Tuesday, 23 September 2008
NATO Secretary General Press Conference
The transcript of the somewhat perplexing press conference that Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer gave in London last Friday has now been posted on the NATO webiste. You can read it here.
After London, Budapest Next
Last week, NATO Defence Ministers met in London in an informal session, one that issues no communique and takes no decisions. The occasion was surrounded in some mystery, with even the reason for the meeting seeming somewhat confused - even after (or perhaps because) Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer gave his press conference.
Defence Ministers will meet again in Budapest in two weeks time for their regular Autumn informal session. So why was the London meeting held? And what was discussed? What are the concrete results liekly to be? The picture is now becoming a little clearer.
The meeting had been planned at the invitation of UK Defence Secretary Des Browne, who called for the meeting during the Bucharest Summit this spring. His intention was to discuss the further transformation of NATO's defence structures. At issue was the pressing need to provide more equipment to front-line NATO operations in Afghanistan, especially helicopters; and also the need to build common infrastructure including strategic airlift. Another issue that concerned Browne is the need to bring the NATO Response Force up to full operational capability. Further, Browne has ideas about slimming down the NATO HQ bureaucracy to provide funds for the more urgent needs.
However, in the event this agenda was derailed by the fallout from the Russia-Georgia conflict this Summer. A group of countries led by Poland, the Czech Republic and the Baltic States demanded a review of NATO relations with Russia. In this they had the full support of US Defence Secretary Robert Gates. They also called a revision of the mandate of the NATO Response Force, conceived to allow swift NATO intervention beyond Europe's borders, to allow it to operate within NATO territory in the event of a threat from Russia.
According to the AFP, Polish Defence Minister Bogdan Klich told the meeting that NATO's principle task is "still the defence of its member states, which must not be diluted." This is something of a U-turn for the Polish government, which since elections last year, had been taking a much more conciliatory line with Russia. This changed when Russia crushed Georgia in a few days this Summer. The return to an emphasis on territorial defence, something the Baltic States have always insisted on, is part of debate on the future of NATO and a direct thrust at those (including the Secretary General0 who believe that NATO must look ever wider for new security tasks in order to justify its existence in the 21st Century.
NATO sources added that there might be a greater visibility for the NATO air defence forces which have flown missions over the Baltic States since their entry into the Alliance. And their will more resources pumped into military planning for any eventual problems with Russia.
A NATO Spokesperson has been moved to respond to some press reports, saying that NATO has no plans to deploy forces to the Russian border. However, since that was never claimed the denial lacks real credibility. Obviously, the NRF could be used to confront Russia just as easily to mount an operation in Afghanistan or elsewhere.
Browne's agenda on the slimming down of the NATO bureaucracy also ran into problems. The Greek Defence Minister, for one, opining that it was better for the NATO HQ to involve all nations (thereby building solidarity) than to save a little money and cut some nations out of NATO operations.
NATO Ministers move on to Budapest to continue this debate, and also to consider the future of their Afghan mission. They are also looking ofrward to the future Strategic Concept debate which will determine the future roles and organisation of the Alliance.
Defence Ministers will meet again in Budapest in two weeks time for their regular Autumn informal session. So why was the London meeting held? And what was discussed? What are the concrete results liekly to be? The picture is now becoming a little clearer.
The meeting had been planned at the invitation of UK Defence Secretary Des Browne, who called for the meeting during the Bucharest Summit this spring. His intention was to discuss the further transformation of NATO's defence structures. At issue was the pressing need to provide more equipment to front-line NATO operations in Afghanistan, especially helicopters; and also the need to build common infrastructure including strategic airlift. Another issue that concerned Browne is the need to bring the NATO Response Force up to full operational capability. Further, Browne has ideas about slimming down the NATO HQ bureaucracy to provide funds for the more urgent needs.
However, in the event this agenda was derailed by the fallout from the Russia-Georgia conflict this Summer. A group of countries led by Poland, the Czech Republic and the Baltic States demanded a review of NATO relations with Russia. In this they had the full support of US Defence Secretary Robert Gates. They also called a revision of the mandate of the NATO Response Force, conceived to allow swift NATO intervention beyond Europe's borders, to allow it to operate within NATO territory in the event of a threat from Russia.
According to the AFP, Polish Defence Minister Bogdan Klich told the meeting that NATO's principle task is "still the defence of its member states, which must not be diluted." This is something of a U-turn for the Polish government, which since elections last year, had been taking a much more conciliatory line with Russia. This changed when Russia crushed Georgia in a few days this Summer. The return to an emphasis on territorial defence, something the Baltic States have always insisted on, is part of debate on the future of NATO and a direct thrust at those (including the Secretary General0 who believe that NATO must look ever wider for new security tasks in order to justify its existence in the 21st Century.
NATO sources added that there might be a greater visibility for the NATO air defence forces which have flown missions over the Baltic States since their entry into the Alliance. And their will more resources pumped into military planning for any eventual problems with Russia.
A NATO Spokesperson has been moved to respond to some press reports, saying that NATO has no plans to deploy forces to the Russian border. However, since that was never claimed the denial lacks real credibility. Obviously, the NRF could be used to confront Russia just as easily to mount an operation in Afghanistan or elsewhere.
Browne's agenda on the slimming down of the NATO bureaucracy also ran into problems. The Greek Defence Minister, for one, opining that it was better for the NATO HQ to involve all nations (thereby building solidarity) than to save a little money and cut some nations out of NATO operations.
NATO Ministers move on to Budapest to continue this debate, and also to consider the future of their Afghan mission. They are also looking ofrward to the future Strategic Concept debate which will determine the future roles and organisation of the Alliance.
Friday, 19 September 2008
NATO's Transformation Ministerial
For a decade 'transformation' has been a buzzword for taking the old Cold War NATO and remodelling the Alliance for the new security situation. Since 9/11 that has primarily meant an expeditionary Alliance doing its part in what the Pentagon now calls the 'long war'. NATO created Allied Command Transformation, a major NATO command headquarters based in Norfolk, Virginia. This was aimed at rebuilding the forces of all NATO nations for power projection outside Europe.
At the request of Defence Secretary Des Browne, NATO ministers came to London to discuss the development of Alliance forces. In a statement released by the MID, Browne said that:
"NATO is the cornerstone of our Euro-Atlantic security, and it has bound North America and Europe in common purpose for nearly sixty years. That unity of purpose has been displayed in NATO's response to recent events in the Caucasus. However over time institutions build bad habits. There remains a mismatch between our aspirations and what we actually deliver. The NATO response force is not getting the forces or capabilities that it needs. We are lacking sufficient capabilities in key areas like intra-theatre air lift. Resources need to be switched from non-deployable capabilities. These capabilities require proper resourcing and investment. This meeting today is about transforming NATO to address all these points - and more - and to ensure that operations are central to NATO's purpose. Achieving this will allow us to focus better on the way we approach defence and security in the 21st Century."
However, during the afternoon that this meeting was not all about making NATO more capable of undertaking missions such as that in Afghanistan, the 'out of area' missions in which it acts as a 'global security provider'. It was also about the new confrontation with Russia that has emerged in the wake of the war in Georgia this Summer. The LA Times has reported that NATO ministers were discussing a plan to create "an easily deployable military force that could be sent into nations feeling threatened, a senior U.S. Defense official said Thursday. The creation of such a force would take NATO back to its roots as a deterrent against Soviet might after years of concentrating on missions in Kosovo and Afghanistan."
It is certain that ministers were discussing efforts to boost the somewhat faltering NATO Response Force (NRF) intended to bring together some 25,000 NATO soldiers ready to deploy and fight almost instantly. NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer told a press conference today that NATO needed to "strike the right balance between expeditionary forces and core tasks".
As The NATO Monitor has previously reported, this has been an ongoing debate between old and new members of NATO, with the Eastern Europeans concerned that NATO was not doing enough to offer protection form Russia. This feeling has grown exponentially since the Russian intervention in Georgia, and this may be NATO's answer. A common force of C-17 transport aircraft, inaugurated at the NATO Summit in Riga in 2006, was cited by De Hoop Scheffer as an example of common projects that enhance Alliance troop mobility in a cost-efficient manner. He also said that "planning and exercising for the common defence is what NATO does and will do. It is business as usual."
The Secretary General added that "NATO has always been prepared for all eventualities and still is. I don't see any new eventualities," but also admitted that NATO was beefing up some elements of its common defence capabilities, while refusing to be in any way specific on those capabilities.
It is clear that NATO has taken a step back towards its old role, the territorial defence of Europe. It is trying to do so in a way that maintains room for new missions in Afghanistan and, potentially in the future, elsewhere. No decisions were taken at this informal meeting, but further discussions will take place in Budapest in October, in December, in Krakow next Spring and then at the April Summit of Alliance leaders in Strasbourg and Kehl.
What is far less clear at present is what this means for NATO Russia relations. NATO leaders do not seem eager to head into a new Cold War, but at the same time they cannot afford to leave their new members dissatisfied with NATO's Article V mutual defence guarantee.Are we on the point of seeing a revival of a military balance of power in Europe between NATO and Russia? And what role will NATO's nuclear forces play in that stand-off if it emerges?
At the request of Defence Secretary Des Browne, NATO ministers came to London to discuss the development of Alliance forces. In a statement released by the MID, Browne said that:
"NATO is the cornerstone of our Euro-Atlantic security, and it has bound North America and Europe in common purpose for nearly sixty years. That unity of purpose has been displayed in NATO's response to recent events in the Caucasus. However over time institutions build bad habits. There remains a mismatch between our aspirations and what we actually deliver. The NATO response force is not getting the forces or capabilities that it needs. We are lacking sufficient capabilities in key areas like intra-theatre air lift. Resources need to be switched from non-deployable capabilities. These capabilities require proper resourcing and investment. This meeting today is about transforming NATO to address all these points - and more - and to ensure that operations are central to NATO's purpose. Achieving this will allow us to focus better on the way we approach defence and security in the 21st Century."
However, during the afternoon that this meeting was not all about making NATO more capable of undertaking missions such as that in Afghanistan, the 'out of area' missions in which it acts as a 'global security provider'. It was also about the new confrontation with Russia that has emerged in the wake of the war in Georgia this Summer. The LA Times has reported that NATO ministers were discussing a plan to create "an easily deployable military force that could be sent into nations feeling threatened, a senior U.S. Defense official said Thursday. The creation of such a force would take NATO back to its roots as a deterrent against Soviet might after years of concentrating on missions in Kosovo and Afghanistan."
It is certain that ministers were discussing efforts to boost the somewhat faltering NATO Response Force (NRF) intended to bring together some 25,000 NATO soldiers ready to deploy and fight almost instantly. NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer told a press conference today that NATO needed to "strike the right balance between expeditionary forces and core tasks".
As The NATO Monitor has previously reported, this has been an ongoing debate between old and new members of NATO, with the Eastern Europeans concerned that NATO was not doing enough to offer protection form Russia. This feeling has grown exponentially since the Russian intervention in Georgia, and this may be NATO's answer. A common force of C-17 transport aircraft, inaugurated at the NATO Summit in Riga in 2006, was cited by De Hoop Scheffer as an example of common projects that enhance Alliance troop mobility in a cost-efficient manner. He also said that "planning and exercising for the common defence is what NATO does and will do. It is business as usual."
The Secretary General added that "NATO has always been prepared for all eventualities and still is. I don't see any new eventualities," but also admitted that NATO was beefing up some elements of its common defence capabilities, while refusing to be in any way specific on those capabilities.
It is clear that NATO has taken a step back towards its old role, the territorial defence of Europe. It is trying to do so in a way that maintains room for new missions in Afghanistan and, potentially in the future, elsewhere. No decisions were taken at this informal meeting, but further discussions will take place in Budapest in October, in December, in Krakow next Spring and then at the April Summit of Alliance leaders in Strasbourg and Kehl.
What is far less clear at present is what this means for NATO Russia relations. NATO leaders do not seem eager to head into a new Cold War, but at the same time they cannot afford to leave their new members dissatisfied with NATO's Article V mutual defence guarantee.Are we on the point of seeing a revival of a military balance of power in Europe between NATO and Russia? And what role will NATO's nuclear forces play in that stand-off if it emerges?
US to Allies: NATO Should Fight a War on Drugs in Afghanistan
US Defense Secretary Robert Gates has flown into London for the NATO meeting. He has asked ministers to consider taking on the drug lords in Afghnaistan as part of their mission there, saying: "It seems to me that if we or ISAF encounter the opportunity to take out drug labs, or to arrest or take action against drug lords, kingpins, that's an opportunity, given how tied in it is with all the other issues in Afghanistan that that's something we ought to be willing to take on in some way."
Other NATO nations have been extremely reluctant to do this, with the UK, for example, going out of their way to tell residents of Helmand province that their mission is to fight the Taliban, not combat the trade in heroin.
Gates announcement is part of a Bush administration review of strategy in Afghnaistan, and the role of the NATO mission - ISAF - inthe country will make up a major part of deliberations in London.
Other NATO nations have been extremely reluctant to do this, with the UK, for example, going out of their way to tell residents of Helmand province that their mission is to fight the Taliban, not combat the trade in heroin.
Gates announcement is part of a Bush administration review of strategy in Afghnaistan, and the role of the NATO mission - ISAF - inthe country will make up a major part of deliberations in London.
NATO Ministers Meet in London
In the first of two informal Ministerials this Autumn(where no official decisions are taken) NATO Defence Ministers gathered in London, September 18, against a backdrop of crisis in Afghanistan and worsening relations with Russia.
The first significant event, Thursday evening, was a speech by NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI). A couple of points made by the Secretary General stand out. On the aftermath of the conflict in Georgia, he said that: "I don’t have to explain at length why Russia’s justification for recognising Abkhazia and South Ossetia could set a dangerous precedent – with truly global consequences. " This is true, and Russia's recognition of two breakaway states based on their own interpretation of local wishes will have serious implications for global security. Indeed, with the status of Chechnya far from finally settled in the eyes of many Chechens, it could have future implications for Russia. However, De Hoop Scheffer conveniently ignores the point that Russia based its actions on a precedent set by NATO. The recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states follows that of Kosovo, which NATO members were keen to see as an independent state, relying on the declaration of independence by Kosovars and ignoring the concerns of Serbia (of which Kosovo was part, and also of Russia). What is sauce for the NATO goose, is also sauce for the Russia gander. Since international law is in large part customary, it may be that dismembering states based on their citizens perceived desires is becoming much easier legally.
A second very important point made by the Secretary General concerned the future of NATO itself: ".. in this new security context, some have called for a reappraisal of the balance between an expeditionary NATO and our core task of collective defence. Such a discussion is certainly justified. But, again, I do not foresee a 180 degree change in our approach. Article 5 already exists, we don’t have to reinvent it. Neither does upholding Article 5 require us to return to a Cold War military posture in Europe."
De Hoop Scheffer and his policy team have been foremost amongst those arguing that NATO must transform itself into a 'global security provider' to be relevant in the 21st Century. Many object, most especially those new members of NATO in the Baltic States and Eastern Europe who see the Alliance as primarily a bulwark against Russia. They have taken heart from the events of August to strengthen their standpoint. As NATO members and officials begin discussing the terms of reference for the redefinition of NATO's Strategic Concept, a process that is likely to be formally launched at the Strasbourg-Kehl Summit next Spring, this will be the crux of the debate - what is NATO's raison d'etre?
He also noted the visit of the North Atlantic Council to Georgia this week, and the support that NATO is ready to offer to the Saakashvili government. But there is no sign that those nations that refused to accept Georgian membership in Bucharest are ready to accept it now. Nor any sign that they are ready to actually fight Russia over Georgia, which makes NATO support for the country more than a little hollow. It does, however, mean that Georgia must resolve its issues with Russia with western backing and without force. This is to be welcomed.
Other parts of the speech highlight continuing controversies between the US and European states of NATO over the mission in Afghanistan. In particular, as he noted the increasing US military effort in Afghanistan, De Hoop Scheffer also noted that: "While I of course welcome an even greater US effort, I believe that it is important that we continue to make this not just a US responsibility but a collective transatlantic responsibility. When the telephone rings early next year, I hope that the other Allies will also be ready, not just with additional forces, but also with extra contributions to training Afghanistan’s National Army and Police, strengthening its institutions and developing its economy." The debate about burden-sharing amongst Allies in the Afghanistan mission has been long drawn out, and European nations have been unreceptive to US demands for greater engagement to date. Will they be more receptive to President Obama, or President McCain?
Another area of controversy is the US attacks into Pakistan, and the Secretary General alluded to this problem: "Success in Afghanistan also means stepping up our political engagement with her neighbours, notably Pakistan. And this is my third point. As long as Pakistan’s border region remains a sanctuary for insurgents, Afghanistan will never become truly secure." he will travel to Pakistan soon, and NATO and Pakistan must come to an arrangement concerning border security and the presence of the Taliban in Pakistan if any success is to be achieved in Afghanistan. The problem is that, at present, NATO's actions and those of the US where it acts alone, are stimulating support for the Taliban in Pakistan and destabilising the new government. De Hoop Scheffer has his work cut out for him.
The Secretary General's speech is available at the NATO website, and we will continue to report the Ministerial as it progresses.
The first significant event, Thursday evening, was a speech by NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI). A couple of points made by the Secretary General stand out. On the aftermath of the conflict in Georgia, he said that: "I don’t have to explain at length why Russia’s justification for recognising Abkhazia and South Ossetia could set a dangerous precedent – with truly global consequences. " This is true, and Russia's recognition of two breakaway states based on their own interpretation of local wishes will have serious implications for global security. Indeed, with the status of Chechnya far from finally settled in the eyes of many Chechens, it could have future implications for Russia. However, De Hoop Scheffer conveniently ignores the point that Russia based its actions on a precedent set by NATO. The recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states follows that of Kosovo, which NATO members were keen to see as an independent state, relying on the declaration of independence by Kosovars and ignoring the concerns of Serbia (of which Kosovo was part, and also of Russia). What is sauce for the NATO goose, is also sauce for the Russia gander. Since international law is in large part customary, it may be that dismembering states based on their citizens perceived desires is becoming much easier legally.
A second very important point made by the Secretary General concerned the future of NATO itself: ".. in this new security context, some have called for a reappraisal of the balance between an expeditionary NATO and our core task of collective defence. Such a discussion is certainly justified. But, again, I do not foresee a 180 degree change in our approach. Article 5 already exists, we don’t have to reinvent it. Neither does upholding Article 5 require us to return to a Cold War military posture in Europe."
De Hoop Scheffer and his policy team have been foremost amongst those arguing that NATO must transform itself into a 'global security provider' to be relevant in the 21st Century. Many object, most especially those new members of NATO in the Baltic States and Eastern Europe who see the Alliance as primarily a bulwark against Russia. They have taken heart from the events of August to strengthen their standpoint. As NATO members and officials begin discussing the terms of reference for the redefinition of NATO's Strategic Concept, a process that is likely to be formally launched at the Strasbourg-Kehl Summit next Spring, this will be the crux of the debate - what is NATO's raison d'etre?
He also noted the visit of the North Atlantic Council to Georgia this week, and the support that NATO is ready to offer to the Saakashvili government. But there is no sign that those nations that refused to accept Georgian membership in Bucharest are ready to accept it now. Nor any sign that they are ready to actually fight Russia over Georgia, which makes NATO support for the country more than a little hollow. It does, however, mean that Georgia must resolve its issues with Russia with western backing and without force. This is to be welcomed.
Other parts of the speech highlight continuing controversies between the US and European states of NATO over the mission in Afghanistan. In particular, as he noted the increasing US military effort in Afghanistan, De Hoop Scheffer also noted that: "While I of course welcome an even greater US effort, I believe that it is important that we continue to make this not just a US responsibility but a collective transatlantic responsibility. When the telephone rings early next year, I hope that the other Allies will also be ready, not just with additional forces, but also with extra contributions to training Afghanistan’s National Army and Police, strengthening its institutions and developing its economy." The debate about burden-sharing amongst Allies in the Afghanistan mission has been long drawn out, and European nations have been unreceptive to US demands for greater engagement to date. Will they be more receptive to President Obama, or President McCain?
Another area of controversy is the US attacks into Pakistan, and the Secretary General alluded to this problem: "Success in Afghanistan also means stepping up our political engagement with her neighbours, notably Pakistan. And this is my third point. As long as Pakistan’s border region remains a sanctuary for insurgents, Afghanistan will never become truly secure." he will travel to Pakistan soon, and NATO and Pakistan must come to an arrangement concerning border security and the presence of the Taliban in Pakistan if any success is to be achieved in Afghanistan. The problem is that, at present, NATO's actions and those of the US where it acts alone, are stimulating support for the Taliban in Pakistan and destabilising the new government. De Hoop Scheffer has his work cut out for him.
The Secretary General's speech is available at the NATO website, and we will continue to report the Ministerial as it progresses.
Thursday, 31 July 2008
The NATO Monitor
This blog was created to report the Bucharest NATO Summit, which we did. We have now revived the blog as The NATO Monitor to provide a permanent home for monitoring the future of NATO, especially with regard to nuclear weapons and other strategic policies. We will become especially active as NATO moves towards a renewal of its Strategic Concept this Autumn.
Sunday, 6 April 2008
US-Russia Strategic Framework
The full text of the Strategic Framework is too long to post here, but can be accessed at the International Herald Tribune website.
Strategic Framework on Non-Proliferation
Beyond the arms control section of the Framework, the two leaders agreed a section on their non-proliferation agenda. While this is largely an inventory of existing actions such as UN Security Council negotiations on Iran, UNSCR 1540, and other items, there are one or two worth highlighting.
In particular, the two countries commitment to selling nuclear power technology around the world, especially MOX plutonium fuel under the GNEP, runs directly counter to non-proliferation objectives - especially the aim of preventing nuclear terrorism. Dramatically extending sources of enriched uranium and plutonium (however down-blended) around the globe will only make it easier for terrorists to obtain such material. The power stations will also produce waste that could be used for dirty bombs.
The decalaration reads:
Preventing the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction
We recognize the profound importance of preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. We must prevent such weapons from falling into the hands of terrorists and those who support them. To this end, our two countries will provide global leadership on a wide range of cooperative efforts that will advance our common nonproliferation goals. These will include new approaches focused on environmentally-friendly technologies that will support economic growth, promote the expansion of nuclear energy, and create a viable alternative to the spread of sensitive nuclear fuel cycle technologies.
NPT: We confirm our continuing support for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and are committed to its strengthening. We will cooperate in preparing and ensuring a successful outcome of the 2010 NPT Review Conference.
Declaration on Nuclear Energy and Nonproliferation: On July 3, 2007 we issued a declaration on joint actions to strengthen the nuclear nonproliferation regime and to promote the expansion of nuclear energy worldwide. We are working together and with other nations to develop mutually beneficial approaches for economical and reliable access to nuclear energy designed to permit states to gain the benefits of nuclear energy and to create a viable alternative to their acquisition of sensitive fuel cycle technologies.
As nations with secure, advanced nuclear capabilities, we will provide assistance to countries considering nuclear energy in the development of the necessary infrastructure (including nuclear reactors), consider ways for facilitating financing, and will ensure, inter alia, provision of fresh fuel and spent fuel management.
Global Nuclear Energy Partnership: We are working with a wide range of other states to develop the next generation of civil nuclear capability that will be safe and secure, improve the environment, and reduce the risk of nuclear proliferation. GNEP is aimed at accelerating the development and deployment of advanced fuel cycle technologies including recycling that do not involve separating plutonium. Such advanced technologies, when available, would substantially reduce nuclear waste, simplify its disposition, and draw down existing inventories of civilian spent fuel in a safe, secure and proliferation resistant manner.
INPRO: The Russian Federation and the U.S. support the IAEA Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO) that has brought together both the states with developed nuclear technology and states running small-scale nuclear programs or just developing plans for peaceful use of nuclear energy.
Reliable Access to Nuclear Fuel: Recognizing the need for an assured fuel supply, both the
Reserve of low enriched uranium: The Russian Federation is working on the establishment of a stockpile of low enriched uranium to be available to the IAEA for ensuring reliable nuclear fuel supply.
Blending Down Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU): The
Agreement for Cooperation in Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy: We will sign in the near future and work to bring into force the bilateral agreement between the
Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism: The Global Initiative we launched in July 2006 has grown to include 67 participating countries plus the European Union and the IAEA as observers. Participating states are cooperating in strengthening their individual and collective capabilities to prevent terrorists from acquiring nuclear materials, to deny them safe haven and financial and other support, to share information on terrorist activities, to cooperate on law enforcement matters, and to deal with the consequences of an attack. We will continue to expand and strengthen this initiative and fully implement the agreed program of work.
Nuclear Security: We will complete our agreed-to nuclear security upgrades under the Bratislava Nuclear Security Initiative by the end of 2008. We look forward to these upgraded systems continuing to reliably serve their purpose for the years to come. The Senior Interagency Group will report back annually on implementation of the agreed actions under the Bratislava Initiative on emergency response, best practices, security culture, research reactors, and nuclear security upgrades. We will work together to share our nuclear security best practices with other nations, including through international fora.
Proliferation Security Initiative: We reaffirm our commitment to the Proliferation Security Initiative, which constitutes an important means to deter and prevent trafficking in WMD, their delivery means and related materials. We will work cooperatively to prevent and disrupt proliferation finance, in furtherance of the objectives of UNSCR 1540.
Sochi Declaration on Arms Control and Disarmament
President's Putin and Bush have agreed a Strategic Framework declaration. There is substantial content on arms control between the two countries.
There is no commitment to continuing the Moscow Treaty past 2012, but there is a commitment to continuing to negotiate a legal framework to continue the START I Treaty after its 2009 expiration. This is problematic as the Russian Duma and the US Senate will have to ratify any deal, and time is running very short, but since the Bush administration has been adamantly hostile to arms control this volte-face is to be welcomed.
There is also a commitment to examining existing short and intermediate range ballistic missiles and how to reduce threats from them, as well as from cruise missiles. This is positive, but falls far short of constructive Russian ideas like the globalisation of INF.
In short, this Framework is a shopping list of things that could be done, rather than a set of commitments to actually act. But it's not a bad shopping list. The text that deals with arms control reads:
Promoting Security
We acknowledge that today's security environment is fundamentally different than during the Cold War. We must move beyond past strategic principles, which focused on the prospect of mutual annihilation, and focus on the very real dangers that confront both our nations. These include especially the threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. Reflecting the changed nature of our strategic relationship, we will take steps together to counter these new and emerging challenges.
Post-START:
We have reiterated our intention to carry out strategic offensive reductions to the lowest possible level consistent with our national security requirements and alliance commitments.
Substantial reductions of strategic offensive forces have been carried out under the START Treaty, which served as a key instrument in this context. The Moscow Treaty was an additional important step and remains in effect. We will continue development of a legally binding post-START arrangement.
We are fully committed to the goals of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and consider the arrangement we are pursuing to be a further step in implementing our commitments under Article VI of the Treaty.
Missile Defense:
We discussed the issue of missile defense. Both sides expressed their interest in creating a system for responding to potential missile threats in which
The Russian side has made clear that it does not agree with the decision to establish sites in
We agreed to intensify our dialogue after
INF Treaty: Taking note of our Joint Statement on the INF Treaty at the sixty-second session of the UN General Assembly, we will engage in a high-level dialogue to analyze current and future intermediate-range and shorter-range ballistic and cruise missile threats and inventory options for dealing with them.
CFE and Other Items: [] We will work together to address serious differences in areas where our policies do not coincide, including NATO expansion; development of a package solution that helps restore the viability of the CFE regime and prompt ratification of the Adapted CFE Treaty by all the States Parties; and certain military activities in space.
Putin Optimistic
Speaking at a post-Summit press conference today, President Putin said of the US attitude on missile defences that"
"Our partners not only understand our concerns but are also striving to lift them. I have a cautious optimism about agreement," Putin said. "The devil is as usual in detail. It is important that our experts agreed what confidence-building measures there will be and how they will be carried out in reality."
"Our partners not only understand our concerns but are also striving to lift them. I have a cautious optimism about agreement," Putin said. "The devil is as usual in detail. It is important that our experts agreed what confidence-building measures there will be and how they will be carried out in reality."
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