of the questions Craddock has already posed. Should NATO play a role in security provision beyond the Euro-Atlantic area? This is a position that divides NATO. France and Germany are not keen on NATO taking a global leadership role, while the US (with the UK at its side) is enthusiastic for such responsibility. However, it is likely that the strongest opposition away from an emphasis on territorial defence to expeditionary missions will come from the NATO members in Eastern Europe. The Baltic States, Poland and others have a vision of NATO as their protector from Russia. This has only sharpened as a result of the summer’s conflict in Georgia. However, that said, if NATO does decide to take on missions like ISAF, it has do to do so without reservation, united and using all tools necessary to succeed. This has not been the case with ISAF. While troop levels are roughly consistent with the requirement of field commanders, nations have been reluctant to provide certain capabilities (for example, the constant lack of helicopters for troop and supplies transport to remote battlefields), and the debate about the long list of national ‘caveats’ on the use of forces in country has been close to an embarrassment for the Alliance. This is the risk for NATO of pursuing continued relevance through the acceptance of ‘missions of choice’ rather than those forced on the Alliance by the need to defend its members’ territory.

NATO also faces another problem in Afghanistan that General Craddock highlighted:

… the conflict in Afghanistan cannot be won by military means alone – we are just one member of a greater team. The military must provide a safe and secure environment to enable the conditions for the government of Afghanistan – and the international community – to deliver good governance, reconstruction, and enduring development. For this co-operative effort to succeed, we in the international community must come together as part of a truly comprehensive approach. The current effort remains disjointed in time and space.

Perhaps the root of the problem is that we don’t all see the concept in the same light. For some a comprehensive approach entails the many actors in the international community playing their roles and doing their parts, individually, toward the collective vision for success. In the end – I believe the overarching strategy of the international community is correct – but we must find a way to enhance our comprehensive approach toward success. We need a cohesive and coherent effort with cooperation and coordination – building on common strengths and off-setting persistent shortfalls.

While NATO’s ‘take, hold, build’ strategy is the classic strategy for fighting an insurgency, the problem for NATO is that it doesn’t control the final part of this. It has to work with the EU, the United Nations and a wide range of NGOs. The Provincial Reconstruction Teams are part of meeting this need on the ground, but NATO is not structured at the command or political level to run a reconstruction effort. It is true that there needs to be a unified command effort in Afghanistan, but it is doubtful that NATO is best placed to undertake that role. NATO needs to agree, at the political level, to provide forces for its operational commanders and then to allow those commanders to get on with their job. It would be best, if operating outside Europe, that this were done at the service of the United Nations, to reinforce an internationalist and cooperative approach to security building. The UN can bring expertise to bear in areas where NATO is deficient, allowing for a much greater chance of success in Afghanistan.

If NATO is unable to agree an operational framework that frees its commanders to do their job, then it need not engage in a debate as to the desirability or otherwise of amending the Strategic Concept to give NATO the structures it needs to act as a ‘global security provider’ (as the Secretary General likes to say). In such circumstances, NATO would be unable to operationalise such aims anyway, just as it is falling short with ISAF. Whatever path NATO takes the essential thing is that its members act together. As General Craddock put it:

… we are demonstrating a political will that is – somewhat – wavering. And it is this wavering political will that impedes operational progress and brings into question the relevancy of the alliance here in the twenty-first century. Clearly – the alliance cannot nor should not do everything everywhere – but we need to define what role we wish to play in today’s security environment.

This couldn’t be more true, but presents the Alliance with a major difficulty. There has been no revision of the Strategic Concept for a decade as many believe that the members of NATO, especially since the last round of enlargement, diverge too deeply on the role the Alliance should play. However, General Craddock suggests a way to proceed:

NATO must continually assess the role it wants to have in the current security environment and assess its capabilities and its will to fulfil that role… I believe our alliance should start with a comprehensive global strategic threat assessment – shortly followed by a twenty-first century strategic concept.

This seems only sensible. If NATO has a future as an Alliance then its member states must agree what threats it faces, and then how to deal with them. It must also be prepared to provide the necessary resources. At a time of global recession, that is going mean a smaller, more constricted Alliance, at least in terms of a reduction of acquisition of military hardware and of operations. However, if NATO is to retain any credibility then, as Craddock insisted:

Whatever we decide, NATO’s role is in our world – we must all be certain that our reach does not extend beyond our grasp – that our level of ambition is in step with our political will and our military capability.

One proposal that General Craddock advanced would see a radical shift in the way that operations are funded and organized. He suggested that in future, rather than each troop providing nation paying the cost of their operations, NATO should at least explore the possibility of:

.. the use of common funding. With a system of common funding – deployment costs can be shared – thereby reducing the strain on national defence budgets.

He also proposed a major shift in NATO’s decision-making. One where political decision would continue to be taken by consensus, but operational decisions would not:

More flexible and rapid decision-making processes are needed if we are to address the challenges we face today and tomorrow. Our alliance has long operated under the system of consensus – and at the political level – this system has proven powerful in garnering international support and legitimacy. But do we really need to achieve consensus at every level of committee within the NATO structure? In my judgement this policy stands squarely in the path of agile decision-making.

These proposals taken as a whole make sense. They would transform NATO and end the ‘war by committee’ controversy that first emerged in Kosovo. General Craddock properly dealt with military and operational reform of NATO to make Alliance operations more effective. That is his role. However, he ignored one area of NATO defence strategy that is under his control, and where reform is most urgent - the need to reconsider the role of nuclear forces in Alliance policy.
If NATO is to become involved increasingly in expeditionary warfare with Afghanistan as a model, then nuclear weapons are redundant – and indeed counterproductive, they simply have no role whatsoever in such scenarios. The risk assessment and Strategic Concept debates the General proposes have to take this into consideration.

NATO’s nuclear forces also have no role for defence in the current strategic situation. NATO retains a significant nuclear force, both tactical and strategic, supposedly deter aggression. However, the massive conventional forces of the Warsaw Pact have melted away or even joined NATO. There is simply no conventional threat to the Alliance. Similarly, with Russia as a strategic partner, there is no extent nuclear threat to the Alliance. Such nuclear or other WMD threats as might emerge (Iran notably) could, with adept diplomacy and appropriate security guarantees, be negotiated away before they emerge. Rather than refusing to discuss arms reductions and elimination, thereby hurting non-proliferation efforts, NATO needs to engage with its neighbours to achieve a mutual end to WMD threats, and the blueprint for that engagement needs to be written into the Strategic Concept.

A NATO military that was not subject to consensus rules for operations, as the General has proposed, would mean that elimination of the Alliance's nuclear role would become urgent. The Cold War thinking that General Craddock says dominates the Alliance at present must change. The ridiculous assertion in the Strategic Concept that it takes the presence of American nuclear weapons in Europe to maintain the trans-Atlantic link is one part of the NATO’s thinking most in need of such change. A 21st century NATO cannot simply rely on 1950s nuclear thinking.

General Craddock’s speech is available on the RUSI website.

Afghanistan Drowns Out Important Issues in Budapest

The main headlines that emerged from the informal Budapest Defence Ministers meeting concerned Afghanistan. Ministers agreed that NATO forces could go after drug producers, primarily as a means to cut off funding to the Taliban. However, as is often the case with NATO, the items that Ministers hoped journalists would concentrate on were not the most important ones to come out of the meeting.

Defending the Baltic States

NATO Monitor has already covered the controversy at the meeting over defence planning for military intervention in the Baltic States to prevent a Russian invasion. There is deep division amongst NATO ministers on this topic, and a NATO source contacted by NATO Monitor expressed irritation that this had risen to the political level at all. Had the authorities at SHAPE simply begun some contingency planning without any fuss, it may have gone unnoticed, our source said. By raising the question with ministers, SACEUR General Craddock has both divided the political leaders of the Alliance and guaranteed that any future exercises or planning activity will stir up acrimony with Russia.

Relations with Georgia

Understandably, the future nature of NATO contacts with Georgia was discussed in the main meeting, and on the margins. NATO was keen to signal political support for the Georgian government. Having decided to establish a NATO-Georgia Commission this Summer, in the wake of the Georgian conflict with Russia, Ministers met with their Georgian counterpart in this forum for the first time - promising "the coordination of assistance in areas such as defence and security cooperation, security sector reform and airspace management." (NATO's report can be found here).

However, for Georgia and for the United States, this was another opportunity to press for Georgian accession to the Alliance. US Defense Secretary Gates came into the meeting saying he would raise this with his colleagues. His goal was to have the North Atlantic Council meeting this coming December approve a Membership Action Plan for Georgia (and the Ukraine). A positive reaction in Budapest would make this easier. However, Chancellor Merkel of Germany has already ruled this out. Meeting with Russian President Medvedev on October 2, she told the media that it is too early to move ahead. (See a report here) Soundings amongst other NATO nations make it clear that Merkel has considerable support.

Other aspects of some NATO members' approach to Georgia have irritated Secretary General de Hoop Scheffer and the United States. Scheffer has expressed irritation that the French brokered peace deal allowed Russian troops to remain in South Ossetia and Abkhazia indefinitely, although it is very hard to see how any other outcome could have been achieved. Further, the US has been prepared to indirectly support arms sales to Georgia to allow the rebuilding of military stockpiles destroyed by Russia during the short Summer war.

US experts have been advising the Ukraine on appropriate arms to supply, including anti-tank missiles. The Bush administration hold talks with Georgian representatives in Washington DC later this month about supplies of equipments and weapons for the Georgian military. NATO ministers discussed this informally in Budapest and ruled out Alliance support for rebuilding Georgia's military. Even influential members of Congress do not support the administration on this one. Howard Berman, chairman of the House Foreign Relations Committee has ruled out the actual supply of weapons to Georgia.

In short, the US, with British and some Eastern European support, wants to continue the aggressive posture of pushing the boundaries of the relationship with Moscow through a step-change in relations with Georgia and other nations on Russia's periphery. Other NATO members have looked at the war this Summer and seen the potential for a new Cold War, and decided they want no part of it.

Conclusion

The needs of the continuing ISAF mission in Afghanistan continue to dominate NATO meetings, and media coverage of them. But some vital questions of European security are overlooked if tactical changes in Alliance operations are the only focus. NATO's interaction with Russia is, in the long term, much more significant for the future of the Alliance. And yet, these questions get relatively attention at present. The German Defence Minister Franz Jozef Jung told his colleagues that the NATO-Russia Council should be reactivated. With matters of enormous strategic importance to discuss, he is surely right. The outcome of the Afghnaistan mission is important to the future role of the Alliance, but relations with Russia are much more so.

If the confrontation over Georgia, and now over defending the Baltic States, cannot be resolved successfully then the outlook is bleak. Prolems that must be resolved include differences over missile defences, the CFE treaty and tactical nuclear weapons. Without agreement on these topics, a new Cold War looms on the horizon - and that is in no-one's interest.