US Defense Secretary Robert Gates has urged his counterparts in Budapest to allow Georgia to get back on the road to membership for NATO at Ministerial meetings this December. He wants Georgia to be awarded the Membership Action Plan (the last step before joining the Alliance) that it was denied in Bucharest earlier this year.
German Chancellor Angela Merkel is known to be strongly opposed to such a move, especially after the reckless assault ordered by Georgian armed forces on South Ossetia by President Saakashvili.
This one will run and run.
Thursday, 9 October 2008
How to Deal With Russia
While the official agenda in Budapest concerns Afghanistan and support for Georgia, as NATO Spokesman James Apathurai told journalists earlier this week: any NATO ally or indeed SACEUR if he wishes to can put issues onto the agenda.
And the item that, if not on the agenda, is certainly the most important question to have arisen within NATO since the end of the Cold War is - what do we do about Russia? And, more particularly, do we need to be taking active measures to defend ourselves against Russia?
As we have reported, at the informal Ministerial in London a couple of weeks ago, some NATO nations were seeking to have the NATO Response Force tasked with potential deployment within Alliance territory in the event of a threat from Russia. Also, there was a discussion about whether the military staff at SHAPE should be planning for contingencies involving potential Russian threats to the Baltic States.
This is absolutely fundamental to the future of NATO. If the Alliance is unable to provide the security that the Baltic States thought they were getting when they joined, if the Article V guarantee is no guarantee at all - what is NATO about? All the discussion about NATO as a 'global security provider' that its advocates have been passionately advocating for the past couple of years becomes meaningless if the Alliance cannot do collective defence of its own members.
At least, that is how the Baltic States, Poland and their supporters (principally the US and the UK) see things. Others have a rather different take. France and Germany (and note by the way how quickly the divisions that emerged within the Alliance over the invasion of Iraq have reasserted themselves) say that while the Alliance is, of course, about collective defence, the Baltic States are exaggerating current threats. There is no danger of war with Russia on the northern flank, and to begin active preparations for it is merely to provoke the Russians in an unnecessary fashion.
NATO's SACEUR, the top military commander, wants to begin contingency planning for potential conflicts with Russia in the Baltics, or in Poland. American General Craddock is reported to have written a letter to all 26 allies asking for permission to go ahead with defence contingency planning. He has also been discussing the issue with NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer. They take the position that he has the right ot do this planning, but that the support of the Allies is important.
Of course, seeking permission of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) turns this from something that is purely a matter of military caution to a matter of the highest Alliance politics. This situation has arisen because, when the three Baltic States joined NATO in 2004 the Alliance was working to make Russia a strategic partner and no need for such contingency planning was seen.
But now, if the NAC gives the go-ahead, this will ratchet up the political pressure on the relationship with Russia, making a serious international situation even worse. If the NAC doesn't go ahead then the three Baltic States can argue that NATO is not prepared to defend them as it should. Craddock wants to begin with a risk assessment for Estonia, before moving on to prepare contingency plans. Germany and France argue that this would provoke open confrontation with Russia.
This internal dispute risks making the security situation in Europe worse. It shows the urgent need to sit back down with Russia in the NATO-Russia Council and hammer things out. The alternative, a lurch back to the Cold War would be in no-one's interest. It also shows how NATO has changed over the past decade. The new members have very different perceptions of threats to their security form the old members, and those differences will be very hard to reconcile. Further, in the Cold War or through the 1990s NATO would have had no problem with dealing with this problem. The expeditionary Alliance, bogged down a war even the British commander in Afghanistan thinks is unwinnable, has its hands full with new tasks, the tasks that the Secretary General hopes will become its raison d'être - those that involve a global vision of NATO underpinning security with its military force. And yet, so occupied, it seems unable to agree on the basics of mutual defence at home.
This problem needs to be resolved, and resolved very quickly. If not, the Strategic Concept debate that will begin next Spring at the 2009 Summit will prove very hard indeed.
And the item that, if not on the agenda, is certainly the most important question to have arisen within NATO since the end of the Cold War is - what do we do about Russia? And, more particularly, do we need to be taking active measures to defend ourselves against Russia?
As we have reported, at the informal Ministerial in London a couple of weeks ago, some NATO nations were seeking to have the NATO Response Force tasked with potential deployment within Alliance territory in the event of a threat from Russia. Also, there was a discussion about whether the military staff at SHAPE should be planning for contingencies involving potential Russian threats to the Baltic States.
This is absolutely fundamental to the future of NATO. If the Alliance is unable to provide the security that the Baltic States thought they were getting when they joined, if the Article V guarantee is no guarantee at all - what is NATO about? All the discussion about NATO as a 'global security provider' that its advocates have been passionately advocating for the past couple of years becomes meaningless if the Alliance cannot do collective defence of its own members.
At least, that is how the Baltic States, Poland and their supporters (principally the US and the UK) see things. Others have a rather different take. France and Germany (and note by the way how quickly the divisions that emerged within the Alliance over the invasion of Iraq have reasserted themselves) say that while the Alliance is, of course, about collective defence, the Baltic States are exaggerating current threats. There is no danger of war with Russia on the northern flank, and to begin active preparations for it is merely to provoke the Russians in an unnecessary fashion.
NATO's SACEUR, the top military commander, wants to begin contingency planning for potential conflicts with Russia in the Baltics, or in Poland. American General Craddock is reported to have written a letter to all 26 allies asking for permission to go ahead with defence contingency planning. He has also been discussing the issue with NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer. They take the position that he has the right ot do this planning, but that the support of the Allies is important.
Of course, seeking permission of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) turns this from something that is purely a matter of military caution to a matter of the highest Alliance politics. This situation has arisen because, when the three Baltic States joined NATO in 2004 the Alliance was working to make Russia a strategic partner and no need for such contingency planning was seen.
But now, if the NAC gives the go-ahead, this will ratchet up the political pressure on the relationship with Russia, making a serious international situation even worse. If the NAC doesn't go ahead then the three Baltic States can argue that NATO is not prepared to defend them as it should. Craddock wants to begin with a risk assessment for Estonia, before moving on to prepare contingency plans. Germany and France argue that this would provoke open confrontation with Russia.
This internal dispute risks making the security situation in Europe worse. It shows the urgent need to sit back down with Russia in the NATO-Russia Council and hammer things out. The alternative, a lurch back to the Cold War would be in no-one's interest. It also shows how NATO has changed over the past decade. The new members have very different perceptions of threats to their security form the old members, and those differences will be very hard to reconcile. Further, in the Cold War or through the 1990s NATO would have had no problem with dealing with this problem. The expeditionary Alliance, bogged down a war even the British commander in Afghanistan thinks is unwinnable, has its hands full with new tasks, the tasks that the Secretary General hopes will become its raison d'être - those that involve a global vision of NATO underpinning security with its military force. And yet, so occupied, it seems unable to agree on the basics of mutual defence at home.
This problem needs to be resolved, and resolved very quickly. If not, the Strategic Concept debate that will begin next Spring at the 2009 Summit will prove very hard indeed.
NATO Defence Ministers Meet in Budapest
NATO Defence Ministers meet in Budapest today and tomorrow. The principle topics of discussion will be the Alliance ISAF mission in Afghanistan, and the aftermath of the conflict in Georgia. However, the global financial meltdown will also be a topic for discussion as Deutchse Welle reports:
much of the discussions in Budapest will revolve around ways to boost NATO's capabilities at a time of global economic slowdown. Officials say the financial crisis should encourage member states to make better use of their defense budgets. "The pressure on national budgets will only grow as a result of the current financial crisis. Which means finding efficiencies across government spending will become ever more important," said alliance spokesman James Appathurai.
Ministers will also look to agree a target of adapting forces so that 50% are deployable beyond NATO's borders. This is not without controversy, as Turkey, Poland and the Baltic States are said to be sticking firmly to the position that their national defense needs are more important than the ability to project power globally.
NATO Monitor will keep up to date throughout the meeting.
much of the discussions in Budapest will revolve around ways to boost NATO's capabilities at a time of global economic slowdown. Officials say the financial crisis should encourage member states to make better use of their defense budgets. "The pressure on national budgets will only grow as a result of the current financial crisis. Which means finding efficiencies across government spending will become ever more important," said alliance spokesman James Appathurai.
Ministers will also look to agree a target of adapting forces so that 50% are deployable beyond NATO's borders. This is not without controversy, as Turkey, Poland and the Baltic States are said to be sticking firmly to the position that their national defense needs are more important than the ability to project power globally.
NATO Monitor will keep up to date throughout the meeting.
Sunday, 5 October 2008
Defence Planning, Response Force for Baltics Debate Continues
A couple of related items came up at NATO Spokesman James Apathurai's press briefing last week. Journalists asked about the NATO Response Force (NRF) questions that had leaked during the London Defence Ministerial a couple of weeks ago, and a group of NATO nations (plus Sweden and Finland) which is establishing a combined heavy airlift capability took a big step towards the purchase of the C-17 aircraft they will operate for the Alliance.
Appathurai was asked "whether you can give us any flavour of what were the discussions in London between the Ministers of Defence on what to do about the Baltics, whether there's any need to give them any sort of greater defence, reassurement?"
He replied that "there was an informal discussion amongst the NATO Defence Ministers on the issue of planning and exercising for collective defence. The consensus, not a formal decision because this was not a decision-taking meeting, but the consensus was that NATO has always done what is necessary to ensure that the necessary... that the appropriate planning and exercising is in place for the defence of allied territory. That is one of our core... or "the" core task of NATO; that no one should be surprised if any prudent planning or any exercises take place in future to meet... to continue to meet, excuse me, that core task. And if and when such planning or exercises take place, this should be considered business as usual for NATO."
This somewhat waffly answer conceals a difficult truth for NATO. In the wake of the conflict in Georgia the Baltic States have asked for NATO's defence guarantee to be given some extra teeth. They received support for this from Des Browne, then UK Defence Secretary. Specifically, they wanted assurances that in the event of Russian military deployments near their borders, the NRF could be deployed to defend them. France, Germany and Italy objected and NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer was left to finesse the question at a press conference in London, something he didn't do very well, raising more inquisitive eyebrows than he intended. (See previous posts on the London meeting)
De Hoop Sceffer and US Ambassador to NATO Volker have previously promised to do all that is necessary, both in terms of planning and exercises, to ensure that NATO is ready to defend the Baltic States. However, the idea of formally committing the NRF has become controversial as it is symbolic of the new confrontation with Russia. This has been building as Russian objections to the deployment of missile defence in Eastern Europe, and NATO nations failure to ratify the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty led to a cut-off in cooperation on CFE implementation. The Georgian conflict this summer has turned a simmering dispute into a full blown stand-off between the two.
The signing of the Memorandum of Understanding for the collective purchase of C-17 transport aircraft is significant in this context. It gives NATO a joint capacity to transport the NRF (as opposed to asking for American help) and thus contributes to enhanced operational capacity for the NRF. Since the transport wing will be based in Hungary, it also shifts the balance of NATO forces eastwards, and seems to go against promises about the restriction of military infrastructure in the east of Europe that were made to Russia repeatedly during the past 15 years, thus contributing further to Russia's sense of encirclement, and to the crisis in relations between NATO and Russia.
NATO leaders protest they don't want a new Cold War. They need to work out relations with Russia very quickly if it is to be avoided. Russia has announced plans to step up its nuclear force modernisation, and to work on its own missile defences. It has suspended cooperation with NATO on CFE and used that suspension to mount the Georgia operation in stealth. It has threatened to significantly enhance its military forces in Kaliningrad.
In present circumstances, the internal NATO debate about stepping up defence cooperation for the Baltics can only contribute to this negative spiral.
Appathurai was asked "whether you can give us any flavour of what were the discussions in London between the Ministers of Defence on what to do about the Baltics, whether there's any need to give them any sort of greater defence, reassurement?"
He replied that "there was an informal discussion amongst the NATO Defence Ministers on the issue of planning and exercising for collective defence. The consensus, not a formal decision because this was not a decision-taking meeting, but the consensus was that NATO has always done what is necessary to ensure that the necessary... that the appropriate planning and exercising is in place for the defence of allied territory. That is one of our core... or "the" core task of NATO; that no one should be surprised if any prudent planning or any exercises take place in future to meet... to continue to meet, excuse me, that core task. And if and when such planning or exercises take place, this should be considered business as usual for NATO."
This somewhat waffly answer conceals a difficult truth for NATO. In the wake of the conflict in Georgia the Baltic States have asked for NATO's defence guarantee to be given some extra teeth. They received support for this from Des Browne, then UK Defence Secretary. Specifically, they wanted assurances that in the event of Russian military deployments near their borders, the NRF could be deployed to defend them. France, Germany and Italy objected and NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer was left to finesse the question at a press conference in London, something he didn't do very well, raising more inquisitive eyebrows than he intended. (See previous posts on the London meeting)
De Hoop Sceffer and US Ambassador to NATO Volker have previously promised to do all that is necessary, both in terms of planning and exercises, to ensure that NATO is ready to defend the Baltic States. However, the idea of formally committing the NRF has become controversial as it is symbolic of the new confrontation with Russia. This has been building as Russian objections to the deployment of missile defence in Eastern Europe, and NATO nations failure to ratify the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty led to a cut-off in cooperation on CFE implementation. The Georgian conflict this summer has turned a simmering dispute into a full blown stand-off between the two.
The signing of the Memorandum of Understanding for the collective purchase of C-17 transport aircraft is significant in this context. It gives NATO a joint capacity to transport the NRF (as opposed to asking for American help) and thus contributes to enhanced operational capacity for the NRF. Since the transport wing will be based in Hungary, it also shifts the balance of NATO forces eastwards, and seems to go against promises about the restriction of military infrastructure in the east of Europe that were made to Russia repeatedly during the past 15 years, thus contributing further to Russia's sense of encirclement, and to the crisis in relations between NATO and Russia.
NATO leaders protest they don't want a new Cold War. They need to work out relations with Russia very quickly if it is to be avoided. Russia has announced plans to step up its nuclear force modernisation, and to work on its own missile defences. It has suspended cooperation with NATO on CFE and used that suspension to mount the Georgia operation in stealth. It has threatened to significantly enhance its military forces in Kaliningrad.
In present circumstances, the internal NATO debate about stepping up defence cooperation for the Baltics can only contribute to this negative spiral.
Tuesday, 23 September 2008
NATO Secretary General Press Conference
The transcript of the somewhat perplexing press conference that Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer gave in London last Friday has now been posted on the NATO webiste. You can read it here.
After London, Budapest Next
Last week, NATO Defence Ministers met in London in an informal session, one that issues no communique and takes no decisions. The occasion was surrounded in some mystery, with even the reason for the meeting seeming somewhat confused - even after (or perhaps because) Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer gave his press conference.
Defence Ministers will meet again in Budapest in two weeks time for their regular Autumn informal session. So why was the London meeting held? And what was discussed? What are the concrete results liekly to be? The picture is now becoming a little clearer.
The meeting had been planned at the invitation of UK Defence Secretary Des Browne, who called for the meeting during the Bucharest Summit this spring. His intention was to discuss the further transformation of NATO's defence structures. At issue was the pressing need to provide more equipment to front-line NATO operations in Afghanistan, especially helicopters; and also the need to build common infrastructure including strategic airlift. Another issue that concerned Browne is the need to bring the NATO Response Force up to full operational capability. Further, Browne has ideas about slimming down the NATO HQ bureaucracy to provide funds for the more urgent needs.
However, in the event this agenda was derailed by the fallout from the Russia-Georgia conflict this Summer. A group of countries led by Poland, the Czech Republic and the Baltic States demanded a review of NATO relations with Russia. In this they had the full support of US Defence Secretary Robert Gates. They also called a revision of the mandate of the NATO Response Force, conceived to allow swift NATO intervention beyond Europe's borders, to allow it to operate within NATO territory in the event of a threat from Russia.
According to the AFP, Polish Defence Minister Bogdan Klich told the meeting that NATO's principle task is "still the defence of its member states, which must not be diluted." This is something of a U-turn for the Polish government, which since elections last year, had been taking a much more conciliatory line with Russia. This changed when Russia crushed Georgia in a few days this Summer. The return to an emphasis on territorial defence, something the Baltic States have always insisted on, is part of debate on the future of NATO and a direct thrust at those (including the Secretary General0 who believe that NATO must look ever wider for new security tasks in order to justify its existence in the 21st Century.
NATO sources added that there might be a greater visibility for the NATO air defence forces which have flown missions over the Baltic States since their entry into the Alliance. And their will more resources pumped into military planning for any eventual problems with Russia.
A NATO Spokesperson has been moved to respond to some press reports, saying that NATO has no plans to deploy forces to the Russian border. However, since that was never claimed the denial lacks real credibility. Obviously, the NRF could be used to confront Russia just as easily to mount an operation in Afghanistan or elsewhere.
Browne's agenda on the slimming down of the NATO bureaucracy also ran into problems. The Greek Defence Minister, for one, opining that it was better for the NATO HQ to involve all nations (thereby building solidarity) than to save a little money and cut some nations out of NATO operations.
NATO Ministers move on to Budapest to continue this debate, and also to consider the future of their Afghan mission. They are also looking ofrward to the future Strategic Concept debate which will determine the future roles and organisation of the Alliance.
Defence Ministers will meet again in Budapest in two weeks time for their regular Autumn informal session. So why was the London meeting held? And what was discussed? What are the concrete results liekly to be? The picture is now becoming a little clearer.
The meeting had been planned at the invitation of UK Defence Secretary Des Browne, who called for the meeting during the Bucharest Summit this spring. His intention was to discuss the further transformation of NATO's defence structures. At issue was the pressing need to provide more equipment to front-line NATO operations in Afghanistan, especially helicopters; and also the need to build common infrastructure including strategic airlift. Another issue that concerned Browne is the need to bring the NATO Response Force up to full operational capability. Further, Browne has ideas about slimming down the NATO HQ bureaucracy to provide funds for the more urgent needs.
However, in the event this agenda was derailed by the fallout from the Russia-Georgia conflict this Summer. A group of countries led by Poland, the Czech Republic and the Baltic States demanded a review of NATO relations with Russia. In this they had the full support of US Defence Secretary Robert Gates. They also called a revision of the mandate of the NATO Response Force, conceived to allow swift NATO intervention beyond Europe's borders, to allow it to operate within NATO territory in the event of a threat from Russia.
According to the AFP, Polish Defence Minister Bogdan Klich told the meeting that NATO's principle task is "still the defence of its member states, which must not be diluted." This is something of a U-turn for the Polish government, which since elections last year, had been taking a much more conciliatory line with Russia. This changed when Russia crushed Georgia in a few days this Summer. The return to an emphasis on territorial defence, something the Baltic States have always insisted on, is part of debate on the future of NATO and a direct thrust at those (including the Secretary General0 who believe that NATO must look ever wider for new security tasks in order to justify its existence in the 21st Century.
NATO sources added that there might be a greater visibility for the NATO air defence forces which have flown missions over the Baltic States since their entry into the Alliance. And their will more resources pumped into military planning for any eventual problems with Russia.
A NATO Spokesperson has been moved to respond to some press reports, saying that NATO has no plans to deploy forces to the Russian border. However, since that was never claimed the denial lacks real credibility. Obviously, the NRF could be used to confront Russia just as easily to mount an operation in Afghanistan or elsewhere.
Browne's agenda on the slimming down of the NATO bureaucracy also ran into problems. The Greek Defence Minister, for one, opining that it was better for the NATO HQ to involve all nations (thereby building solidarity) than to save a little money and cut some nations out of NATO operations.
NATO Ministers move on to Budapest to continue this debate, and also to consider the future of their Afghan mission. They are also looking ofrward to the future Strategic Concept debate which will determine the future roles and organisation of the Alliance.
Friday, 19 September 2008
NATO's Transformation Ministerial
For a decade 'transformation' has been a buzzword for taking the old Cold War NATO and remodelling the Alliance for the new security situation. Since 9/11 that has primarily meant an expeditionary Alliance doing its part in what the Pentagon now calls the 'long war'. NATO created Allied Command Transformation, a major NATO command headquarters based in Norfolk, Virginia. This was aimed at rebuilding the forces of all NATO nations for power projection outside Europe.
At the request of Defence Secretary Des Browne, NATO ministers came to London to discuss the development of Alliance forces. In a statement released by the MID, Browne said that:
"NATO is the cornerstone of our Euro-Atlantic security, and it has bound North America and Europe in common purpose for nearly sixty years. That unity of purpose has been displayed in NATO's response to recent events in the Caucasus. However over time institutions build bad habits. There remains a mismatch between our aspirations and what we actually deliver. The NATO response force is not getting the forces or capabilities that it needs. We are lacking sufficient capabilities in key areas like intra-theatre air lift. Resources need to be switched from non-deployable capabilities. These capabilities require proper resourcing and investment. This meeting today is about transforming NATO to address all these points - and more - and to ensure that operations are central to NATO's purpose. Achieving this will allow us to focus better on the way we approach defence and security in the 21st Century."
However, during the afternoon that this meeting was not all about making NATO more capable of undertaking missions such as that in Afghanistan, the 'out of area' missions in which it acts as a 'global security provider'. It was also about the new confrontation with Russia that has emerged in the wake of the war in Georgia this Summer. The LA Times has reported that NATO ministers were discussing a plan to create "an easily deployable military force that could be sent into nations feeling threatened, a senior U.S. Defense official said Thursday. The creation of such a force would take NATO back to its roots as a deterrent against Soviet might after years of concentrating on missions in Kosovo and Afghanistan."
It is certain that ministers were discussing efforts to boost the somewhat faltering NATO Response Force (NRF) intended to bring together some 25,000 NATO soldiers ready to deploy and fight almost instantly. NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer told a press conference today that NATO needed to "strike the right balance between expeditionary forces and core tasks".
As The NATO Monitor has previously reported, this has been an ongoing debate between old and new members of NATO, with the Eastern Europeans concerned that NATO was not doing enough to offer protection form Russia. This feeling has grown exponentially since the Russian intervention in Georgia, and this may be NATO's answer. A common force of C-17 transport aircraft, inaugurated at the NATO Summit in Riga in 2006, was cited by De Hoop Scheffer as an example of common projects that enhance Alliance troop mobility in a cost-efficient manner. He also said that "planning and exercising for the common defence is what NATO does and will do. It is business as usual."
The Secretary General added that "NATO has always been prepared for all eventualities and still is. I don't see any new eventualities," but also admitted that NATO was beefing up some elements of its common defence capabilities, while refusing to be in any way specific on those capabilities.
It is clear that NATO has taken a step back towards its old role, the territorial defence of Europe. It is trying to do so in a way that maintains room for new missions in Afghanistan and, potentially in the future, elsewhere. No decisions were taken at this informal meeting, but further discussions will take place in Budapest in October, in December, in Krakow next Spring and then at the April Summit of Alliance leaders in Strasbourg and Kehl.
What is far less clear at present is what this means for NATO Russia relations. NATO leaders do not seem eager to head into a new Cold War, but at the same time they cannot afford to leave their new members dissatisfied with NATO's Article V mutual defence guarantee.Are we on the point of seeing a revival of a military balance of power in Europe between NATO and Russia? And what role will NATO's nuclear forces play in that stand-off if it emerges?
At the request of Defence Secretary Des Browne, NATO ministers came to London to discuss the development of Alliance forces. In a statement released by the MID, Browne said that:
"NATO is the cornerstone of our Euro-Atlantic security, and it has bound North America and Europe in common purpose for nearly sixty years. That unity of purpose has been displayed in NATO's response to recent events in the Caucasus. However over time institutions build bad habits. There remains a mismatch between our aspirations and what we actually deliver. The NATO response force is not getting the forces or capabilities that it needs. We are lacking sufficient capabilities in key areas like intra-theatre air lift. Resources need to be switched from non-deployable capabilities. These capabilities require proper resourcing and investment. This meeting today is about transforming NATO to address all these points - and more - and to ensure that operations are central to NATO's purpose. Achieving this will allow us to focus better on the way we approach defence and security in the 21st Century."
However, during the afternoon that this meeting was not all about making NATO more capable of undertaking missions such as that in Afghanistan, the 'out of area' missions in which it acts as a 'global security provider'. It was also about the new confrontation with Russia that has emerged in the wake of the war in Georgia this Summer. The LA Times has reported that NATO ministers were discussing a plan to create "an easily deployable military force that could be sent into nations feeling threatened, a senior U.S. Defense official said Thursday. The creation of such a force would take NATO back to its roots as a deterrent against Soviet might after years of concentrating on missions in Kosovo and Afghanistan."
It is certain that ministers were discussing efforts to boost the somewhat faltering NATO Response Force (NRF) intended to bring together some 25,000 NATO soldiers ready to deploy and fight almost instantly. NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer told a press conference today that NATO needed to "strike the right balance between expeditionary forces and core tasks".
As The NATO Monitor has previously reported, this has been an ongoing debate between old and new members of NATO, with the Eastern Europeans concerned that NATO was not doing enough to offer protection form Russia. This feeling has grown exponentially since the Russian intervention in Georgia, and this may be NATO's answer. A common force of C-17 transport aircraft, inaugurated at the NATO Summit in Riga in 2006, was cited by De Hoop Scheffer as an example of common projects that enhance Alliance troop mobility in a cost-efficient manner. He also said that "planning and exercising for the common defence is what NATO does and will do. It is business as usual."
The Secretary General added that "NATO has always been prepared for all eventualities and still is. I don't see any new eventualities," but also admitted that NATO was beefing up some elements of its common defence capabilities, while refusing to be in any way specific on those capabilities.
It is clear that NATO has taken a step back towards its old role, the territorial defence of Europe. It is trying to do so in a way that maintains room for new missions in Afghanistan and, potentially in the future, elsewhere. No decisions were taken at this informal meeting, but further discussions will take place in Budapest in October, in December, in Krakow next Spring and then at the April Summit of Alliance leaders in Strasbourg and Kehl.
What is far less clear at present is what this means for NATO Russia relations. NATO leaders do not seem eager to head into a new Cold War, but at the same time they cannot afford to leave their new members dissatisfied with NATO's Article V mutual defence guarantee.Are we on the point of seeing a revival of a military balance of power in Europe between NATO and Russia? And what role will NATO's nuclear forces play in that stand-off if it emerges?
US to Allies: NATO Should Fight a War on Drugs in Afghanistan
US Defense Secretary Robert Gates has flown into London for the NATO meeting. He has asked ministers to consider taking on the drug lords in Afghnaistan as part of their mission there, saying: "It seems to me that if we or ISAF encounter the opportunity to take out drug labs, or to arrest or take action against drug lords, kingpins, that's an opportunity, given how tied in it is with all the other issues in Afghanistan that that's something we ought to be willing to take on in some way."
Other NATO nations have been extremely reluctant to do this, with the UK, for example, going out of their way to tell residents of Helmand province that their mission is to fight the Taliban, not combat the trade in heroin.
Gates announcement is part of a Bush administration review of strategy in Afghnaistan, and the role of the NATO mission - ISAF - inthe country will make up a major part of deliberations in London.
Other NATO nations have been extremely reluctant to do this, with the UK, for example, going out of their way to tell residents of Helmand province that their mission is to fight the Taliban, not combat the trade in heroin.
Gates announcement is part of a Bush administration review of strategy in Afghnaistan, and the role of the NATO mission - ISAF - inthe country will make up a major part of deliberations in London.
NATO Ministers Meet in London
In the first of two informal Ministerials this Autumn(where no official decisions are taken) NATO Defence Ministers gathered in London, September 18, against a backdrop of crisis in Afghanistan and worsening relations with Russia.
The first significant event, Thursday evening, was a speech by NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI). A couple of points made by the Secretary General stand out. On the aftermath of the conflict in Georgia, he said that: "I don’t have to explain at length why Russia’s justification for recognising Abkhazia and South Ossetia could set a dangerous precedent – with truly global consequences. " This is true, and Russia's recognition of two breakaway states based on their own interpretation of local wishes will have serious implications for global security. Indeed, with the status of Chechnya far from finally settled in the eyes of many Chechens, it could have future implications for Russia. However, De Hoop Scheffer conveniently ignores the point that Russia based its actions on a precedent set by NATO. The recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states follows that of Kosovo, which NATO members were keen to see as an independent state, relying on the declaration of independence by Kosovars and ignoring the concerns of Serbia (of which Kosovo was part, and also of Russia). What is sauce for the NATO goose, is also sauce for the Russia gander. Since international law is in large part customary, it may be that dismembering states based on their citizens perceived desires is becoming much easier legally.
A second very important point made by the Secretary General concerned the future of NATO itself: ".. in this new security context, some have called for a reappraisal of the balance between an expeditionary NATO and our core task of collective defence. Such a discussion is certainly justified. But, again, I do not foresee a 180 degree change in our approach. Article 5 already exists, we don’t have to reinvent it. Neither does upholding Article 5 require us to return to a Cold War military posture in Europe."
De Hoop Scheffer and his policy team have been foremost amongst those arguing that NATO must transform itself into a 'global security provider' to be relevant in the 21st Century. Many object, most especially those new members of NATO in the Baltic States and Eastern Europe who see the Alliance as primarily a bulwark against Russia. They have taken heart from the events of August to strengthen their standpoint. As NATO members and officials begin discussing the terms of reference for the redefinition of NATO's Strategic Concept, a process that is likely to be formally launched at the Strasbourg-Kehl Summit next Spring, this will be the crux of the debate - what is NATO's raison d'etre?
He also noted the visit of the North Atlantic Council to Georgia this week, and the support that NATO is ready to offer to the Saakashvili government. But there is no sign that those nations that refused to accept Georgian membership in Bucharest are ready to accept it now. Nor any sign that they are ready to actually fight Russia over Georgia, which makes NATO support for the country more than a little hollow. It does, however, mean that Georgia must resolve its issues with Russia with western backing and without force. This is to be welcomed.
Other parts of the speech highlight continuing controversies between the US and European states of NATO over the mission in Afghanistan. In particular, as he noted the increasing US military effort in Afghanistan, De Hoop Scheffer also noted that: "While I of course welcome an even greater US effort, I believe that it is important that we continue to make this not just a US responsibility but a collective transatlantic responsibility. When the telephone rings early next year, I hope that the other Allies will also be ready, not just with additional forces, but also with extra contributions to training Afghanistan’s National Army and Police, strengthening its institutions and developing its economy." The debate about burden-sharing amongst Allies in the Afghanistan mission has been long drawn out, and European nations have been unreceptive to US demands for greater engagement to date. Will they be more receptive to President Obama, or President McCain?
Another area of controversy is the US attacks into Pakistan, and the Secretary General alluded to this problem: "Success in Afghanistan also means stepping up our political engagement with her neighbours, notably Pakistan. And this is my third point. As long as Pakistan’s border region remains a sanctuary for insurgents, Afghanistan will never become truly secure." he will travel to Pakistan soon, and NATO and Pakistan must come to an arrangement concerning border security and the presence of the Taliban in Pakistan if any success is to be achieved in Afghanistan. The problem is that, at present, NATO's actions and those of the US where it acts alone, are stimulating support for the Taliban in Pakistan and destabilising the new government. De Hoop Scheffer has his work cut out for him.
The Secretary General's speech is available at the NATO website, and we will continue to report the Ministerial as it progresses.
The first significant event, Thursday evening, was a speech by NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI). A couple of points made by the Secretary General stand out. On the aftermath of the conflict in Georgia, he said that: "I don’t have to explain at length why Russia’s justification for recognising Abkhazia and South Ossetia could set a dangerous precedent – with truly global consequences. " This is true, and Russia's recognition of two breakaway states based on their own interpretation of local wishes will have serious implications for global security. Indeed, with the status of Chechnya far from finally settled in the eyes of many Chechens, it could have future implications for Russia. However, De Hoop Scheffer conveniently ignores the point that Russia based its actions on a precedent set by NATO. The recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states follows that of Kosovo, which NATO members were keen to see as an independent state, relying on the declaration of independence by Kosovars and ignoring the concerns of Serbia (of which Kosovo was part, and also of Russia). What is sauce for the NATO goose, is also sauce for the Russia gander. Since international law is in large part customary, it may be that dismembering states based on their citizens perceived desires is becoming much easier legally.
A second very important point made by the Secretary General concerned the future of NATO itself: ".. in this new security context, some have called for a reappraisal of the balance between an expeditionary NATO and our core task of collective defence. Such a discussion is certainly justified. But, again, I do not foresee a 180 degree change in our approach. Article 5 already exists, we don’t have to reinvent it. Neither does upholding Article 5 require us to return to a Cold War military posture in Europe."
De Hoop Scheffer and his policy team have been foremost amongst those arguing that NATO must transform itself into a 'global security provider' to be relevant in the 21st Century. Many object, most especially those new members of NATO in the Baltic States and Eastern Europe who see the Alliance as primarily a bulwark against Russia. They have taken heart from the events of August to strengthen their standpoint. As NATO members and officials begin discussing the terms of reference for the redefinition of NATO's Strategic Concept, a process that is likely to be formally launched at the Strasbourg-Kehl Summit next Spring, this will be the crux of the debate - what is NATO's raison d'etre?
He also noted the visit of the North Atlantic Council to Georgia this week, and the support that NATO is ready to offer to the Saakashvili government. But there is no sign that those nations that refused to accept Georgian membership in Bucharest are ready to accept it now. Nor any sign that they are ready to actually fight Russia over Georgia, which makes NATO support for the country more than a little hollow. It does, however, mean that Georgia must resolve its issues with Russia with western backing and without force. This is to be welcomed.
Other parts of the speech highlight continuing controversies between the US and European states of NATO over the mission in Afghanistan. In particular, as he noted the increasing US military effort in Afghanistan, De Hoop Scheffer also noted that: "While I of course welcome an even greater US effort, I believe that it is important that we continue to make this not just a US responsibility but a collective transatlantic responsibility. When the telephone rings early next year, I hope that the other Allies will also be ready, not just with additional forces, but also with extra contributions to training Afghanistan’s National Army and Police, strengthening its institutions and developing its economy." The debate about burden-sharing amongst Allies in the Afghanistan mission has been long drawn out, and European nations have been unreceptive to US demands for greater engagement to date. Will they be more receptive to President Obama, or President McCain?
Another area of controversy is the US attacks into Pakistan, and the Secretary General alluded to this problem: "Success in Afghanistan also means stepping up our political engagement with her neighbours, notably Pakistan. And this is my third point. As long as Pakistan’s border region remains a sanctuary for insurgents, Afghanistan will never become truly secure." he will travel to Pakistan soon, and NATO and Pakistan must come to an arrangement concerning border security and the presence of the Taliban in Pakistan if any success is to be achieved in Afghanistan. The problem is that, at present, NATO's actions and those of the US where it acts alone, are stimulating support for the Taliban in Pakistan and destabilising the new government. De Hoop Scheffer has his work cut out for him.
The Secretary General's speech is available at the NATO website, and we will continue to report the Ministerial as it progresses.
Thursday, 31 July 2008
The NATO Monitor
This blog was created to report the Bucharest NATO Summit, which we did. We have now revived the blog as The NATO Monitor to provide a permanent home for monitoring the future of NATO, especially with regard to nuclear weapons and other strategic policies. We will become especially active as NATO moves towards a renewal of its Strategic Concept this Autumn.
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