State Department's Gordon on US-European Cooperation

Assistant Secretary of State Phillip Gordon gave an interesting speech in Berlin last week on US Global Cooperation with Europe. He outlined the reasons why Europe is still very important for the US. Of course, the most interesting thing was that the speech needed to be given at all. Europe is nervous at the Pacific shift that the US is undertaking, and it seems that European allies are constantly seeking reassurance that the US won't be abandoning them.

Gordon said that:

More than ever we see Europe as our partner of first resort when it comes to managing a very challenging world. That was the philosophy that we brought with us, we the Obama administration, to office. It’s the philosophy that the then-candidate Obama spelled out not very far from here during the election campaign, and it’s just based on a very simple premise which is that unless you believe the United States alone can manage this very challenging world, you have to look for strong partners that have resources and share your values and interests, and those are more than anywhere to be found in Europe and the European Union.

This view of Europe as an ally in US strategy to the rest of the world, rather than Europe as a part of the world that has to be defended, accords with current strategic reality. But NATO Monitor is not convinced that it is the basis for a continuation of the tight relationship inside NATO that has existed since 1949. While there may be a coincidence of interests between the US and Europeans in some pats of the world on some occasions, more often there are differences, both economic and political; as well as differences of approach to problems.

Afghanistan is just one area where Europe and the US have, at least after ten years of war, very different interests and problems to confront, and Gordon acknowledged that at least in part while appealing for continued alliance solidarity.

The speech is also interesting on smart defence - of which more in a later post - and partnerships. Well worth reading.

Russian Proposal for "Sectoral" BMD in Europe

Pavel Podvig has an interesting post on Russian proposals for European BMD at his blog on Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces. Apparently the Russian Ministry of Defence took the opportunity of the Moscow missile defence conference last week to publish a proposal for "sectoral" missile defences in Europe.



Under this proposal NATO would use BMD assets to protect one part of the continent (let's just make the crazy assumption for the moment that BMD for an entire continent can actually work), while Russia would protect the other half, including most of Norway, the Baltic States and Poland. This would require NATO to give up the defence of a sizeable chunk of its member states' territory.

That, of course, is never going to happen, and the Russians know it. Indeed, within minutes of this blog post going online Francois Heisbourg of the Fondation pour la Recherche Strategique had tweeted his view that this is unacceptable to the West.

This proposal is no great surprise. Russia has been demanding a genuine partnership between itself and NATO on BMD for years. They see this as a way to avoid NATO BMD having the capacity to shoot down Russian ICBMs, something NATO denies wanting, but which could be achieved by relatively easy modifications and additions to the system that NATO is proposing.

At the same conference, Ellen Tauscher, the Obama administration's special envoy on strategic stability missile defence gave an impassioned plea for cooperation between Russia and the US in this area. She underlined that the US does not want to undermine Russian capabilities:

Phases 3 and 4 of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (as well as Phases 1 and 2, for that matter) will not undermine Russia’s strategic nuclear deterrent. Nothing we do with respect to our missile defense plans will undercut Russia’s national security. It would not be in our interest to do so, would be expensive and technically extremely difficult.

However, it is to be noted that she didn't say it is impossible for the NATO system to do what Russia claims it might be able to do in the future. Tauscher also offered ways for Russia and NATO to build confidence, which she claimed would enhance, not reduce strategic stability:

One of the best ways to build that confidence would be to work with us on NATO-Russia missile defense Centers where we can share sensor data and develop coordinated pre-planned responses and reach agreement on our collective approach to the projected threat. This will give us collectively a common understanding and foundation. Furthermore, we have seen the positive benefit this cooperation could have on missile defense effectiveness at the recent NATO-Russia Council Theater Missile Defense Computer Aided Exercise. 

While we undertake this missile defense cooperation, our two governments could do even more to prevent the proliferation of ballistic missile technology. We already cooperate in the Missile Technology Control Regime and in the Proliferation Security Initiative. We are working together in the UN to counter Iran and North Korea’s efforts to develop nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. Just last month, we worked together in the UN Security Council to strongly condemn the DPRK’s missile launch and placed additional sanctions on transfers of nuclear and ballistic missile technology to and from North Korea. Working together on missile defense would also send a strong message to proliferators that Russia, NATO and the United States are working to counter their efforts.

And finally, Tauscher held out the possibility that if missile threats from outside Europe are reduced in the future then the Phased Adaptive Approach allows for BMD capabilities to be reduced accordingly. The fly in the ointment with that suggestion is that the only viable missile threat to Europe at present comes from the Indian Agni V system. And India is an friend. NATO BMD is aimed fairly and squarely at Iran (politically at least) but there is no Iranian capability to strike at NATO, nor is one likely to emerge for many years, if at all. Iran doesn't have the missiles and it has no nuclear warhead.

Tauscher also made clear that the US cannot accept the sectoral approach, and would offer nothing more than a political statement that BMD is not aimed at Russia:

The United States and NATO also cannot agree to Russia’s proposal for “sectoral” missile defense. Just as Russia must ensure the defense of its own territory, NATO must ensure the defense of its own territory. We are able to agree to a political statement that our missile defenses are not directed at Russia. I have been saying this for many, many months now. Such a political statement would publicly proclaim our intent to cooperate and chart the direction for cooperation.

Of course, such words are meaningless. If NATO gains a capability to shoot down Russian ballistic missiles even in theory, then the Russians have to react. They have to add capability to missiles and/or increase missile numbers. Otherwise, the rules of deterrence mean that they are under a first strike threat they cannot match and strategic stability is undermined. So much is absolutely obvious.

It seems that BMD will remain an issue of contention between the US, NATO and Russia for some time to come. In the meantime, just the possibility of its deployment is complicating both nuclear and conventional arms control; as well as general relations between the two sides. As NATO Monitor has long advocated, it would be much better if the BMD plans were aborted, and NATO concentrated enhancing its security through confidence building and arms control measures with Russia, and in its wider neighbourhood. Such an approach is much more likely to bear long term fruit than deployment of a BMD system which every test shows is unlikely to work in any case.

Oxfam Blog on Consequences for Mali of NATO's Libya Mission

The Oxfam blog, From Poverty to Power,  has published a piece today by me on the link between arms flows out of Libya, governance problems across the Sahel and the deepening food crisis. This is all part of the continuing series of unintended consequences of NATO's action in Libya last year - and something which NATO leaders should be analysing when they meet in Chicago. If NATO is to have a more expeditionary future, relying on responsibility to protect mandates from the UN Security Council, it cannot ignore the wider consequences of its actions while simply congratulating itself on the efficiency of its military machine.

NATO Extends Baltic Air Patrols

The Washington Post and others report that NATO has decided to extend the air patrols it mounts over the Baltic States until 2018. These patrols are a largely symbolic measure of reassurance for the Baltics. This comes against a background of awkward relations between NATO and Russia, with the CFE Treaty in abeyance, and Russian concerns over NATO BMD plans leading to a deadlock in talks on cooperation and to increasing tension over tactical nuclear forces. The Baltic States are also amongst those who are most fearful of Russian intentions, for obvious reasons, especially as the US has announced a withdrawal of half its remaining forces in Europe - leading some Europeans to doubt their long term commitment to the region.

What this gesture highlights is that, should Russia wish to conquer the Baltic States (and there is absolutely no evidence they do) there is basically no way they could be defended. Genuine security for Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia lies in a long term improvement and normalisation of relations between NATO and Russia, not in the presence of 4 aircraft flying over their territory.

Daalder, Stavridis Should Consider the Problems Libya Intervention Caused

US Ambassador to NATO Ivo Daalder and Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) Admiral James Stavridis have penned a piece on the NATO operation in Libya for Foreign Affairs. NATO Monitor was, naturally, expecting to read an analysis which painted NATO in the best light possible, but from the very first line the article seems to overstate the case, when the authors write:

NATO's operation in Libya has rightly been hailed as a model intervention.

and then later in the piece they write:

By any measure, NATO succeeded in Libya. It saved tens of thousands of lives from almost certain destruction.

Well, up to a point Lord Copper as Evelyn Waugh put it. Not even the strongest supporter of Operation Unified Protector could pretend that it was an absolute and unqualified success, but that is where Daalder and Stavridis take this. In so doing, they have to ignore evidence during the operation and also to simply not comment on the consequences that have started to emerge since NATO ceased military action. They write:

Washington also led the charge for the UN resolution that authorized the intervention, justifying the action as consistent with "the responsibility to protect," the norm that calls on the international community to intervene when governments fail to safeguard their own civilians.

Most would agree (and NATO Monitor certainly does) that the initial actions to protect Benghazi from the regime's offensive, and the destruction of what remained of the Libyan air force on the ground, plus the protection offered to other cities in the face of sustained assault by Gaddhafi's forces could all be explained under the 'responsibility to protect' (R2P) mandate. Beyond that, the situation becomes much more complicated. NATO military force was used, not to protect civilians, but to assist in attacks on the regime. Instead of protecting cities, NATO was facilitating military assaults on them. It can be argued that no civilians could be safe while Gaddhafi remained in power, but that would be to deny the divided nature of Libyan society and the fact that some Libyans continue to support him even now he is dead. It was always likely that the stretching of the mandate by NATO to meet the political goals of the US, UK and France would be problematic. Many have noted that the NATO interpretation of the R2P mandate has undermined the concept itself. For example, the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung has written:

The intervention was clearly authorized by the United Nations Security Council (UN-SC) in Resolution 1973. Nevertheless, it is the first time for the international community to call upon the principle of a “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P) - established by the UN General Assembly in 2005 - to justify the Libyan campaign. With the Libya operation we are on new ground. There has not been any precedent yet which would clearly justify that the threshold to take resort to the concept of R2P is reached. What is intensifying this uncertainty is the politically desired regime change, which is clearly not authorized by the UN-SC and would under the given mandate not be legitimate for NATO to perform. Both the uncertainty concerning the exact criteria needed to trigger the R2P as well as the problem of a regime change will have consequences for both international law and the sovereignty of nation states far beyond the mission in Libya since humanitarian interventions and the closely related R2P could conceivably become a new precedent.Regardless of how the R2P will be enshrined in the future, the clear distinction between regime change and the protection of civilians has to be respected today.

As NATO pushed the boundaries of its mandate, Russia and China said clearly that they would not be quick to grant the Alliance such a mandate again. And now, for reasons of power politics, they have made good on those statements and blocked international intervention to help the people of Syria as their own government attacks them. If NATO had been more cautious in Libya, and stuck to the mandated purpose of Unified Protector by protecting people from military assault no matter who the attacking party and who the target, then while it is unlikely there would yet be a decisive outcome there, it is likely that there would be a military stalemate forcing a political solution. R2P requires impartiality, and the humanitarian NGOs and international groups that conceived the principle are deeply disturbed at the way it has been reinterpreted and misapplied in Libya. The tragic case of Syria is showing all to clearly why Unified Protector was not an unqualified success. The consequence, in the short term, is that there is no protection for the people of Homs.

NATO's impartiality was further undermined by the actions of France in breaching the UN arms embargo. This had been swiftly agreed in February 2011. France argued that the subsequent mandate of March authorizing 'all necessary measures' to protect civilians had varied the arms embargo., They argued further that they were arming rebel groups with light infantry weapons to enable the protection of civilians. For many, this stretched R2P beyond breaking point. It is very hard to accept that providing weapons to fuel a civil war in any way protects civilians. French actions also undermined the UN Security Council on arms embargoes, which by precedent apply to the entire territory of a country unless a resolution states that it only applies to certain groups within a country. Legal protections for civilians and the authority of the UN to prevent conflict were suddenly doubly undermined.


There are areas where the argument in the Foreign Affairs article are valid. For example, where the authors write:

[NATO] conducted an air campaign of unparallelled precision, which, although not perfect, greatly minimized collateral damage. 

they are undoubtedly right. The great care taken to do everything possible to avoid direct civilian casualties from NATO strikes is commendable. No doubt lessons learned in Afghanistan played a great part in this, and it is likely that Unified Protector is almost unique in the low level of civilian casualties caused by airstrikes. NATO's military infrastructure and experience of operations from Bosnia onwards contributed to this outcome. The authors correctly state that: 

The first lesson is that NATO is uniquely positioned to respond quickly and effectively to international crises. Some countries have significant military reach. But when a group of countries wants to launch a joint intervention as a coalition -- which confers political legitimacy -- only NATO can provide the common command structure and capabilities necessary to plan and execute complex operations. 

NATO is a unique multi-national institution. Its international command structure is indeed unmatched. As a regional organisation empowered to enforce UN mandates, this military power can be of great use. But the member states of the Alliance need to learn to act as they are authorised, not as they wish they had been authorised, or as is consistent with the political desires of NATO governments.

However, the lesson that Daalder and Stavridis take from Unified Protector is not this, it is that NATO member states must cooperate more to build a still more effective military infrastructure. They say that European members of NATO must do more so the US can do less. This burdensharing argument is as old as the Alliance itself. They write:

NATO began to address these shortfalls before the war in Libya began. At the Lisbon summit in November 2010, for example, the alliance adopted a new "strategic concept" to guide it for the next decade. In it, the allies committed to deploying the "full range of capabilities necessary to deter and defend against any threat to the safety and security of [its] populations." It also identified and prioritized the ten capabilities that member states agreed were essential to the organization's strength not only in today's operations (such as enhanced methods to counter improvised explosive devices and improvements in information sharing) but also in the future (such as missile defense and joint intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance -- a key deficiency in Libya).

The alliance will now have to summon the political will to implement these standards in a period of fiscal austerity. NATO countries can continue to invest in their military capabilities on their own -- which means investing inefficiently and often insufficiently, while leaning on an increasingly impatient United States to make up the difference. Or member states can invest through NATO and other multinational programs, saving money, promoting cooperation, sharing capabilities, and demonstrating solidarity. NATO will continue to succeed only if every member state chooses the latter course.

It is depressing that this is the only conclusion that they seek to draw from the Libya experience. There are other conclusions that must be drawn which are more profound, and which are rooted not just in a narrow examination of NATO's military efficiency in Operation Unified Protector, but in the realities on the ground then and now. It is essential to look at the effects of the operation beyond the end of hostilities, in Libya and across the region.

One major concern is the proliferation of small arms and light weapons from Libyan arms dumps throughout Libya and across the region. There has been great concern about the flow of MANPADS and other weapons out of Libya. The US believes that only 5000 of 20000 MANPADS have been recovered. There are deep concerns that Al Qaeda related groups in Africa might buy such weapons to try to shoot down western aircraft, as has happened in East Africa in the past.  There are reports that Libyan weapons have been smuggled to rebel groups in Sudan. Some of the weapons have already left north Africa. For example, Haaretz has reported that some Libyan weapons have reached Hamas in Gaza.

These weapons flows have also facilitated conflict in neighbouring countries, notably Mali. Gaddhafi had recruited Tuareg tribes to come to his support, and armed them heavily. Following the defeat of the regime, they returned to the northern Sahara in Mali and Niger. Well armed and ready to fight, they have restarted a rebellion in Mali that had been quelled as recently as 2009. Attacks have been made on several cities, including Timbuctou, and there has been fighting between Tuaregs and the Malian army. 20,000 people have already been displaced in this sparsely populated region. This instability and the risk of internal conflict is also feared in Tunisia and other countries including Niger, Chad and Sudan.

In October the UN called on Libyan authorities to halt the flow of weapons out of the country and control the weapons within their borders. This highlights another problem the NATO operation left behind it. Libya has no national government. The National Transitional Council, with its power base in Benghazi, controls little of the country and few of the diverse militias that remain. Some 300 militias are still armed and ready to fight. There are regular attacks on towns, most recently Bani Walid was taken over by Gaddhafi loyalists and militiamen from Misrata attacked a refugee camp killing men, women and children thought to have supported the old regime. In short, the country is unstable and there is a great risk of further violence and potentially of civil war. Many scores remain to be settled and it cannot be ruled out that the country will be divided.

If Ambassador Daalder and SACEUR Stavridis had published a truly honest assessment of the NATO mission they would have mentioned these facts. Any analysis of the effectiveness of this or any other humanitarian intervention has to include the problems caused or exacerbated by the intervention, and not just look at what might have gone right. In claiming to have saved thousands of lives, the authors must accept that their actions have led to deaths in Libya, Mali and Sudan. They should also accept that they have, however unwittingly, exacerbated the risks of terrorism across the region.

Most serious, however, is the damage done to the emerging R2P international law norm. Humanitarian law is a fragile thing, and the protections offered to civilians in conflict zones are weak. All Security Council members, and all NATO members, have a duty to ensure that they are even handed in actions intended to prevent harm to civilians, and that unlike in Unified Protector, heir operations are not simply a cover for other political goals.

'The Cable Reporting from Munich Security Conference

Foreign Policy blog The Cable has made some good posts at the Munich Security Conference. Notably, this quote from Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski:

The question posed to Sikorski and the other panelists at the Friday evening discussion was whether Germany could play a role in Europe today similar to the role the United States played in Europe after World War II. Sikorski said that Germany doesn't have the attributes of a hegemon, such as an overwhelming economy, a large military budget, and an international role commensurate of a preeminent regional power."So you will not be a benign hegemon in Europe and you shouldn't even try," Sikorski told his largely German audience. He even referred to lingering concerns about German power left over from the WWII period."Why is Russia always a bigger security challenge than Germany for Poland? When Germany gets too big for its boots, we always automatically add allies," Sikorski said. "So don't get too dizzy with success."Ouch."Germany cannot be said to be said to be similar to the United States [in the post WWII period]," Sikorski said. "The position of benign hegemon for Germany is not attainable, and therefore I would propose your actual position in the EU, which is a very honorable one, is the position of the largest shareholder."

Did Poland join NATO to counter Germany as much as Russia? Was it a reaction as much to World War Two as the Cold War? There is an element of that under the surface.

Of course, Poland doesn't have a stable history of independence. It is unlucky to be situated with no strategic or obvious natural borders, and between two large neighbours, so these fears are deeply ingrained in the national psyche. But it is unusual to take a slap at a neighbour and ally in public like this - especially at a time when the Germans have done nothing to deserve it!

 

Afghan Cost Cutting Could Bring Security Problems

Reuters has published an excellent piece on the cost concerns pushing NATO to look at smaller Afghan National Security Forces of around 230,000, instead of 350,000 as currently planned. The article reports the cost story that NATO Monitor mentioned yesterday, and has one interesting quote:

Diplomats and NATO officials said there were concerns about the dangers of building up such a large force and then cutting it back."The problem is: what are they going do?" said one diplomat. "You don't want large numbers of armed unemployed."

This is absolutely the heart of the matter. If you train up and equip 350,000 troops, or less, and then retain only 230,000 then you have thousands of trained and armed men who will turn to some form of insurgency. It would make no sense whatsoever, and yet it seems to be an option that NATO is considering for reasons of political expediency at home.


Between the possibility of ending the NATO combat role early, and the apparent problems of sustaining funding for the ANSF afterwards, there is a serious risk that the West, with its war weary publics is in danger of simply abandoning the country to its fate. It doesn't help that there has been no convincing rationale for being in Afghanistan since the Taliban were toppled and Al Qaeda destroyed in the country after 9/11, and no politician has been able to make  an argument that sounded in any way convincing to voters.


But this does raise the question, what have the years of fighting and loss of life been for? What strategic goal has been served?

A Pakistani View on the 'State of the Taliban'

General Talat Masood rejects the main thrust of the NATO State of the Taliban report. It is clear that relations between NATO and PAkistan have been further poisoned by this episode, which is serious for NATO as it needs the Pakistani supply lines to maintain ISAF sustainably.

NATO Looking for Help to Fund Afghan Security Forces

One topic that was raised at the Defence Ministers gathering this week was future funding of the Afghan National Security Forces beyond 2014. This is absolutely vital as the Afghan government is in no position to pay the estimated $6 billion per year necessary to equip, train and deploy their police and army units.


By 2014 it is planned to have 350,000 ANSF personnel in place, although some think this is too many. For example, French Defence Minister Gerard Longuet told journalists that "A reasonable number would be 230,000." In contrast, the Taliban are thought to number in the region of 20,000 fighters, although that number could certainly increase quickly.


NATO Secretary General told the press that NATO was appealing to the entire international community to help secure the future of Afghanistan by contributing to the bill, and when pressed if he meant China and Russia, as well as others, replied:

“It’s a call on the whole of the international community to contribute to financing the Afghan security forces because I think it is also in the interest of countries in the region to see a stable and secure Afghanistan.”

This is certainly something NATO needs to get right, and in comparison with the bills that they are paying to keep combat forces in country, $6 billion per year spread between all NATO members is very little. NATO Monitor is having trouble figuring out why China and Russia would find it in their strategic interest to help NATO out with this, especially Russia since NATO is so unresponsive to their concerns on BMD and CFE.


(Read more here and here, and watch the press conference here.)

Pakistani View on NATO Supply Problem

The Pakistan Observer has an interesting analysis from a Pakistani point of view on NATO's supply line problems. It concludes:

Stocked-up supplies and reliance on the NDN thus far enables the US and NATO to sustain the war that for many looks no longer winnable although the United States has had to pay six times as much to import supplies via alternative routes. The writing on the wall is that the US will have to mend fences with Pakistan.