If the Danish newspaper Politiken is correct in this article, then the US has dropped the possibility of supporting Canadian Defence Minister Peter Mackay as the new NATO Secretary General. They are now, along with major European powers, supporting Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen.
That should about sew things up for Rasmussen, but will leave some important constituencies to be mollified, notably Turkey which has opposed the appointment. The Eastern Europeans will also be somewhat miffed, as they are beginning to feel like second class citizens within the Alliance. The Poles, in particular, were convinced that their man should get the job.
Another big change is the American announcement of a new Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), the Alliance's top military post. The current SACEUR, General Craddock, is widely perceived as being too close to ex-President Bush's political outlook. His replacement, Admiral James Stavridis of SOUTHCOM, was a surprise. (Here is the Pentagon press release about him).Most observers were expecting Admiral Mattis of NATO's Allied Command Transformation to get the job.
According to Der Spiegel, some in Germany at least were upset that the Pentagon made the appointment out of the blue without reference to European sensibilities. However, I certainly don't recall big debates in the Alliance about this in the past, and this job is in the gift of the US President. Any potential fights about the next Secretary General will be more significant in the short and longer term.
Friday, 20 March 2009
Friday, 13 March 2009
New NATO Secretary General Part III
It seems that Turkey is expressing ever stronger opposition to the candidacy of Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen for the job of NATO Secretary General. In particular, they object to his handling of the Danish cartoons crisis in 2005, but also because Denmark allows the Kurdish PKK to operate from their soil. The PKK has been fighting Turkey for decades, and their radio station broadcasts from Denmark. The Obama administration has signalled publicly that it has not yet made a decision, a blow to Rasmussen's supporters, but also to those of Canadian Defence Minister Peter Mackay who was thought to have US support. The International Herald Tribune has a good article on this. Der Spiegel has a good take on it too.
What is certain is that with NATO operating in Afghanistan, and running the Mediterranean Dialogue with numerous Muslim countries, whoever is the new NATO Secretary General needs to be well regarded in the Muslim world, a well as within the Alliance.
Other names newly mentioned in the past day or so include Czech deputy Prime Minister Alex Vondra (although the angry outbursts about President Obama's scepticism on missile defence deployments to Europe won't help his chances); and former Bulgarian foreign minister Solomon Passy (who is something of an outsider). Watch this space.
What is certain is that with NATO operating in Afghanistan, and running the Mediterranean Dialogue with numerous Muslim countries, whoever is the new NATO Secretary General needs to be well regarded in the Muslim world, a well as within the Alliance.
Other names newly mentioned in the past day or so include Czech deputy Prime Minister Alex Vondra (although the angry outbursts about President Obama's scepticism on missile defence deployments to Europe won't help his chances); and former Bulgarian foreign minister Solomon Passy (who is something of an outsider). Watch this space.
Kouchner Promotes NATO Membership for France
Apostate Socialist and French foreign minister, Bernard Kouchner, has defended the French decision to rejoin NATO's integrated military command in an interview with Le Figaro newspaper.
NATO/FRANCE
Q. - Why is it in France’s interest to rejoin NATO’s integrated command, a cumbersome bureaucratic structure, unsuited to conducting the modern asymmetric wars, as we have seen in Afghanistan?
THE MINISTER - That’s your view. We are founding members of the Atlantic Alliance. General de Gaulle withdrew us from the integrated command in 1966 since he didn’t want, in the Cold War era, foreign troops stationed in France not under French command. Today the situation has changed. The Warsaw Pact and communist danger no longer exist. We have participated in all the NATO operations, in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, yet we haven’t been involved in developing the plans. France can no longer go on being the only film director not invited to contribute to the screenplay! This in no way calls our independence of decision-making into question. I remind you that Germany’s full membership of NATO didn’t compel her to participate in the invasion of Iraq. On the other hand, we are going to get some significant NATO commands and, above all, contribute to drawing up the plans which we are supposed, if we accept them, to apply. We are in favour of NATO’s Europeanization! On top of this, it will be easier for the Europeans to decide to conduct external operations, without American agreement or participation.
The interview touches a number of interesting questions, and you can read it all here.
NATO/FRANCE
Q. - Why is it in France’s interest to rejoin NATO’s integrated command, a cumbersome bureaucratic structure, unsuited to conducting the modern asymmetric wars, as we have seen in Afghanistan?
THE MINISTER - That’s your view. We are founding members of the Atlantic Alliance. General de Gaulle withdrew us from the integrated command in 1966 since he didn’t want, in the Cold War era, foreign troops stationed in France not under French command. Today the situation has changed. The Warsaw Pact and communist danger no longer exist. We have participated in all the NATO operations, in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, yet we haven’t been involved in developing the plans. France can no longer go on being the only film director not invited to contribute to the screenplay! This in no way calls our independence of decision-making into question. I remind you that Germany’s full membership of NATO didn’t compel her to participate in the invasion of Iraq. On the other hand, we are going to get some significant NATO commands and, above all, contribute to drawing up the plans which we are supposed, if we accept them, to apply. We are in favour of NATO’s Europeanization! On top of this, it will be easier for the Europeans to decide to conduct external operations, without American agreement or participation.
The interview touches a number of interesting questions, and you can read it all here.
France to Rejoin NATO's Integrated Military
In a speech this week, President Sarkozy announced his intention to reintegrate France into NATO's military structure. This reverses more than 40 years of French policy, since President de Gaulle expelled NATO forces from France in 1966.
France's nuclear forces will remain outside NATO structures, but for many, many years NATO and France have coordinated target planning, so this decision will have little or no operational effect.
Under the French constitution Sarkozy does not need the approval of the National Assembly to reintegrate with NATO. he has, however, asked the Prime Minister to hold a debate and vote on March 17. It is likely that the measure will pass, but this is no foregone conclusion, and the debate is likely to prove stormy.
The Socialists, led by Segolene Royal, oppose the move (as they opposed the original withdrawal from the military structure). Royal has described NATO as the 'armed wing of the West' and is overtly hostile to the Alliance. In response to Sarkozy's speech another Socialist leader, Lionel Jospin, wrote in the Nouvel Observateur magazine that:
In an uncertain world, France must retain its ability to freely assess for itself international realities and then play its full role, without having to censor itself in the name of transatlantic solidarity.
But the opposition is not only on the left. Dominique de Villepin, President Chirac's foreign minister at the time of the invasion of Iraq, told Canal+ TV that:
The independent positioning of France is essential for the global balance of power. If tomorrow, we integrated into NATO, would we, could we, maintain the position that we have done on Iraq?
That said, since France has been ever-present in NATO missions in the former Yugoslavia, and lately in Afghanistan, the measure will not represent a major change. France has been offered two major NATO commands (one the Allied Command Transformation based in Norfolk, Virginia). It was the refusal of the US to countenance such an offer that caused the failure of President Chirac's bid for reintegration in 1996, something that President Sarkozy mentioned (a little ungraciously) this week.
France will now be in a much better position to push for the negotiation of a new Strategic Concept by NATO, something it has agreed with Germany to do at the April Summit. The French government also hopes that this move will smooth the way to broaden and deepen European defence cooperation within the EU, in partnership with NATO. France has often been seen to promote European defence initiatives as a way of weakening NATO, and they hope this will no longer be the case. That remains to be seen.
One thing is surely true. The Eastern Europeans who see NATO primarily, indeed in some cases almost exclusively, as a defensive organisations aimed against Russia have lost ground. France will support an expeditionary Alliance, and will try to position NATO in a more cooperative relationship with Russia.
France was never as divorced from NATO as its public image suggested. But even so this is a major development. NATO Monitor will follow next week's National Assembly debate with interest.
France's nuclear forces will remain outside NATO structures, but for many, many years NATO and France have coordinated target planning, so this decision will have little or no operational effect.
Under the French constitution Sarkozy does not need the approval of the National Assembly to reintegrate with NATO. he has, however, asked the Prime Minister to hold a debate and vote on March 17. It is likely that the measure will pass, but this is no foregone conclusion, and the debate is likely to prove stormy.
The Socialists, led by Segolene Royal, oppose the move (as they opposed the original withdrawal from the military structure). Royal has described NATO as the 'armed wing of the West' and is overtly hostile to the Alliance. In response to Sarkozy's speech another Socialist leader, Lionel Jospin, wrote in the Nouvel Observateur magazine that:
In an uncertain world, France must retain its ability to freely assess for itself international realities and then play its full role, without having to censor itself in the name of transatlantic solidarity.
But the opposition is not only on the left. Dominique de Villepin, President Chirac's foreign minister at the time of the invasion of Iraq, told Canal+ TV that:
The independent positioning of France is essential for the global balance of power. If tomorrow, we integrated into NATO, would we, could we, maintain the position that we have done on Iraq?
That said, since France has been ever-present in NATO missions in the former Yugoslavia, and lately in Afghanistan, the measure will not represent a major change. France has been offered two major NATO commands (one the Allied Command Transformation based in Norfolk, Virginia). It was the refusal of the US to countenance such an offer that caused the failure of President Chirac's bid for reintegration in 1996, something that President Sarkozy mentioned (a little ungraciously) this week.
France will now be in a much better position to push for the negotiation of a new Strategic Concept by NATO, something it has agreed with Germany to do at the April Summit. The French government also hopes that this move will smooth the way to broaden and deepen European defence cooperation within the EU, in partnership with NATO. France has often been seen to promote European defence initiatives as a way of weakening NATO, and they hope this will no longer be the case. That remains to be seen.
One thing is surely true. The Eastern Europeans who see NATO primarily, indeed in some cases almost exclusively, as a defensive organisations aimed against Russia have lost ground. France will support an expeditionary Alliance, and will try to position NATO in a more cooperative relationship with Russia.
France was never as divorced from NATO as its public image suggested. But even so this is a major development. NATO Monitor will follow next week's National Assembly debate with interest.
Tuesday, 10 March 2009
The Next Secretary General Part II
Following first reports in January, countries are now beginning to jockey for position in the race to be the next Secretary General. There are many different stories starting to surface, and the early names are not necessarily those now making the running.
One who is, and who has heavy-weight European backing, is Danish Prime Minister Rasmussen. According to Sueddeutsche Zeitung "Britain, France and Germany will back Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen to succeed Jaap de Hoop Scheffer as secretary-general of NATO" (translation by Reuters).
Early mentions of Norwegian Minister of Defense Anne-Grete Strom-Erichsen have dropped off, with her colleague, Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Stoere, being touted as a good possibility. While former UK Defence Minister Des Browne has been mentioned, he would be a surprise choice coming so soon after Labour Party colleague Lord Robertson.
However, following a Washington Post report, speculation mounted that the United States (while the Obama administration has not yet made a decision) is sounding out Allies on the possibility of appointing Canadian Defence Minister Peter Mackay.
The Canadian Chronicle Herald wrties of him that:
Mr. MacKay is lobbying for the job as the political master of the defence alliance, but the job has always been held by a European and most observers think they are unlikely to want to give up the post.
It’s a job that involves subtle European diplomacy and behind-the-scenes arm-twisting, which a young Canadian might not be expected to do as well as a seasoned European. Also, Mr. MacKay would be seen as more hawkish and closer to the Americans than many European allies, and if he got the job, that would be one fewer job that the Europeans could trade among themselves.
And media reports suggest the reaction in Europe was not entirely positive when Mr. MacKay recently toured Europe, pressing allies to do more in Afghanistan.
There is likely a lot of horse-trading to be done, as the Secretary-General has traditionally been a European. But there isn't long to go. Current Secretary General De Hoop Scheffer leaves office this Summer, and a new appointment must be made at the Strasbourg-Kehl Summit at the beginning of April.
One who is, and who has heavy-weight European backing, is Danish Prime Minister Rasmussen. According to Sueddeutsche Zeitung "Britain, France and Germany will back Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen to succeed Jaap de Hoop Scheffer as secretary-general of NATO" (translation by Reuters).
Early mentions of Norwegian Minister of Defense Anne-Grete Strom-Erichsen have dropped off, with her colleague, Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Stoere, being touted as a good possibility. While former UK Defence Minister Des Browne has been mentioned, he would be a surprise choice coming so soon after Labour Party colleague Lord Robertson.
However, following a Washington Post report, speculation mounted that the United States (while the Obama administration has not yet made a decision) is sounding out Allies on the possibility of appointing Canadian Defence Minister Peter Mackay.
The Canadian Chronicle Herald wrties of him that:
Mr. MacKay is lobbying for the job as the political master of the defence alliance, but the job has always been held by a European and most observers think they are unlikely to want to give up the post.
It’s a job that involves subtle European diplomacy and behind-the-scenes arm-twisting, which a young Canadian might not be expected to do as well as a seasoned European. Also, Mr. MacKay would be seen as more hawkish and closer to the Americans than many European allies, and if he got the job, that would be one fewer job that the Europeans could trade among themselves.
And media reports suggest the reaction in Europe was not entirely positive when Mr. MacKay recently toured Europe, pressing allies to do more in Afghanistan.
There is likely a lot of horse-trading to be done, as the Secretary-General has traditionally been a European. But there isn't long to go. Current Secretary General De Hoop Scheffer leaves office this Summer, and a new appointment must be made at the Strasbourg-Kehl Summit at the beginning of April.
Friday, 6 March 2009
Poland Challenges US Vision for NATO
Polish Defence Minister Bogdan Klich said yesterday in Warsaw that Poland is concerned that in the past ten years NATO placed too strong an emphasis on military missions (in the Balkans and then Afghanistan), forgetting somewhat that it is above all a defensive alliance.
This is an unusually frank statement of a position that is common to the newer NATO members. Their increasing outspokenness, including the attempt by Lithuania to block the reinstatement of relations with Russia, led to a question to US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.
QUESTION: Thank you. Madame Secretary, as you know, some of the new NATO members have interpreted your recent overtures to Russia as potentially the U.S. making deals behind their back. I wonder – I know that you’ve been emphasizing that you’ll be consulting before any decisions are made anywhere – in Asia, in Middle East and Europe, everywhere you go. But what did you do today to give assurances to those allies that you will not indeed make any deals over their heads, whether it be with the Lithuanians, the Czechs or the Poles? Thank you.
SECRETARY CLINTON: I think I reiterated that as members of this alliance, we share a common defense commitment – an Article 5 requirement – that we take very seriously. We intend to work with and support all of our NATO allies.
As the Strasbourg-Kehl Summit approaches, these deep-seated differences on the role of the Alliance are becoming clearer. Secretary Clinton can make reassuring statements, but the truth is that the US-Russia relationship is vital to the Obama administration, and its vision for the future of the Alliance is at variance with those that cling to Article V as NATO's central role. It will require a lot of diplomatic skill to begin to build abridge between the two camps.
This is an unusually frank statement of a position that is common to the newer NATO members. Their increasing outspokenness, including the attempt by Lithuania to block the reinstatement of relations with Russia, led to a question to US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.
QUESTION: Thank you. Madame Secretary, as you know, some of the new NATO members have interpreted your recent overtures to Russia as potentially the U.S. making deals behind their back. I wonder – I know that you’ve been emphasizing that you’ll be consulting before any decisions are made anywhere – in Asia, in Middle East and Europe, everywhere you go. But what did you do today to give assurances to those allies that you will not indeed make any deals over their heads, whether it be with the Lithuanians, the Czechs or the Poles? Thank you.
SECRETARY CLINTON: I think I reiterated that as members of this alliance, we share a common defense commitment – an Article 5 requirement – that we take very seriously. We intend to work with and support all of our NATO allies.
As the Strasbourg-Kehl Summit approaches, these deep-seated differences on the role of the Alliance are becoming clearer. Secretary Clinton can make reassuring statements, but the truth is that the US-Russia relationship is vital to the Obama administration, and its vision for the future of the Alliance is at variance with those that cling to Article V as NATO's central role. It will require a lot of diplomatic skill to begin to build abridge between the two camps.
NATO-Russia Council to Reopen
The North Atlantic Council (NAC) has decided to resume full relations with Russia. The NATO-Russia Council (NRC), suspended since the Russo-Georgian War last summer, will begin to meet at Ambassadorial level following the Strasbourg-Kehl Summit in April. NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer announced to journalists that:
Ministers reached agreement to formally resume the NATO-Russia Council, including at ministerial level, as soon as possible after the Summit in Strasbourg and Kehl. There was, of course, a lot of discussion on how this forum, how the NRC should be used, and there is strong agreement that the NATO-Russia Council is certainly not a fair-weather body, and that the weather is not yet fair. I'll get to that in a moment. It is, in other words, a forum where you discuss the things you disagree, sometimes fundamentally disagree, and subjects where you can work together.
Where we disagree, and where we go on disagreeing, but what we nevertheless have discussed, of course, is Russia's recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Its intention to build military bases there, part of Georgian territory, let's not forget that. Parts of Georgian territory in many United Nations Security Council resolutions. The non-accession of monitors, also a major point for discussion, where Russia is not fulfilling its obligations.
On a different matter, the suspension of the CFE Treaty are areas of particular concern to the allies.
So in other words, if we resume the NATO-Russia Council also in a more formal sense, we will urge Russia to meet fully its commitments, with respect to Georgia, and let me mention, on top of what I already did, withdrawal from the areas Russia has committed to leave. I mentioned already the monitors and Russia's responsibility with regards to security and order. These are issues we should discuss in the NATO-Russia Council, and I know that Russia is willing to have that discussion as well.
There was also an exchange of views on President Medvedev's proposals on a new European security architecture. To the extent details are clear, and I think we might need some more details and some more clarity in this regard, there's certainly a willingness in NATO, and I know there's a willingness in the Russian side as well, to discuss certainly the hard security aspects of the Medvedev proposals in the framework of the NATO-Russia Council, although the primary forum for discussing these issues was and is the OSCE. And we have, of course, the Chairman in Office of the OSCE in our midst, the Greek Minister Bakoyannis.
The debate between ministers was apparently ‘robust’, and many of NATO’s newest members were unhappy with a decision to proceed at this point. Lithuania held out to the last against the resumption of business as usual with Russia. This despite the fact that, as the Secretary General had made clear, NATO has many issues which it needs to be able to discuss with Russia. Moreover, the resumption of normal relations is a key part of the Obama administration’s strategy for re-engaging Russia, and there was no possibility that Lithuania would be allowed to stand in the way.
Lithuanian Foreign Minister Vygaudas Usackas briefed that he believed it to be :
.. premature to open formal dialogue. I think we have to use this time before the summit and encourage Russia to be more cooperative on all the various questions which are a part of NATO security agenda.
In contrast, the statements from British and German representatives were much more positive.
"The crisis which is now behind us militarily ... cannot leave us in a situation where we refuse to talk," German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier told his colleagues. Germany had been reluctant to break off relations last summer, and has been working assiduously to restore contact ever since.
He was supported by UK Foreign Secretary David Miliband, who said later that:
NATO and Russia need to work together. I think it is important that NATO move to re-establish the NATO- Russian Council. I think that gives us an opportunity to put our concerns directly to the Russians. It also allows us to engage on issues of mutual concern in a number of areas.” The UK had supported the Bush administration in breaking off NATO-Russia talks, and is now supporting the Obama administration in their resumption.
A number of the Eastern European members of NATO expressed deep concern at the ease with which their western counterparts have shrugged off the events of last year.
"We support NATO-Russia dialogue. Russia must be given an opportunity to demonstrate a constructive attitude, interest in more extensive relations with NATO and a will to move forward on issues of mutual interest," Estonian Foreign Minister Urmas Paet briefed journalists, but warned that "we cannot seriously speak of true NATO-Russia partnership before Russia fulfills the terms of the treaties it has signed."
Briefing reporters in Warsaw, Polish Defence Minister Bogdan Klich expressed strong reservations at the decision and added that NATO’s credibility was on the line in relations with Russia, over Georgia, but also over the failure to issue invitations to the Ukraine and Georgia to join the Alliance.
The Czech government came under some criticism at home for its refusal to back the Lithuanian veto. Czech representatives felt that the suspension of the NRC last year was far too small a protest about the war in Georgia, and the move now to reinstate it deeply cynical. The Czechs further warned of Russian "imperial ambitions".
Not all of the older NATO members were wildly enthusiastic about the reopening of the NATO-Russia Council. They were pragmatic enough to accept it. Greek Foreign Minister Bakoyannis accepted the decision as “necessary and useful”, but underlined that relations “must be of a sincere and substantive dialogue", as well as of "cooperation on handling common challenges such as, for example, international terrorism, the proliferation of nuclear weapons and of weapons of mass destruction and the situation in Afghanistan."
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton pressed the US position hard. Talks on the NATO ISAF mission in Afghanistan were delayed by some time in order to get agreement. Sources say that Lithuanian delegation members complained that all NATO members should be on an equal footing, and that they had been placed under intolerable pressure to give way. Clinton acknowleged that the debate had been “vigourous”, but continued that:
I thought it was absolutely invigorating to have the kind of true debate that exists among friends and allies over such an important issue. We emerged with greater unity of purpose about how to build a constructive relationship with Russia and a stronger consensus about our relations with the emerging nations of Europe’s east. While the alliance won’t agree and indeed need not agree on every issue relating to Russia, we can and do agree that we must find ways to work constructively with Russia where we share areas of common interest. We also agree we must find ways to manage our differences with Russia where they persist, and stand firm where our principles or our vital interests are at stake.
She did accept that some member States have “..particular concerns that a number of nations in Europe’s east, who have long experience with Russia, have voiced about any kind of dialogue with Russia, whether it be NATO-Russia, the United States-Russia, or any kind of discussion,” but emphasized that the position of the administration is that:
.. there are benefits to reenergizing the NATO-Russia Council .. We have areas where we believe we not only can, but must cooperate with Russia – nonproliferation, arms control, antiterrorism, anti-piracy efforts. There are a number of important matters that should be discussed between us and Russia. There are equally serious matters that we need to not stop talking to Russia about. I don’t think you punish Russia by stopping conversations with them about matters, whether it be the misuse of energy supplies or the failure to comply with the requirements set forth by the OSCE and others concerning their actions in Georgia.
(Read the Secretary of State’s full Press Briefing)
In truth, of course, NATO needs Russia – especially for its vital mission in Afghanistan. As the NATO Monitor has regularly observed, NATO leaders have tied the future credibility of the Alliance as a future 'global security provider' to success by ISAF. And, to do the best it can to ensure that success, NATO needs Russia.
NATO would like Russian help in rescinding the Kyrgyz decision to close the Manas air base (a vital resupply point) to the US and other Alliance members. They would also like Russia to allow a land-supply route for non-lethal military supplies for Afghanistan. US sources have briefed that they are hopeful that Russia may also allow lethal military supplies to travel by land, and the opening of an air corridor into Afghanistan. (Reuters has a good report on this) None of this will be possible without the resumption of talks in the NRC.
The dispute that surfaced yesterday on the issue is yet another example of the differences between old and new NATO members. The Eastern Europeans see NATO through the lens of Article V, its main purpose the same as it was in 1949. The US, and many of the older NATO members, see NATO as a renewed Alliance which can act globally to build security for all. It is very hard to see how too such completely disparate world views can be reconciled. Of course, at Strasbourg and beyond, the cracks will be papered over. But the Strategic Concept debate is likely to prove long and hard indeed.
Ministers reached agreement to formally resume the NATO-Russia Council, including at ministerial level, as soon as possible after the Summit in Strasbourg and Kehl. There was, of course, a lot of discussion on how this forum, how the NRC should be used, and there is strong agreement that the NATO-Russia Council is certainly not a fair-weather body, and that the weather is not yet fair. I'll get to that in a moment. It is, in other words, a forum where you discuss the things you disagree, sometimes fundamentally disagree, and subjects where you can work together.
Where we disagree, and where we go on disagreeing, but what we nevertheless have discussed, of course, is Russia's recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Its intention to build military bases there, part of Georgian territory, let's not forget that. Parts of Georgian territory in many United Nations Security Council resolutions. The non-accession of monitors, also a major point for discussion, where Russia is not fulfilling its obligations.
On a different matter, the suspension of the CFE Treaty are areas of particular concern to the allies.
So in other words, if we resume the NATO-Russia Council also in a more formal sense, we will urge Russia to meet fully its commitments, with respect to Georgia, and let me mention, on top of what I already did, withdrawal from the areas Russia has committed to leave. I mentioned already the monitors and Russia's responsibility with regards to security and order. These are issues we should discuss in the NATO-Russia Council, and I know that Russia is willing to have that discussion as well.
There was also an exchange of views on President Medvedev's proposals on a new European security architecture. To the extent details are clear, and I think we might need some more details and some more clarity in this regard, there's certainly a willingness in NATO, and I know there's a willingness in the Russian side as well, to discuss certainly the hard security aspects of the Medvedev proposals in the framework of the NATO-Russia Council, although the primary forum for discussing these issues was and is the OSCE. And we have, of course, the Chairman in Office of the OSCE in our midst, the Greek Minister Bakoyannis.
The debate between ministers was apparently ‘robust’, and many of NATO’s newest members were unhappy with a decision to proceed at this point. Lithuania held out to the last against the resumption of business as usual with Russia. This despite the fact that, as the Secretary General had made clear, NATO has many issues which it needs to be able to discuss with Russia. Moreover, the resumption of normal relations is a key part of the Obama administration’s strategy for re-engaging Russia, and there was no possibility that Lithuania would be allowed to stand in the way.
Lithuanian Foreign Minister Vygaudas Usackas briefed that he believed it to be :
.. premature to open formal dialogue. I think we have to use this time before the summit and encourage Russia to be more cooperative on all the various questions which are a part of NATO security agenda.
In contrast, the statements from British and German representatives were much more positive.
"The crisis which is now behind us militarily ... cannot leave us in a situation where we refuse to talk," German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier told his colleagues. Germany had been reluctant to break off relations last summer, and has been working assiduously to restore contact ever since.
He was supported by UK Foreign Secretary David Miliband, who said later that:
NATO and Russia need to work together. I think it is important that NATO move to re-establish the NATO- Russian Council. I think that gives us an opportunity to put our concerns directly to the Russians. It also allows us to engage on issues of mutual concern in a number of areas.” The UK had supported the Bush administration in breaking off NATO-Russia talks, and is now supporting the Obama administration in their resumption.
A number of the Eastern European members of NATO expressed deep concern at the ease with which their western counterparts have shrugged off the events of last year.
"We support NATO-Russia dialogue. Russia must be given an opportunity to demonstrate a constructive attitude, interest in more extensive relations with NATO and a will to move forward on issues of mutual interest," Estonian Foreign Minister Urmas Paet briefed journalists, but warned that "we cannot seriously speak of true NATO-Russia partnership before Russia fulfills the terms of the treaties it has signed."
Briefing reporters in Warsaw, Polish Defence Minister Bogdan Klich expressed strong reservations at the decision and added that NATO’s credibility was on the line in relations with Russia, over Georgia, but also over the failure to issue invitations to the Ukraine and Georgia to join the Alliance.
The Czech government came under some criticism at home for its refusal to back the Lithuanian veto. Czech representatives felt that the suspension of the NRC last year was far too small a protest about the war in Georgia, and the move now to reinstate it deeply cynical. The Czechs further warned of Russian "imperial ambitions".
Not all of the older NATO members were wildly enthusiastic about the reopening of the NATO-Russia Council. They were pragmatic enough to accept it. Greek Foreign Minister Bakoyannis accepted the decision as “necessary and useful”, but underlined that relations “must be of a sincere and substantive dialogue", as well as of "cooperation on handling common challenges such as, for example, international terrorism, the proliferation of nuclear weapons and of weapons of mass destruction and the situation in Afghanistan."
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton pressed the US position hard. Talks on the NATO ISAF mission in Afghanistan were delayed by some time in order to get agreement. Sources say that Lithuanian delegation members complained that all NATO members should be on an equal footing, and that they had been placed under intolerable pressure to give way. Clinton acknowleged that the debate had been “vigourous”, but continued that:
I thought it was absolutely invigorating to have the kind of true debate that exists among friends and allies over such an important issue. We emerged with greater unity of purpose about how to build a constructive relationship with Russia and a stronger consensus about our relations with the emerging nations of Europe’s east. While the alliance won’t agree and indeed need not agree on every issue relating to Russia, we can and do agree that we must find ways to work constructively with Russia where we share areas of common interest. We also agree we must find ways to manage our differences with Russia where they persist, and stand firm where our principles or our vital interests are at stake.
She did accept that some member States have “..particular concerns that a number of nations in Europe’s east, who have long experience with Russia, have voiced about any kind of dialogue with Russia, whether it be NATO-Russia, the United States-Russia, or any kind of discussion,” but emphasized that the position of the administration is that:
.. there are benefits to reenergizing the NATO-Russia Council .. We have areas where we believe we not only can, but must cooperate with Russia – nonproliferation, arms control, antiterrorism, anti-piracy efforts. There are a number of important matters that should be discussed between us and Russia. There are equally serious matters that we need to not stop talking to Russia about. I don’t think you punish Russia by stopping conversations with them about matters, whether it be the misuse of energy supplies or the failure to comply with the requirements set forth by the OSCE and others concerning their actions in Georgia.
(Read the Secretary of State’s full Press Briefing)
In truth, of course, NATO needs Russia – especially for its vital mission in Afghanistan. As the NATO Monitor has regularly observed, NATO leaders have tied the future credibility of the Alliance as a future 'global security provider' to success by ISAF. And, to do the best it can to ensure that success, NATO needs Russia.
NATO would like Russian help in rescinding the Kyrgyz decision to close the Manas air base (a vital resupply point) to the US and other Alliance members. They would also like Russia to allow a land-supply route for non-lethal military supplies for Afghanistan. US sources have briefed that they are hopeful that Russia may also allow lethal military supplies to travel by land, and the opening of an air corridor into Afghanistan. (Reuters has a good report on this) None of this will be possible without the resumption of talks in the NRC.
The dispute that surfaced yesterday on the issue is yet another example of the differences between old and new NATO members. The Eastern Europeans see NATO through the lens of Article V, its main purpose the same as it was in 1949. The US, and many of the older NATO members, see NATO as a renewed Alliance which can act globally to build security for all. It is very hard to see how too such completely disparate world views can be reconciled. Of course, at Strasbourg and beyond, the cracks will be papered over. But the Strategic Concept debate is likely to prove long and hard indeed.
Thursday, 5 March 2009
The Declaration on Alliance Security
NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer presented ministers with his draft of the Declaration on Atlantic Security. He told Ministers that:
Finally, as instructed by our Heads of State and Government a year ago in Bucharest, next month’s Summit will issue a Declaration on Alliance Security. This Declaration should, in my view, underline NATO’s determination to perform the full range of its missions, from its core task of collective defence to projecting stability abroad. It should convey to our publics, in plain and powerful words, NATO’s “raison d’être” at 60. And it should also give us the necessary vision and political guidance to start a process which will lead to updating our 1999 Strategic Concept, in order to set out in detail the Alliance’s role in the new security environment of the 21st century.
Having failed to obtain agreement last year to begin a review of NATO’s Strategic Concept, De Hoop Scheffer persuaded the Allies to agree a new statement of principles. He had hoped that NATO would issue a new Atlantic Charter. The original was written at the height of World War II, as a statement of western values in the fight against Hitler. It led directly to the formation of the United Nations, and then of NATO as the fight against fascism became the fight against communism. However, NATO leaders downplayed the idea, and it became a Declaration.
What is important, though, is the content. The document as drafted by the Secretary General includes review of NATO activity over the past 60 years and a future vision for NATO strategy as well as foreseen security duties and obligations of member states and NATO missions beyond NATO territory.
It seems that the principle importance of the Declaration will be the breadth of topics that it covers, and the fact that it will serve as a public terms of reference for the Strategic Concept debate that follows. As such, while hardly likely to be a document of historic importance like the original charter, it will be influential in shaping NATO for coming decades. In so far as the Declaration breaks new ground for NATO, De Hoop Scheffer will leave his mark as Secretary General on the Alliance when he retires later this year.
Finally, as instructed by our Heads of State and Government a year ago in Bucharest, next month’s Summit will issue a Declaration on Alliance Security. This Declaration should, in my view, underline NATO’s determination to perform the full range of its missions, from its core task of collective defence to projecting stability abroad. It should convey to our publics, in plain and powerful words, NATO’s “raison d’être” at 60. And it should also give us the necessary vision and political guidance to start a process which will lead to updating our 1999 Strategic Concept, in order to set out in detail the Alliance’s role in the new security environment of the 21st century.
Having failed to obtain agreement last year to begin a review of NATO’s Strategic Concept, De Hoop Scheffer persuaded the Allies to agree a new statement of principles. He had hoped that NATO would issue a new Atlantic Charter. The original was written at the height of World War II, as a statement of western values in the fight against Hitler. It led directly to the formation of the United Nations, and then of NATO as the fight against fascism became the fight against communism. However, NATO leaders downplayed the idea, and it became a Declaration.
What is important, though, is the content. The document as drafted by the Secretary General includes review of NATO activity over the past 60 years and a future vision for NATO strategy as well as foreseen security duties and obligations of member states and NATO missions beyond NATO territory.
It seems that the principle importance of the Declaration will be the breadth of topics that it covers, and the fact that it will serve as a public terms of reference for the Strategic Concept debate that follows. As such, while hardly likely to be a document of historic importance like the original charter, it will be influential in shaping NATO for coming decades. In so far as the Declaration breaks new ground for NATO, De Hoop Scheffer will leave his mark as Secretary General on the Alliance when he retires later this year.
Unease on Missile Defence
While the deployment of US missile defences to Poland and the Czech Republic is not part of the official agenda at NATO, the subject is an ever-present worry for some. In the US, advocates of the Bush missile defence agenda are still trying to adapt to the post-Bush world in which some of their cherished programmes (like the deployment of a radar in the Czech Republic and interceptors in Poland as part of the mid-course BMD system). For example, Michael Rubin of the conservative American Enterprise Institute writes in support of the European deployment for Radio Free Europe.
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton will go from the NATO meeting to meetings with Russian counterparts, where the future of the European BMD sites will be discussed. As the International Herald Tribune reports, both the Czechs and the Poles have some nervousness about this meeting. Bloomberg also reports on this topic today.
The Czechs appear to want to ensure the deployment of US troops on their soil, while the Poles are concerned that the US sticks to a deal about the deployment of Patriot batteries in Poland, even if the interceptor site is never built. This degree of nervousness about the US commitment to the defence of Europe recalls the days of the Cold War, when west Europeans felt much the same way. In this case though the European protagonists have only themselves to blame. They struck a controversial deal with the Bush administration in its dying days, knowing that it would likely be reversed if Barrack Obama became President. They ignored advice to wait, and now feel that they have been let down, when it is rather they who have failed to understand the nature of great power politics.
The Czech and Polish governments are now left lamenting the fate of the BMD programmes with their conservative allies, essentially powerless to affect the outcome. They must now avoid the mistake of assuming that their security interests cannot be met by the Obama administration. After all, friendly relations with Russia, leading to greatly reduced nuclear forces and a more stable Europe is a path to security for all concerned. One that is, in the long run, much better than a return to a Cold War-style stand-off where Poland, in particular, could never feel safe as they would be on the European front line.
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton will go from the NATO meeting to meetings with Russian counterparts, where the future of the European BMD sites will be discussed. As the International Herald Tribune reports, both the Czechs and the Poles have some nervousness about this meeting. Bloomberg also reports on this topic today.
The Czechs appear to want to ensure the deployment of US troops on their soil, while the Poles are concerned that the US sticks to a deal about the deployment of Patriot batteries in Poland, even if the interceptor site is never built. This degree of nervousness about the US commitment to the defence of Europe recalls the days of the Cold War, when west Europeans felt much the same way. In this case though the European protagonists have only themselves to blame. They struck a controversial deal with the Bush administration in its dying days, knowing that it would likely be reversed if Barrack Obama became President. They ignored advice to wait, and now feel that they have been let down, when it is rather they who have failed to understand the nature of great power politics.
The Czech and Polish governments are now left lamenting the fate of the BMD programmes with their conservative allies, essentially powerless to affect the outcome. They must now avoid the mistake of assuming that their security interests cannot be met by the Obama administration. After all, friendly relations with Russia, leading to greatly reduced nuclear forces and a more stable Europe is a path to security for all concerned. One that is, in the long run, much better than a return to a Cold War-style stand-off where Poland, in particular, could never feel safe as they would be on the European front line.
Foreign Ministers Meet in Summit Preview
Following on from the recent Defence Ministers meeting, it is now the turn of Foreign Ministers to engage in preparations for the forthcoming Summit in Strasbourg and Kehl.
The full press briefing before the meeting by James Appathurai, NATO Spokesperson, contains some interesting pieces of information.
The importance of Afghanistan for the future of the Alliance is underscored by the fact that half the meeting will be taken up in discussion of the Alliance political-military strategy in the country; beginning with a briefing from Secretary of State Hillary Clinton on the Obama administration’s review of US strategy in the region.
Another prominent topic will be relations with Russia, on which:
.. the Secretary General will report tomorrow morning to the Ministers on his political contacts and they will discuss possible next steps, including the resumption of formal meetings of the NATO-Russia Council at Ambassadorial and Ministerial level.
Perhaps as important in the long run is the Alliance’s internal debate on its policy direction. This will be dealt with in a discussion on:
.. the Declaration on Alliance security. This is again a tasking given to him by Ministers to draft, and he has done that, a declaration to be adopted at the summit in early April. This declaration should in essence underline NATO's determination to perform the full range of its missions including collective defence to projecting stability abroad. It should convey for our publics NATO's raison d'être at the age of 60, a sprightly and flexible 60. And it should also set out the way forward in launching a process which should lead to updating the Strategic Concept, which as you know dates to 1999, in order to set out in detail the Alliance's role in the new security environment of the 21st century.
Ministers, with invitee nations, will also be discussing the latest round of enlargement agreed last year at Bucharest. I’ll be reporting the various parts of the discussion as the meeting goes on.
The full press briefing before the meeting by James Appathurai, NATO Spokesperson, contains some interesting pieces of information.
The importance of Afghanistan for the future of the Alliance is underscored by the fact that half the meeting will be taken up in discussion of the Alliance political-military strategy in the country; beginning with a briefing from Secretary of State Hillary Clinton on the Obama administration’s review of US strategy in the region.
Another prominent topic will be relations with Russia, on which:
.. the Secretary General will report tomorrow morning to the Ministers on his political contacts and they will discuss possible next steps, including the resumption of formal meetings of the NATO-Russia Council at Ambassadorial and Ministerial level.
Perhaps as important in the long run is the Alliance’s internal debate on its policy direction. This will be dealt with in a discussion on:
.. the Declaration on Alliance security. This is again a tasking given to him by Ministers to draft, and he has done that, a declaration to be adopted at the summit in early April. This declaration should in essence underline NATO's determination to perform the full range of its missions including collective defence to projecting stability abroad. It should convey for our publics NATO's raison d'être at the age of 60, a sprightly and flexible 60. And it should also set out the way forward in launching a process which should lead to updating the Strategic Concept, which as you know dates to 1999, in order to set out in detail the Alliance's role in the new security environment of the 21st century.
Ministers, with invitee nations, will also be discussing the latest round of enlargement agreed last year at Bucharest. I’ll be reporting the various parts of the discussion as the meeting goes on.
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