There have been some thought-provoking comments recently on the need for a new Strategic Concept debate within NATO. Notably, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, speaking to the Bundestag on March 26, made some good points.
Chancellor Merkel said that as the new concept is developed NATO should try "as much prevention as possible, so that we don't reach the point where only military assistance helps.” She also said that NATO’s decade-old strategy needs rewriting to reflect the impact of the September 11 terrorist attacks and the expansion of the alliance’s mission beyond its historic role of defending Europe during the Cold War. Merkel added that the work should be finished inside a year.
NATO sources have indicated that if NATO heads of State and Government do order a Strategic Concept revision, that it will probably be finished in time for the next Summit, currently projected for late 2010 or early 2011.
Importantly, with many people talking about NATO as a ‘global security provider’, Merkel said that "I don't see a global NATO." This reflects German reluctance to engage fully in Afghanistan, where their troops have been relegated to a non-combat role in relatively peaceful areas of the country.
NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, echoed this call for a new Strategic Concept during his recent trip to Washington DC, saying that:
NATO's future will be discussed, as well. The question: Is NATO going to have a new strategic concept, which brings to the surface a number of questions President Obama already spoke about - NATO's expeditionary capabilities, never forgetting NATO's core function, the integrity of the NATO territory, NATO's relations with Russia. We have many things on which we disagree, but NATO needs Russia and Russia needs NATO, so let's work on the things we agree on, and let's not hide our disagreements and let us realize that also this relationship can and in my opinion should be - should be strengthened.
De Hoop Scheffer and Merkel’s views on relations with Russia are, however, anathema to new NATO members. For example, Poland has a much harder line on their Eastern neighbours, and a much more traditional view of NATO’s raison d’être. Witold Waszczykowski, deputy head of Poland's National Security Bureau, recently told Reuters:
There is a discussion about the possibility of NATO dealing with climate change, but not about real problems. In Western Europe, a number of countries prefer to discuss the attacks in Mumbai and have a tendency to forget about other issues, for example Russia and Georgia.
This attitude is common in the East. Many of the newer NATO members joined the old NATO of common defence, not the new NATO of power projection and humanitarian intervention.
Still, it is clear now that the debate will be joined. As British Foreign Secretary David Miliband told the House of Commons on March 31. Answering Mike Gapes MP, chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee, he told the Commons:
The summit on Friday and Saturday marks the 60th anniversary of the foundation of NATO, and it is an important chance to look forward. One of the foundations of NATO's future, whatever the debates about how it should combine the defence of its members with operations beyond its borders, is that it must embody the transatlantic alliance that has served Europe and North America so well over the past 60 years. I hope that the meeting on Friday and Saturday can be more than a "celebration". First, it needs to be a chance to chart the future in respect of Afghanistan, the biggest and most important NATO mission currently under way. It should also start the debate about how NATO can look forward, in the next 10 or 20 years, to working in a very different context from that in which it was created.
Now we await the formal decision of the Summit to begin the Strategic Concept review.
Wednesday, 1 April 2009
Downgrading Missile Defence
Aviation Week carries an article entitled Europe Warms to Missile Defense as US Cools. Based on interviews with primarily European industry people, it is somewhat pessimistic about the prospects for further developments of continent-wide missile defences.
.. for European missile defense efforts, the summit had been regarded as a key venue in which to urge members to embrace the concept of continental defense. The Pentagon’s push for a European site for the ground-based midcourse system—with a radar in the Czech Republic and interceptors in Poland—would be the centerpiece. But the Obama administration has yet to articulate a clear path forward on the third site, which Russia has strenuously opposed. As a result, the Czech government this month decided not to seek parliamentary endorsement for the radar construction. In addition, it was hoped that working groups would be asked to study architectures for expanding the alliance’s current emphasis on theater missile defense into a network covering all of Europe, and to begin cooperatively developing key new components such as early warning systems and interceptors.
Both Congress and the Obama administration are, at best, now sceptical about the need for or value of the deployment of the mid-course BMD system to Europe. Indeed, last year Congress passed legislation prohibiting spending on the European sites until the Missile Defense Agency could prove that the system worked under operationally realistic conditions, and would provide value for money.
Eastern Europeans in particular are now discovering that it is not enough, when dealing with the US, to know the position of the administration. The wishes of Congress must also be taken into account. And, it isn't wise to make deals on controversial programmes with administrations in the final months before they leave office. The Obama administration now has to make sure that its slowing of the BMD deployments do not antagonise European allies too much, and that means making sure that they understand their security is being provided for in other ways. An emphasis on non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament (the direction the administration anyhow wishes to take) is more sensible than spending billions on a last-ditch defence that probably wouldn't work anyway.
And of course, what the Eastern Europeans are really nervous about is Russia. Slowing or stopping the BMD deployment will improve relations with Russia in the short term. In the longer term, it has to be about building trust. and that is the best kind of security to have.
.. for European missile defense efforts, the summit had been regarded as a key venue in which to urge members to embrace the concept of continental defense. The Pentagon’s push for a European site for the ground-based midcourse system—with a radar in the Czech Republic and interceptors in Poland—would be the centerpiece. But the Obama administration has yet to articulate a clear path forward on the third site, which Russia has strenuously opposed. As a result, the Czech government this month decided not to seek parliamentary endorsement for the radar construction. In addition, it was hoped that working groups would be asked to study architectures for expanding the alliance’s current emphasis on theater missile defense into a network covering all of Europe, and to begin cooperatively developing key new components such as early warning systems and interceptors.
Both Congress and the Obama administration are, at best, now sceptical about the need for or value of the deployment of the mid-course BMD system to Europe. Indeed, last year Congress passed legislation prohibiting spending on the European sites until the Missile Defense Agency could prove that the system worked under operationally realistic conditions, and would provide value for money.
Eastern Europeans in particular are now discovering that it is not enough, when dealing with the US, to know the position of the administration. The wishes of Congress must also be taken into account. And, it isn't wise to make deals on controversial programmes with administrations in the final months before they leave office. The Obama administration now has to make sure that its slowing of the BMD deployments do not antagonise European allies too much, and that means making sure that they understand their security is being provided for in other ways. An emphasis on non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament (the direction the administration anyhow wishes to take) is more sensible than spending billions on a last-ditch defence that probably wouldn't work anyway.
And of course, what the Eastern Europeans are really nervous about is Russia. Slowing or stopping the BMD deployment will improve relations with Russia in the short term. In the longer term, it has to be about building trust. and that is the best kind of security to have.
Tuesday, 31 March 2009
Russian Ambassador Rogozin on NATO-Russia Relationship
Russian Ambassador to NATO Dmitri Rogozin published a piece on relations with the Alliance in the Moscow Times today. He makes some good points, and proposes once again the Russian idea of a pan-European security treaty.
The crisis in Georgia last August tested Europe's security system, and the system failed to fulfill its core task of ensuring common security for the continent as a whole. As a result, Europe must re-examine its current security arrangements, analyze what happened, and take this analysis into account in reforming those arrangements.
..
When the NATO-Russia council (NRC) was created in 2002, it was devised as a mechanism for dialogue, cooperation, and joint decision-making on issues of mutual interest, including non-proliferation and arms control, the fight against terrorism, civil emergency planning, and military-to-military cooperation. The NRC also was supposed to act as a forum for "holding prompt consultations" in crisis situations and to prevent such crises by "early identification of emerging problems." Unfortunately, the Georgian crisis demonstrated that Russia's dialogue with NATO was less substantial than it should have been. Yet NATO-Russia cooperation is of the utmost importance to global security. We need NATO and NATO needs us in order to face common threats and challenges. .. Indeed, Russia's foremost foreign-policy goal is a real, strategic partnership with the West in which we work together to solve the multitude of modern security problems. (My emphasis)
..
Europe needs an integrated, solid, and indivisible system of comprehensive security. We are not calling for abolishing everything and starting from scratch. On the contrary, we must build on existing institutions. In short, we need to retain the hardware, but update the software. Russia's initiative for a pan-European security treaty should be the new operating system.
All of this is very conciliatory sounding. There are some sections of the piece that are less so. Russian fears about US and NATO enlargement around its borders are clearly stated:
Russia has tried for years to get away from Cold War thinking and to persuade our partners to drop their stereotypes. After the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, Russia quickly extended a helping hand to the Americans. But the West did not appreciate this gesture. Military bases have been impetuously established along Russia's perimeter. The United States plans to establish part of its global missile defense system in the Czech Republic and Poland. The Warsaw Pact ceased to exist 20 years ago, but NATO still proceeds eastward, adding new member states for reasons other than enhancing security and democracy.
And when he offers NATO a choice between Russian support in the international struggle against terrorist groups, and NATO support for Georgia, there are few in the Alliance who would agree with him:
A real, working NATO-Russia relationship could provide the Alliance with solutions to problems that it cannot tackle on its own. It would also give new impetus to the European security system. This is what we want to see in the future – and it is a future that is not possible without Russia. To see why, simply compare the importance of combating international terrorism with the value of nurturing Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili's personal ambitions; things soon fall into place.
All in all, for an Ambassador whose appointment was widely seen as a Russian hard line snub to NATO, this represents an unclenching of the fist, or a pushing of the reset button - or whatever current metaphor one wants to use. NATO and Russia need to work together in mutual respect to create true security in Europe. It seems the signs on this score are more positive than they have been for some time.
The crisis in Georgia last August tested Europe's security system, and the system failed to fulfill its core task of ensuring common security for the continent as a whole. As a result, Europe must re-examine its current security arrangements, analyze what happened, and take this analysis into account in reforming those arrangements.
..
When the NATO-Russia council (NRC) was created in 2002, it was devised as a mechanism for dialogue, cooperation, and joint decision-making on issues of mutual interest, including non-proliferation and arms control, the fight against terrorism, civil emergency planning, and military-to-military cooperation. The NRC also was supposed to act as a forum for "holding prompt consultations" in crisis situations and to prevent such crises by "early identification of emerging problems." Unfortunately, the Georgian crisis demonstrated that Russia's dialogue with NATO was less substantial than it should have been. Yet NATO-Russia cooperation is of the utmost importance to global security. We need NATO and NATO needs us in order to face common threats and challenges. .. Indeed, Russia's foremost foreign-policy goal is a real, strategic partnership with the West in which we work together to solve the multitude of modern security problems. (My emphasis)
..
Europe needs an integrated, solid, and indivisible system of comprehensive security. We are not calling for abolishing everything and starting from scratch. On the contrary, we must build on existing institutions. In short, we need to retain the hardware, but update the software. Russia's initiative for a pan-European security treaty should be the new operating system.
All of this is very conciliatory sounding. There are some sections of the piece that are less so. Russian fears about US and NATO enlargement around its borders are clearly stated:
Russia has tried for years to get away from Cold War thinking and to persuade our partners to drop their stereotypes. After the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, Russia quickly extended a helping hand to the Americans. But the West did not appreciate this gesture. Military bases have been impetuously established along Russia's perimeter. The United States plans to establish part of its global missile defense system in the Czech Republic and Poland. The Warsaw Pact ceased to exist 20 years ago, but NATO still proceeds eastward, adding new member states for reasons other than enhancing security and democracy.
And when he offers NATO a choice between Russian support in the international struggle against terrorist groups, and NATO support for Georgia, there are few in the Alliance who would agree with him:
A real, working NATO-Russia relationship could provide the Alliance with solutions to problems that it cannot tackle on its own. It would also give new impetus to the European security system. This is what we want to see in the future – and it is a future that is not possible without Russia. To see why, simply compare the importance of combating international terrorism with the value of nurturing Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili's personal ambitions; things soon fall into place.
All in all, for an Ambassador whose appointment was widely seen as a Russian hard line snub to NATO, this represents an unclenching of the fist, or a pushing of the reset button - or whatever current metaphor one wants to use. NATO and Russia need to work together in mutual respect to create true security in Europe. It seems the signs on this score are more positive than they have been for some time.
Jamie Shea on Engagement With Pakistan
Jamie Shea, Director of Policy Planning in the NATO Secretary General's office, has always been one of the most thoughtful of NATO staff. Radio Free Europe is carrying a very interesting interview with him on what NATO will do to try to engage further with Pakistan.
Since everyone agrees that cannot succeed in Afghanistan without working more closely with Pakistan (even while there is little agreement what 'success' will look like), and Shea is a key man in building that closer engagement, this interview is well worth the read.
Amongst the key points, Shea says that ".. specific examples of cooperation on the ground.." could include:
..improving the lines of communication. Eighty percent of our supplies for ISAF [NATO-led International Security Assistance Force] go through Pakistan. Setting up a NATO liaison office in Islamabad. Stepping up the cooperation on the [Afghan-Pakistan] border. We are in the process of setting up six border cooperation centers. Sharing intelligence. These kinds of things. We've got to bring Pakistan as closely as we can into a regional approach in order to be successful in Afghanistan.
He also mentions improved logistics as essential. Jamie Shea has never been afraid to speak honestly, and when he talks about Taliban successes, like blowing up thirty trucks in a supply convoy, looking spectacular, he sounds much more in touch with reality than typical NATO spokespeople. He is also right to say that more cooperation is necessary to safeguard southern supply routes.
Read the interview.
Since everyone agrees that cannot succeed in Afghanistan without working more closely with Pakistan (even while there is little agreement what 'success' will look like), and Shea is a key man in building that closer engagement, this interview is well worth the read.
Amongst the key points, Shea says that ".. specific examples of cooperation on the ground.." could include:
..improving the lines of communication. Eighty percent of our supplies for ISAF [NATO-led International Security Assistance Force] go through Pakistan. Setting up a NATO liaison office in Islamabad. Stepping up the cooperation on the [Afghan-Pakistan] border. We are in the process of setting up six border cooperation centers. Sharing intelligence. These kinds of things. We've got to bring Pakistan as closely as we can into a regional approach in order to be successful in Afghanistan.
He also mentions improved logistics as essential. Jamie Shea has never been afraid to speak honestly, and when he talks about Taliban successes, like blowing up thirty trucks in a supply convoy, looking spectacular, he sounds much more in touch with reality than typical NATO spokespeople. He is also right to say that more cooperation is necessary to safeguard southern supply routes.
Read the interview.
Turkey Still Opposes Rasmussen
Reuters have a report on the appointment of the next NATO Secretary General:
Turkey's resistance to Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen could prevent NATO nations naming a new secretary-general of the alliance at a summit this week, diplomats said on Monday. Ankara has not threatened outright to veto Rasmussen, the front-runner, but has made clear its dismay at his refusal to apologize for Danish newspaper cartoons of the Prophet Mohammad which sparked riots in several Muslim states in 2006. Prime Minister Tayyip Erogan said Muslim countries wanted Turkey to block his appointment. Some NATO members are asking privately whether he would be the best choice at a time when the alliance is seeking to improve its image in the Islamic world.
It is interesting that the Turks say that other Muslim nations have been talking to them about this. The cartoons issue has hung over Rasmussen from the beginning. As NATO Monitor has previously noted, with the ongoing mission in Afghanistan; the increasingly important Mediterranean dialogue; and the possibility that NATO will operate in other Muslim states in the future, this appointment matters for NATO's credibility.
US diplomats, who recently swung behind Rasmussen at the urging of the UK, France and Germany, are now saying that no decision is necessary this week. They have even privately mooted the option of extending the term of current Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer if no agreement can be found by July. These are not good signs for Rasmussen. As the EU Observer says:
NATO officials see this option however as a signal for Mr Rasmussen will likely not be offered the job. "Either he gets it at the summit, or he doesn't at all," one NATO source told EUobserver.
The Czech Republic had been proposing their Deputy Prime Minister Alex Vondra, but his chances evaporated when Prime Minister Mirek Topolanek told the European Parliament that President Obama's proposals for rescuing the global economy would put Europe on 'the road to hell'.
Canadian Defence Minister Peter Mackay is trying to position himself as a compromise candidate, with Poland now supporting him having accepted that their man Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski cannot win the job. Mackay, however, is seen as a lightweight and probably too close to the political and foreign policy views of former US President George W. Bush.
It is not yet even certain that Turkey will veto Rasmussen. While Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan has been raising concerns, Turkish President Abdullah Gul has been going out of his way to say that Turkey has no problem with Rasumussen. It is possible that late moves by Denmark against separatist Kurdish Roj TV, which broadcasts from Copenhagen, might be the trade-off necessary to get Rasmussen the job. Turkey claims that Roj TV is run by the separatist PKK which has been at war with Turkey for years, although the station denies that. Danish police and prosecutors have travelled to Ankara to review evidence, says Turkish newspaper Hurriyet, and to decide whether or not enough proof exists to justify closing Roj TV under Danish law. Although Danish sources deny that there is any link between the two issues, the visit seems coincidental to say the least. Even a sign that a solution favourable to Turkey were coming would probably be enough to persuade Erdogan to allow a NATO decision this week. And Rasmussen will speak next week to a UN Alliance of Civilisations Summit in Istanbul, which would be an excellent venue for him to put on the record his respect for Islam and his willingness to work with the Muslim world.
NATO certainly needs a decision on a new leader this weekend. A failure to agree a new Secretary General will take some of the shine off an already somewhat lacklustre Summit. At present the accession of Croatia and Albania to the Alliance, and the re-entry of France to the military command, plus the adoption of an Atlantic Declaration are the most that can be expected.
Turkey's resistance to Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen could prevent NATO nations naming a new secretary-general of the alliance at a summit this week, diplomats said on Monday. Ankara has not threatened outright to veto Rasmussen, the front-runner, but has made clear its dismay at his refusal to apologize for Danish newspaper cartoons of the Prophet Mohammad which sparked riots in several Muslim states in 2006. Prime Minister Tayyip Erogan said Muslim countries wanted Turkey to block his appointment. Some NATO members are asking privately whether he would be the best choice at a time when the alliance is seeking to improve its image in the Islamic world.
It is interesting that the Turks say that other Muslim nations have been talking to them about this. The cartoons issue has hung over Rasmussen from the beginning. As NATO Monitor has previously noted, with the ongoing mission in Afghanistan; the increasingly important Mediterranean dialogue; and the possibility that NATO will operate in other Muslim states in the future, this appointment matters for NATO's credibility.
US diplomats, who recently swung behind Rasmussen at the urging of the UK, France and Germany, are now saying that no decision is necessary this week. They have even privately mooted the option of extending the term of current Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer if no agreement can be found by July. These are not good signs for Rasmussen. As the EU Observer says:
NATO officials see this option however as a signal for Mr Rasmussen will likely not be offered the job. "Either he gets it at the summit, or he doesn't at all," one NATO source told EUobserver.
And NATO Spokesman James Appathurai has confirmed to Danish newspaper Politiken that:
.. the decision as to who is to be the next secretary-general of NATO is unlikely to be taken at a summit on Friday and Saturday. “I wouldn’t exclude the possibility that the decision could be taken at the summit, but I don’t expect it to be.
The trouble is that there is no other candidate who even comes close to meeting NATO needs and achieving consensus amongst NATO members. The Norwegian Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Store is a popular candidate, but does not come from an EU country. With NATO and the EU keen to exploit the re-entry of France into NATO's military command structures to allow the two to work together much more closely than in the past, he would be a strange choice. The various Eastern European candidates are perceived as far too hostile to Russia, and too interested in rebranding NATO as a defensive Alliance aimed against Russia. This doesn't suit President Obama, who is keen for better relations with Russia, and for a major new initiative on nuclear arms control. It also goes against the interests of those NATO members keen to see NATO position itself as a global alliance capable of providing security for all.The Czech Republic had been proposing their Deputy Prime Minister Alex Vondra, but his chances evaporated when Prime Minister Mirek Topolanek told the European Parliament that President Obama's proposals for rescuing the global economy would put Europe on 'the road to hell'.
Canadian Defence Minister Peter Mackay is trying to position himself as a compromise candidate, with Poland now supporting him having accepted that their man Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski cannot win the job. Mackay, however, is seen as a lightweight and probably too close to the political and foreign policy views of former US President George W. Bush.
It is not yet even certain that Turkey will veto Rasmussen. While Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan has been raising concerns, Turkish President Abdullah Gul has been going out of his way to say that Turkey has no problem with Rasumussen. It is possible that late moves by Denmark against separatist Kurdish Roj TV, which broadcasts from Copenhagen, might be the trade-off necessary to get Rasmussen the job. Turkey claims that Roj TV is run by the separatist PKK which has been at war with Turkey for years, although the station denies that. Danish police and prosecutors have travelled to Ankara to review evidence, says Turkish newspaper Hurriyet, and to decide whether or not enough proof exists to justify closing Roj TV under Danish law. Although Danish sources deny that there is any link between the two issues, the visit seems coincidental to say the least. Even a sign that a solution favourable to Turkey were coming would probably be enough to persuade Erdogan to allow a NATO decision this week. And Rasmussen will speak next week to a UN Alliance of Civilisations Summit in Istanbul, which would be an excellent venue for him to put on the record his respect for Islam and his willingness to work with the Muslim world.
NATO certainly needs a decision on a new leader this weekend. A failure to agree a new Secretary General will take some of the shine off an already somewhat lacklustre Summit. At present the accession of Croatia and Albania to the Alliance, and the re-entry of France to the military command, plus the adoption of an Atlantic Declaration are the most that can be expected.
NATO Summit Website
If you want to follow the NATO Summit on their website, the go to the NATO website.NATO Monitor will follow the NATO site closely, adding comment and details to the items that they post.
France Rejoins NATO Military Structure
On March 17, the French National Assembly confirmed President Nicolas Sarkozy's announcement that France would rejoin NATO's integrated military command. This overturns 50 years of French policy, and most importantly in domestic terms, the legacy of General de Gaulle, who expelled NATO and US forces from France in 1966, partly because the US had refused to reveal details of US nuclear forces in France, or the circumstances in which they would be used.
The result of the vote last week was never in question, since Prime Minister Francois Fillon had made the vote a question of confidence in the government. He also insisted that was a matter of foreign and defence policy, which is a presidential prerogative under the French Constitution.
This parliamentary manoeuvre ensured that Gaullist opposition to rejoining the military structures of the Alliance was muted, since most Deputies were not willing to bring down the government over the issue. However, many commentators suggested that if the vote were secret then at least a third of government Deputies would vote no, enough to make the measure fail. Major figures like former Prime Ministers Dominique de Villepin and Alain Juppé, as well as Francois Bayrou, a former leader of the forerunner of Sarkozy's UMP party and twice presidential candidate, spoke out strongly against the move. In the end, the threat of domestic political chaos was enough to persuade most doubters and the final vote was 329 to 268 in favour.
France will now take command of Joint Command Lisbon, which notably includes responsibility for running the NATO Response Force and mounting missions using allied Combined Joint Task Forces. These mechanisms are most likely to be used to project force beyond the NATO area. The JCL also has responsibility for military components of the Mediterranean Dialogue. France will also lead the Allied Command transformation, based in Norfolk, Virgina. The command has responsibility for managing the transformation of the Alliance from a static defence organisation to a flexible, expeditionary Alliance that can support security needs across the globe.
In 1996, when President Chirac failed to get France back into the military command, he wanted command of Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH), the major NATO command in the Mediterranean. During the debate on the 17th, Fillon was taunted that Sarkozy had failed to get this command (now known as Allied Joint Force Command Naples), and settled for two lesser commands instead.
France will also join the Defence Planning Committee (although not its Nuclear Planning Group), and will assign some 800 officers to positions within NATO's military structures.
The result of the vote last week was never in question, since Prime Minister Francois Fillon had made the vote a question of confidence in the government. He also insisted that was a matter of foreign and defence policy, which is a presidential prerogative under the French Constitution.
This parliamentary manoeuvre ensured that Gaullist opposition to rejoining the military structures of the Alliance was muted, since most Deputies were not willing to bring down the government over the issue. However, many commentators suggested that if the vote were secret then at least a third of government Deputies would vote no, enough to make the measure fail. Major figures like former Prime Ministers Dominique de Villepin and Alain Juppé, as well as Francois Bayrou, a former leader of the forerunner of Sarkozy's UMP party and twice presidential candidate, spoke out strongly against the move. In the end, the threat of domestic political chaos was enough to persuade most doubters and the final vote was 329 to 268 in favour.
France will now take command of Joint Command Lisbon, which notably includes responsibility for running the NATO Response Force and mounting missions using allied Combined Joint Task Forces. These mechanisms are most likely to be used to project force beyond the NATO area. The JCL also has responsibility for military components of the Mediterranean Dialogue. France will also lead the Allied Command transformation, based in Norfolk, Virgina. The command has responsibility for managing the transformation of the Alliance from a static defence organisation to a flexible, expeditionary Alliance that can support security needs across the globe.
In 1996, when President Chirac failed to get France back into the military command, he wanted command of Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH), the major NATO command in the Mediterranean. During the debate on the 17th, Fillon was taunted that Sarkozy had failed to get this command (now known as Allied Joint Force Command Naples), and settled for two lesser commands instead.
France will also join the Defence Planning Committee (although not its Nuclear Planning Group), and will assign some 800 officers to positions within NATO's military structures.
Croatia Can Go To The Ball
There has been some concern over the delay in ratifying Croatia's membership of NATO, as the NATO Monitor reported a while back (see the story here). However, on Monday, only just in time for the Summit, those concerns have evaporated and Croatia will join the Alliance this week.Slovenia had delayed ratification of Croatian membership over a border dispute. This concerns the Bay of Piran and dates back many years. Croatia claims half the bay, a claim disputed by Slovenia which says that if Croatia gets it way then Slovenia's access to the Adriatic Sea will be blocked. (The BBC has a good report on this, and the map above comes from that story.)
Slovenian nationalists failed to collect enough signatures to force a referendum by the March 26 deadline, and on Friday the President confirmed the Parliament's ratification vote dating back to February. To the relief of NATO officials, Slovenia deposited its instrument of ratification with the United States on Monday. So, Croatia will officially join NATO this weekend.
Meanwhile, the territorial dispute continues. Slovenia is still blocking EU membership for Croatia. EU Commissioner on expansion Olli Rehn tabled a new compromise proposal last week, which the two parties are studying.
But for NATO the problem is over, and one cloud hanging over the Summit has evaporated.
Monday, 23 March 2009
NATO Secretary General News
Jim Hoagland of the Washington Post reports:
On a more positive note, national security adviser Jim Jones flew secretly to Switzerland this month to meet with vacationing Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen and then threw U.S. support behind Rasmussen to become the next NATO secretary general. Mazeltov, Denmark.
You can read Hoagland's short piece here.
Now it remains to be seen what Washington can give Ankara to allay their concerns, as Turkey appears to be the last real opponent Rasmussen has.
On a more positive note, national security adviser Jim Jones flew secretly to Switzerland this month to meet with vacationing Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen and then threw U.S. support behind Rasmussen to become the next NATO secretary general. Mazeltov, Denmark.
You can read Hoagland's short piece here.
Now it remains to be seen what Washington can give Ankara to allay their concerns, as Turkey appears to be the last real opponent Rasmussen has.
NATO – a Middle East Peacekeeper?
With the Strasbourg-Kehl Summit fast approaching, the debate about the future of NATO, and in particular the ambition of some within the Alliance to have it become a ‘global security provider’, is taking some interesting twists and turns. It may soon coincide with the Obama administration’s action on the Arab-Israeli peace process, which under the new leadership of Presidential Envoy George Mitchell is far more dynamic already than under President Bush.
NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer visited Israel in January as part of the Alliance’s Mediterranean Dialogue. One issue for discussion was a potential role for NATO as a future peacekeeper if the parties to the peace process are able to come to a final accord on Palestine and Israel.
The idea that NATO troops might be deployed in the Middle East has been on the agenda for a year or more (I noted it in another piece on Israeli-NATO links here). Retired US Marine General James Jones (a former NATO SACEUR and now President Obama’s National Security Advisor) is a key proponent of the concept.
In an interview with Ha’aretz, de Hoop Scheffer said that:
I believe, however, that in the context of a comprehensive peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, should all parties ask for NATO's assistance in implementing such an agreement and should there be a UN mandate, then the North Atlantic Council would certainly discuss it. Personally, I think the answer would be positive.
This declaration of intent comes with a caveat. The Secretary General says that he is not including Gaza in this possible deployment, believing such a deployment to be beyond the realms of the possible for NATO. Indeed, even General Jones has, for the moment, only proposed a NATO force for the West Bank to answer Israeli security concerns after a peace deal. He restated this proposal late last year to Israeli officials while acting as then-Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice’s envoy to the region. The Israeli Defence Force was unenthusiastic.
During his meetings with Israelis, Jones has proposed that a NATO-based international force deploy in the West Bank in the interim period between an Israeli withdrawal and the Palestinian forces becoming able to curb terror activity....The IDF is particularly wary of such a plan, a top IDF officer said, who added that the military's operational freedom in the territories was responsible for the drop in terrorist attacks. "NATO is a very bad idea," the officer said. "No other country in the world has successfully dealt with terror like Israel has. There is a need for continuous combat; NATO will not want to endanger its soldiers on behalf of Israeli citizens."
Would NATO be a good candidate to run a peacekeeping force for the United Nations after an Arab-Israeli peace deal? There are arguments on both sides. There is a good mix within the Alliance of countries who are seen to favour one side or the other, so both sides could expect even-handed enforcement of a peace deal. On the other hand the US influence over the Alliance, and its deep connection to Israel might be seen as tipping NATO too far one way to allow for true impartiality. There are a lot of questions that would need to be answered before NATO could be seen as the logical candidate for Middle East peacekeeper.
Can the IDF be persuaded that NATO can do the job of ensuring Israeli security? And conversely, what would the Palestinian Authority security apparatus feel about NATO’s role. NATO does not have a stellar record of success in Afghanistan. Political divisions have severely undermined efforts to build security there, and this cannot be allowed to happen again. Will NATO’s increasingly close links with Israel – the two partners have conducted joint military exercises in recent years – be a foundation for future trust, or for mistrust? NATO also has good links with some Arab nations such as Jordan and Egypt. How would this affect a peacekeeping role? If NATO would not be prepared to police an agreement in Gaza, then who would? And without a neutral peacekeeper there, what would an agreement be worth?
Pondering these questions, it becomes clear why the debate about a possible global role for NATO in the future is so fraught. Of course, a peaceful Middle East would represent a huge increase in stability and security for NATO’s southern flank. No other organisation has the ability to put together a multi-national command structure of the kind that NATO can. On the other hand, the idea of 26 (or by then) 28 Ambassadors trying to micromanage an operation in such difficult circumstances is impossible to imagine. Structural reform of NATO to allow operational commanders to run matters in the field would be essential, naturally after the North Atlantic Council had agreed a mission by consensus.
These are big topics, and this is why NATO needs a Strategic Concept review.
NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer visited Israel in January as part of the Alliance’s Mediterranean Dialogue. One issue for discussion was a potential role for NATO as a future peacekeeper if the parties to the peace process are able to come to a final accord on Palestine and Israel.
The idea that NATO troops might be deployed in the Middle East has been on the agenda for a year or more (I noted it in another piece on Israeli-NATO links here). Retired US Marine General James Jones (a former NATO SACEUR and now President Obama’s National Security Advisor) is a key proponent of the concept.
In an interview with Ha’aretz, de Hoop Scheffer said that:
I believe, however, that in the context of a comprehensive peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, should all parties ask for NATO's assistance in implementing such an agreement and should there be a UN mandate, then the North Atlantic Council would certainly discuss it. Personally, I think the answer would be positive.
This declaration of intent comes with a caveat. The Secretary General says that he is not including Gaza in this possible deployment, believing such a deployment to be beyond the realms of the possible for NATO. Indeed, even General Jones has, for the moment, only proposed a NATO force for the West Bank to answer Israeli security concerns after a peace deal. He restated this proposal late last year to Israeli officials while acting as then-Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice’s envoy to the region. The Israeli Defence Force was unenthusiastic.
During his meetings with Israelis, Jones has proposed that a NATO-based international force deploy in the West Bank in the interim period between an Israeli withdrawal and the Palestinian forces becoming able to curb terror activity....The IDF is particularly wary of such a plan, a top IDF officer said, who added that the military's operational freedom in the territories was responsible for the drop in terrorist attacks. "NATO is a very bad idea," the officer said. "No other country in the world has successfully dealt with terror like Israel has. There is a need for continuous combat; NATO will not want to endanger its soldiers on behalf of Israeli citizens."
Would NATO be a good candidate to run a peacekeeping force for the United Nations after an Arab-Israeli peace deal? There are arguments on both sides. There is a good mix within the Alliance of countries who are seen to favour one side or the other, so both sides could expect even-handed enforcement of a peace deal. On the other hand the US influence over the Alliance, and its deep connection to Israel might be seen as tipping NATO too far one way to allow for true impartiality. There are a lot of questions that would need to be answered before NATO could be seen as the logical candidate for Middle East peacekeeper.
Can the IDF be persuaded that NATO can do the job of ensuring Israeli security? And conversely, what would the Palestinian Authority security apparatus feel about NATO’s role. NATO does not have a stellar record of success in Afghanistan. Political divisions have severely undermined efforts to build security there, and this cannot be allowed to happen again. Will NATO’s increasingly close links with Israel – the two partners have conducted joint military exercises in recent years – be a foundation for future trust, or for mistrust? NATO also has good links with some Arab nations such as Jordan and Egypt. How would this affect a peacekeeping role? If NATO would not be prepared to police an agreement in Gaza, then who would? And without a neutral peacekeeper there, what would an agreement be worth?
Pondering these questions, it becomes clear why the debate about a possible global role for NATO in the future is so fraught. Of course, a peaceful Middle East would represent a huge increase in stability and security for NATO’s southern flank. No other organisation has the ability to put together a multi-national command structure of the kind that NATO can. On the other hand, the idea of 26 (or by then) 28 Ambassadors trying to micromanage an operation in such difficult circumstances is impossible to imagine. Structural reform of NATO to allow operational commanders to run matters in the field would be essential, naturally after the North Atlantic Council had agreed a mission by consensus.
These are big topics, and this is why NATO needs a Strategic Concept review.
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